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I.  Introduction and Summary 
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) appreciates the opportunity to 
offer these comments on the Draft 2011 Integrated Energy Policy Report (IEPR). NRDC 
is a nonprofit membership organization with a long-standing interest in minimizing the 
societal costs of the reliable energy services that Californians demand. We represent our 
nearly 100,000 California members’ interests in receiving affordable energy services and 
reducing the environmental impact of California’s energy consumption.  
NRDC appreciates the ongoing effort of the California Energy Commission 
(Energy Commission or CEC) staff to address the numerous energy issues facing 
California and applauds the overall focus of the Draft IEPR on increasing energy 
efficiency and meeting renewable energy targets. We provide comments on a select 
number of chapters and recommend that the Commission adopt the 2011 IEPR with the 
following additional suggestions.  
II. Chapter 1: Renewable Electricity Status and Issues 
1.  NRDC recommends that Staff include a discussion of the offshore renewable 
energy work of the Marine Renewable Energy Working Group and highlight the 
need for improved policy commitment to clearing development hurdles.  
The Draft 2011 IEPR notes that the technical potential of wave and tidal power is 
32,763 MW and that of offshore wind is 75,400 MW (more than double the technical 
potential of onshore wind).
1  However, the Draft IEPR fails to mention important policy 
initiatives that will help California realize the potential of offshore renewable energy 
sources, while protecting and conserving ocean resources for broad public benefit.
2  
NRDC suggests adding the following language to the list of efforts to improve permitting 
for utility-scale and DG renewable projects, on page 35, to describe the California’s 
Ocean Protection Council’s Marine Renewable Energy working group.  This working 
group was created in March 2010 to address the information needs of state agencies to 
evaluate wave energy proposals, address uncertainty in regulatory processes for test 
                                                 
1 California Energy Commission, 2011. Draft 2011 Integrated Energy Policy Report. Publication Number: 
CEC-100-2011-001-LCD (Draft 2011 IEPR), p.33 
2 Id.    5 
projects, and to facilitate the development of agreements and joint state-federal 
committees to improve coordination of state and federal permitting processes.
3   
We provide the following suggested language for incorporation
4: 
  The Ocean Protection Council recently passed a resolution recommending that 
“ the Energy Commission should adopt an ocean renewable energy policy that 
guides the state’s goals for the development of these renewable energy 
technologies while balancing this development with the protection and 
conservation of ocean resources for broad public benefit” and to “consider 
adopting an ocean renewable energy policy for inclusion in the 2012 IEPR 
update”
5  
In addition to incorporating this language into the final 2011 IEPR, we also strongly urge 
the CEC to include implementation of this resolution as part of the forthcoming 2012 
IEPR scope and update. 
III. Chapter 2: Achieving Cost‐Effective Energy Efficiency for California: Assembly 
Bill 2021 Progress Report 
1.  NRDC urges the CEC to prioritize the recommendations that ensure the public 
utilities truly integrate energy efficiency into procurement planning, and that 
evaluations are sufficiently robust to support using energy efficiency as a 
resource as well as to improve future program planning.    
NRDC appreciates the hard work conducted by CEC staff and stakeholders, such 
as the Northern California Power Authority (NCPA), towards enabling the publicly 
owned utilities (POUs) to achieve all cost-effective energy efficiency. We also recognize 
the resource limitations faced by the utilities of all sizes and the challenges that additional 
requirements bring. However, efficiency is by far the most cost-effective source of 
energy (even after accounting for the additional requirements) that the utilities can use to 
provide electric services to their customers and reduce utility bills. The CEC has been 
and should continue to work on strategies that address the various constraints of the 
different sized utilities as one size does not fit all. The variety of the POUs requires 
additional consideration, but is not inherently a barrier to the CEC moving forward with 
their recommendations. 
                                                 
3 http://www.opc.ca.gov/2010/05/offshore-wave-energy-development/  
4 Throughout these comments, recommended new language is presented as underline and recommended 
language to be omitted is indicated by ”strikethrough” 
5http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/pdf/agenda_items/20111216/7._OceanRenewables/2011.12.16_Oce
anRenewables_Memo.pdf  6 
NRDC supports the recommendations in the Draft 2011 IEPR and will continue to 
be involved in designing improvements to add value to the efficiency work of the 
utilities. We urge the CEC that when implementing the recommendations of the IEPR, to 
prioritize the integration of efficiency into resource planning and to ensure evaluation is 
sufficient to provide critical information to resource and program planners. 
Integrating efficiency into resource planning 
While we appreciate the constraints on many of the utilities to provide additional 
data to the Energy Commission, the CEC and stakeholders cannot assess or support 
utility efforts to improve efficiency integration into resource planning unless there is 
sufficient information to understand the particular circumstances of individual utilities. 
This information is not only important to ensure all utilities are complying with state law, 
but it is also critical to support the POUs efficiency efforts to expand efficiency and save 
customers money. For many utilities, it seems that efficiency is essentially treated as an 
‘add-on’ subject to budget cuts in hard economic times. Instead, if efficiency were treated 
as a resource, the supply of energy efficiency (costing POUs about 2 cents/kWh)
6 would 
not be the first resource to be cut when the benchmark for conventional generation is 
around 9 cents/kWh.
7 If efficiency were truly included in the mix of supply side resource 
options considered when resource planners determine how they will meet the electricity 
needs of their customers, program planners would likely have larger and more consistent 
budgets, yielding greater bill savings for their customers and environmental benefits for 
California.     
In addition, given the resource constraints on both the CEC and the utilities, we 
suggest that if the CEC has not already done so, they should provide a template for their 
requested information to ensure that the data collected are consistent across utilities. 
Also, the CEC could hold a workshop or an informal roundtable on the mechanics of how 
to integrate efficiency into resource planning, including how to design strategies to 
overcome common barriers. The CEC could also work more closely with a few utilities 
during the resource planning process to ensure that efficiency is fully integrated. 
                                                 
6 CMUA, NCPA, SCPPA, Energy Efficiency in California’s Public Power Sector, A Status Report (March 
2011). Available at: http://www.ncpa.com/energy-efficiency-reports-7.html. 
7 CPUC, Energy Division, Resolution E-4298, Table 1: Adopted 2009 Market Price Referents (December 
17, 2009). Available at: http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_RESOLUTION/111386.pdf.  7 
We therefore urge the CEC to prioritize their recommendation to obtain 
comprehensive information on resource planning and suggest the following supplemental 
language on p.55:  
Staff requests that publicly owned utilities provide information by March 
2012…While some publicly owned utilities have performed recent 
integrated resource assessments, they usually treat efficiency as a load 
adjustment, not an equally comparable supply resource.  CEC staff should 
work with the utilities and stakeholders to identify the key barriers to 
integrating efficiency into resource planning and develop strategies for 
overcoming such barriers.  
Evaluation, Measurement, and Verification 
Equally as important and critical to ensuring that efficiency can be relied upon as 
a resource is the continuation of the CEC’s efforts to ensure robust independent 
evaluation. The CEC has conducted a number of workshops over the past year intended 
to aid the POUs in conducting sufficient evaluation, including how best to aggregate 
studies when possible as well as explored methodologies for rotating evaluations of 
programs when possible. The CEC should continue to prioritize this effort along with 
integration of efficiency into procurement to ensure that there is a strong understanding 
of and ability to rely on effective efficiency programs as a resource. We strongly support 
the recommendation in the Draft 2011 IEPR that the CEC will continue to engage with 
the POUs on this matter. 
2.  NRDC recommends that the CEC begin working on improvements to the target 
setting process as soon as possible to ensure the next round of targets are derived 
from sound potential studies. 
We strongly support the CEC’s request for more documentation of the potential 
estimates and energy efficiency targets adopted in order to increase the transparency of 
those processes.
8 Without understanding how models were modified, it is difficult to 
understand what the true potential is for efficiency, what the challenges are for the 
utilities, and how to address barriers to enable greater efficiency savings. While 
documentation is an important first step to understanding the methodology and process of 
the past target setting process, we urge the CEC to focus immediately on improvements 
                                                 
8 Draft 2011 IEPR at 56.  8 
for the next update to allow enough time for collaboration in determining how best to 
move forward and to address particular concerns.  
We provide the following language for incorporation: 
The CEC should convene the utilities and interested stakeholders at least 
18 months prior to the start of the next target setting process to build on 
the improvements to the recent potential model, identify key items that 
require additional guidance, develop a template of key information 
required to assess the potential model, and address other needs to ensure a 
sufficiently robust target setting process. 
 
3.  NRDC recommends the CEC confer with the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) to ensure the 2009 investor owned utility (IOU) data in the 
final 2011 IEPR is consistent with CPUC reports. 
We highlight that the 2009 IOU data presented in Table 5 is slightly different than 
Energy Division’s (ED) 2009 Evaluation Report.
9 According to ED’s 2009 report, total 
IOU expenditures were $786M,
10 energy savings were 3,315 GWh, demand savings were 
542 MW, and natural gas savings were 28 MMTherm.
11 We recommend reaching out to 
the CPUC to ensure that data sources are commensurate. 
IV.  Chapter 3: Achieving Energy Savings in California Buildings 
1.  NRDC recommends that the CEC modify its cost-effectiveness criteria to compare 
energy efficiency with the cost of avoided on-site renewable energy instead of the 
current generation mix.  
The Draft IEPR report states that “the goal is to minimize energy use as much as 
technologically possible through cost-effective efficiency measures, and then generate the 
balance of the building’s energy needs with onsite renewable electricity generation such 
as solar photovoltaic systems or wind-driven electricity generators.”
12  We support this 
approach, but note that the current path we are on would likely result in underachieving 
efficiency thereby requiring energy needs to be met through higher cost renewable 
energy. 
                                                 
9 Id. at 53.  
10 CPUC Energy Division, Energy Efficiency Evaluation Report for the 2009 Bridge Funding Period, 
Executive Summary, p.3 (January 2011).  Available at: 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/D66CCF63-5786-49C7-B250-
00675D91953C/0/EEEvaluationReportforthe2009BFPeriod.pdf. 
11 Id. at 4. 
12 Draft 2011 IEPR at 60.  9 
One way to truly value efficiency as the first procurement resource - and to ensure 
that we capture as much efficiency as possible - is to modify the cost-effectiveness to 
more accurately account for the avoided cost associated with energy efficiency. For 
example, Title 20 cost-effectiveness is currently considered relative to a flat rate of 
$0.14/kWh which corresponds to the current average retail rate of electricity in 
California. This rules out efficiency measures that may not be considered cost-effective 
currently, but may be considerably cheaper than the on-site renewable energy that would 
be needed to fulfill the Zero Net Energy (ZNE) mandate. In the context of ZNE, cost-
effectiveness should be defined as “cheaper than onsite renewable electricity” instead of 
“cheaper than the grid.” This would encourage the acceleration of energy efficiency 
measures so that ZNE buildings can be designed and built in the most cost-effective 
manner.  
The figure below illustrates the sweet spot for cost effectiveness as the intersection 
of the energy efficiency and on-site renewable energy cost curves: 
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  We recommend the following supplemental language to the first recommendation 
on p.67: 
The Energy Commission and the CPUC should work jointly on 
developing a definition of ZNE that incorporates the societal value of 
energy (consistent with the time dependent energy valuation approach 
used for California’s Building Energy Efficiency Standards) and includes 
a modified cost-effectiveness methodology to use on-site renewable 
energy as the appropriate value for avoided cost.  
 
2.  NRDC recommends that the CEC define specific goals for energy savings in each 
building energy load category, including plug loads, appliances, HVAC, lighting 
and water heating such that California achieves its Zero Net Energy goals in the 
most cost-effective manner. 
NRDC recommends that the Energy Commission, in consultation with the CPUC 
and interested stakeholders, determine its best-estimate for the most cost-effective 
combination of on-site renewable energy and energy efficiency, and use those estimates 
to set clear policy targets for each resource. Without quantified goals, we could end up 
with best-effort incremental efficiency improvements that yield sub-optimal energy 
reductions, leaving high and costly requirements for on-site renewable energy generation. 
This would at best create undue cost burden for California’s energy bill payers, and at 
worst jeopardize the achievement of ZNE objectives. For example (numbers for 
illustration purposes only), best-effort goals might yield 30% energy reduction, and 
require 70% renewable energy generation, when the most cost-effective combination 
might be a 70/30 ratio instead. Quantified goals are essential to drive the execution of the 
right level of policies in each area.  
In order to determine the optimal mix of energy reductions and on-site energy 
generation, it is necessary to determine the projected cost curves of efficiency in each 
area as well as that of renewable energy by 2020 and 2030, and to pick the combination 
that yields the lowest overall cost per kWh. We urge the CEC to include a specific 
recommendation in the final IEPR. We provide the following language for consideration:  
In consultation with the CPUC, other key agencies, and stakeholders, the 
CEC should establish specific goals for energy savings in each building 
energy load category, including plug loads, appliances, HVAC, lighting 
and water heating such that California achieves its Zero Net Energy goals 
in the most cost-effective manner. 11 
3.  NRDC recommends that the IEPR recognize the need for a strong acceleration of 
plug loads appliance standards development in order to achieve ZNE goals, and 
that Staff evaluates resource needs to enable that acceleration. 
The draft report points to completed standards for televisions, external power 
supplies, DVD players and compact audio devices. It also mentions the current 
rulemaking on battery chargers as well as a new scoping order for new standards and 
upgrading levels of existing standards. NRDC commends the Energy Commission for its 
leadership on appliance efficiency standards; however, we also recognize that the current 
pace of plug load efficiency standard development is not on track to enable ZNE in a 
cost-effective manner.  
EIA projects that plug load energy use will almost double by 2030, while other 
traditional building loads are projected to remain approximately stable. As buildings 
become more energy efficient, plug loads are projected to increase from 28% of home 
energy use today to 57% per the figure below: 
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The current trajectory for plug load efficiency does not support achieving ZNE at a 
reasonable cost. NRDC recommends that the Energy Commission evaluate the pace of 
appliance energy efficiency necessary to enable ZNE cost-effectively. Staff can then 
define a plan for accelerating plug load energy efficiency measures, including resources 
and other needs required for successful implementation. We offer the following language 
for inclusion: 
The CEC should evaluate the pace of appliance efficiency, determine 
whether it is sufficient to enable meeting the state’s ZNE goals, and if 
needed define a plan for accelerating plug load efficiency measures, 
including resources and other needs for successful implementation. 
V.  Chapter 6: Energy Commission Natural Gas Assessment 
1.  NRDC recommends that Staff consider the environmental concerns associated 
with natural gas production and the risks of expansion of production prior to the 
development of stronger health and safety regulations.  
While the precise role of natural gas in California’s energy portfolio remains to be 
seen, it is important to note the environmental and public health issues associated with 
natural gas production. NRDC recommends that Staff insert the following proposed 
language at the top of page 90 of the IEPR, between the paragraphs beginning with 
“Technology development dominates…” and “The Constrained Shale Gas Case is a…” 
in order to recognize natural gas production concerns and reduce avoidable health and 
safety threats: 
Production of natural gas comes with substantial environmental impacts including 
toxic air pollution and drinking water contamination.
13 The oil and gas production 
industry currently enjoys loopholes from important federal environmental 
measures that allow the industry to pollute more than other industries.
14 
Regulations are not strong enough at the state or federal level to sufficiently 
protect the environment and public health, and enforcement is too weak. New 
rules, and the resources for proper enforcement, are essential to reduce risk and 
help protect public health while we transition to cleaner energy sources that will 
power our nation into the future. 
                                                 
13 NRDC, Drilling Down: Protecting Western Communities from the Health and Environmental Effects of 
Oil and Gas Production, 2007. 
14 Ibid. 13 
VI. Chapter 7: Electricity and Natural Gas Demand Forecast  
1.  NRDC strongly urges the CEC to include expected energy efficiency in its 
projections of energy consumption.  
NRDC recommends that the CEC include expected energy efficiency in its 
projections of energy consumption as excluding such information produces an inaccurate 
energy demand forecast.  Over the last several years, CEC staff and stakeholders have 
done significant work to determine projected energy efficiency in the demand forecast.  
However, this work is not reflected in projections of energy consumption and demand.
15  
Currently, the Draft 2011 IEPR’s projections of future energy consumption excludes all 
savings from efficiency programs coming online in 2013-2022—nearly the entirety of the 
forecast period.
16  While these savings might not be considered “committed” by CEC 
definition, energy efficiency will continue to provide savings, as it has for the past 35 
years, and will continue to be California’s top priority resource.  Additionally, the CPUC 
includes projected energy efficiency in its projections of energy consumption.
17  In order 
to maintain consistency across state agencies and with state policy, the CEC should 
include the projected efficiency savings (what it deems “uncommitted”) in its projections 
of energy consumption. 
Excluding the savings from projected efficiency programs and policies not only 
counteracts state policy, but it creates an inaccurate forecast as the savings from 
efficiency are reasonably likely to occur (as seen through the inclusion of efficiency in 
the IOU procurement plans), which is the criterion for determining what should be 
included in the forecast.  Excluding future efficiency savings causes the forecasted 
growth to be off by 48%.  That is, energy growth from 2012-2022 is expected to be 
about half of what is presented in the statewide electricity consumption forecast, after 
accounting for future energy efficiency.
18  
                                                 
15 Draft 2011 IEPR, Table 8, Figures 7, 8, pp. 102-104.  
16 “[T]he Energy Commission does not yet consider this set of delivery mechanisms to be committed, so 
their estimated impacts are not included in the forecasts presented in previous chapters.” Preliminary 
Forecast, p. 182.   
17 CPUC, Long Term Procurement Plan Proceeding, Revised Scoping Memo Assumptions, R.10-05-006, 
Populated Load & Resource Tables for System, (2011).  Available at: 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Procurement/LTPP/LTPP2010/2010+LTPP+Tools+and+Spreadshe
ets.htm. 
18 Energy growth from 2012-2022 in the Mid Case is 37,260 GWh. Preliminary Forecast, Form 1.1, Mid 
Statewide Demand Preliminary Forecast. Available at: 14 
Figure 1: CEC Projected Energy Demand Growth With and Without Energy Efficiency
19 
 
 
While there might be settings in which energy consumption without energy 
efficiency is needed,
20 the context of the IEPR is one in which including energy 
efficiency is essential.  The IEPR is intended to give an overview of the state of energy in 
California, which includes projected energy consumption.  There are a myriad of factors 
that lead to increased and decreased energy consumption.  To systematically exclude 
energy efficiency, which decreases energy consumption, creates an inaccurate projection 
of future energy consumption. In order to improve the accuracy of the demand forecast 
and treat efficiency as a resource, the CEC should incorporate projected efficiency into 
the general forecasts of electricity consumption. 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011_energypolicy/documents/2011-08-30_workshop/mid-
case/01_Mid_Statewide_Demand_Preliminary_Forecast_Forms.xls.   Incremental uncommitted 
efficiency is expected to reduce that by 17,828 GWh in the Mid Case.  Preliminary Forecast, Table A-8, 
Energy Efficiency/Conservation Consumption Savings (GWh), Residential and Non-residential Mid 
Demand Scenario. Available at: http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011_energypolicy/documents/2011-08-
30_workshop/mid-
case/10_Mid_Electricity_Efficiency_Conservation_Savings_by_Planning_Area_and_Sector.xls. Energy 
growth would be 48% lower (17,828/37,260) if incremental uncommitted efficiency were included. 
19 Id.; See Nick Fugate, IEPR Committee Workshop Presentation, “Efficiency/Conservation,” Slide 13 
(August 30, 2011). Available at: http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011_energypolicy/documents/2011-08-
30_workshop/presentations/02_Nick_Fugate_Efficiency_Conservation_Self-Generation.pdf. 
20 See NRDC, Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) on the 2012-2022 Preliminary 
Staff Electricity and Natural Gas Demand Forecast, (September 15, 2011) (showing the numerous 
reasons why excluding energy efficiency from the overall graph of projected consumption is incorrect). 
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2.  NRDC urges the CEC to refrain from distorting the historical record of 
evaluation measurement and verification (EM&V) at the CPUC and to strike the 
inaccurate language.  
There is a clear and consistent record of CPUC-adopted efficiency program 
achievements since 1993,
21 supported by the largest set of evaluation studies up to that 
time. These study results were reviewed twice in CEC-sponsored summary studies and 
found to be generally unbiased and accurate. In contrast, just last year the CPUC 
explicitly rejected Energy Division’s 2006-08 study results, citing the “substantial 
controversy surrounding their accuracy, and their magnitude.”
22  The CPUC has a long 
history of protocols for reporting and evaluating savings, as well as requirements for ex-
ante assumptions used in reporting.  Additionally, the California Measurement Advisory 
Council (CALMAC), established to assess savings, has provided over 800 research 
studies of savings that date back to 1990.
23  Savings estimates at the CPUC were adopted 
following formal public proceedings and it is inappropriate for the CEC to retroactively 
second-guess that process, especially with no newer, nor better, evaluations of those 
historical savings. 
For these reasons, NRDC recommends that the CEC strike the following 
statement: 
  “Because a clear, consistent record of evaluated efficiency program 
achievements is not readily available, at least not prior to the 2006‐2008 
CPUC energy efficiency program cycle, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
around any estimate of historical program impacts. This uncertainty, along 
with uncertainty around attribution of savings among standards, programs, 
and price effects, has been the subject of debate in recent Demand Analysis 
Working Group meetings. Some parties have insisted that Energy 
Commission demand forecasts incorporate historical program impacts that are 
vastly underestimated and/or credit too much savings to standards and price 
                                                 
21 “[In 1993] by Decision (D.) 93-05-063, the Commission established the AEAP as the forum for 
evaluating earnings claims for utility energy efficiency (EE) and low income energy efficiency (LIEE) 
programs.  The Commission also designated the AEAP as the proceeding for the utilities to submit 
annual reports on EE and LIEE accomplishments, and measurement and evaluation activities.” CPUC, 
Opinion Addressing 2005 and 2006 Annual Earnings Assessment Proceedings, D-06-09-038, at 1 
(September 21, 2006). Available at: http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/60064.pdf. 
22  The Commission chose not to rely on the Energy Division’s recommended savings numbers in D. 10-12-
049 citing the “substantial controversy surrounding their accuracy, and their magnitude,” and the CPUC 
has not yet resolved those disputes.  CPUC, Decision Regarding The Risk/Reward Incentive Mechanism 
Earnings True-Up For 2006-2008, R.09-01-019, D.10-12-049, (December 16, 2010).  
23 “More than 800 MA&E research reports dating from 1990 can be found in our Searchable Database.” 
CALMAC, CALMAC website, (last visited May 11, 2011), available at: http://calmac.org/default.asp.  16 
effects, especially before 1998. A recent staff paper summarizes the positions 
of various parties."
24 
 
In lieu, NRDC recommends that the CEC adopt the following statement: 
  Uncertainty around attribution of savings among standards, programs, and 
price effects, has been the subject of debate in recent Demand Analysis 
Working Group meetings.  Parties have disagreed regarding historical 
program impacts and price effects. A recent staff paper summarizes the 
positions of various parties. 
VII.   Chapter 8: California’s Electricity Infrastructure  
1.  NRDC suggests that Staff improve the description of California’s once-through 
cooling (OTC) policy, as well as its correlated impacts.  
The section titled “OTC Mitigation” starting on page 113 should be re-titled 
“Implementation of Clean Water Act” or “Phase out of Once Through Cooling.” 
Mitigation alone is a legally insufficient measure and is not allowed under the State 
Water Board’s OTC policy. Furthermore, the description of the policy also uses the term 
“mitigation” inaccurately and does not clearly track the requirements of the policy or the 
interaction with the advisory role of the energy agencies. We recommend improving the 
description to make clear the limited circumstances, chiefly feasibility and grid 
reliability, under which either delay or track two compliance are contemplated.
25   
The description of once through cooling impacts contained in the last paragraph on 
page 113 is inadequate.  Instead, we suggest using the description contained in the 
California Energy Commission Staff Report, Issues and Environmental Impacts 
Associated with Once-Through Cooling at California’s Coastal Power Plants:  
“California’s coastal power plants are partly responsible for ocean degradation. 
Recent studies required by the California Energy Commission and other State 
agencies have shown that coastal power plants that use seawater for once-through 
cooling are contributing to declining fisheries and the degradation of estuaries, 
bay and coastal waters. These power plants indiscriminately ‘fish’ the water in 
these habitats by killing the eggs, larvae, and adults when water drawn from the 
natural environment flows through the plant (entrainment impacts) and by killing 
large adult fish and invertebrates that are trapped on intake screens (impingement 
impacts). These facilities also affect the coastal environment by discharging 
                                                 
24 Draft 2011 IEPR at 110.  
25 Furthermore, the discussion of air SCAQMD pollution offsets on page 113 is misleading and does not 
reflect the failure of the offset regime to bring about legally required improvements in air quality. 17 
heated water back into natural environments. Most impacts are to early life stages 
of fish and shellfish.”
26 
2.  NRDC strongly urges the CEC to require thorough mitigation efforts to protect 
marine life while conducting seismic surveys of the Diablo Canyon area. 
In the wake of the disastrous tsunami in northern Honshu, Japan, and the 
emergency at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station earlier this year, NRDC 
supported the recommendation of the California Energy Commission to conduct a 
seismic imaging study of the Diablo Canyon area.
27  We believe that such a study could 
be essential to reassessing the earthquake risk at the reactor site. At the same time, we 
recognize that high-intensity offshore seismic surveys can have significant impacts on 
marine mammals, fish, and other marine biota and therefore require thorough mitigation, 
at both the planning and operational stages, to minimize harm to the environment. Such 
mitigation will also be necessary to satisfy the permit requirements of the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5).  For more detail on NRDC’s proposed 
mitigation measures, see NRDC’s written scoping comments submitted to the California 
State Lands Commission on July 29, 2011, describing necessary mitigation measures in 
the proposed Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) for the Central Coastal California 
Seismic Imaging Project (“CCCSIP”). 
VIII. Chapter 11: Bringing Energy Innovation to California Through the Public 
Interest Energy Research Program 
1.  NRDC strongly supports Staff’s recommendations and agrees that PIER is 
essential to meeting California’s goals as a state and must continue. 
NRDC agrees with the CEC’s analysis of the PIER program and strongly supports 
its continuation. The PIER program is necessary for California to continue on its path to a 
clean energy economy and the NRDC recommends that the state continue to fund and 
support this program.  
                                                 
26 California Energy Commission Staff Report, Issues and Environmental Impacts Associated with Once-
Through Cooling at California’s Coastal Power Plants, June 2005, CEC-700-2005-013, available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-700-2005-013/CEC-700-2005-013.PDF 
27 Statement of Thomas B. Cochran, Ph.D., NRDC, on the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and Its Implications 
for U.S. Nuclear Power Reactors, Joint Senate Hearings of the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear 
Safety and the Committee on Environment and Public Works, at 10 (Apr. 12, 2011). 18 
IX. Chapter 13: Nuclear Issues and Status Report on Assembly Bill 1632 Report 
Recommendations 
1.  NRDC recommends that Staff reword the section entitled “Spent Fuel Pool 
Safety” to better indicate the uncertainty that spent fuel pools largely contributed 
to the contamination at Fukushima. 
Energy Commission Staff writes, “International researchers… found that the Unit 
4 spent fuel pool… played a significant part in the widespread release of radioactive 
materials to the environment,” citing a Scientific American article, which in turn cites a 
Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics study.
28 This study has a fair amount of modeling 
that raises a number of questions about the overall scale of the contamination; however, 
the data and reasoning are stretching in making any kind of definitive conclusion about 
the accident events based on their study. The researchers cannot explicitly link the 
observed and modeled data, which is the bulk of their report, to spent fuel pools. Their 
evidence is based on other observations relating to the timing of radiation levels and 
spraying the pools. It is possible that this reduction in levels was due to other actions at 
the site and so this conclusion is fairly speculative considering the rest of the report. 
Additionally, the level of uncertainty in these results makes it difficult to attribute the 
differences in cesium levels to the spent fuel pool, especially considering other reports 
that state that the pools were relatively unharmed. The INPO report included as 
Attachment A states: 
“Subsequent analyses and inspections determined that the spent fuel pool water 
levels never dropped below the top of fuel in any spent fuel pool and that no 
significant fuel damage had occurred. Current investigation results indicate that 
any potential fuel damage may have been caused by debris from the reactor 
building explosions.”
29 
 
NRDC recommends that Staff reword this section of Chapter 13 to reflect a 
healthy amount of skepticism on the spent fuel pool issue. As it is currently worded, Staff 
seems to suggest that the widespread conclusion is that the pools contributed in large part 
to the contamination; in fact, the majority of the evidence points to the contrary. The 
                                                 
28 Stohl et al., Xenon-133 and caesium-137 releases into the atmosphere from the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
nuclear power plant: determination of the source term, atmospheric dispersion, and deposition. Atmos. 
Chem. Phys. Discuss., 11, 28319–28394, 2011. www.atmos-chem-phys-discuss.net/11/28319/2011/ 
(doi:10.5194/acpd-11-28319-2011) 
29 INPO Special Report 11-005 (November 2011). Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. p.12.  
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Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics study should be referenced in the context that it 
presents more questions about the accident. Citing the attached INPO report will help to 
present a more holistic set of perspectives on the issue.  
X.   Conclusion 
NRDC appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Draft 2011 IEPR and 
recommends that the Commission adopt the 2011 IEPR with the inclusion of the 
aforementioned recommendations.  
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1.0  Introduction  
  
This report provides a narrative overview and timeline for the earthquake, tsunami, and 
subsequent nuclear accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 11, 2011.  The purpose of this report is to 
provide an accurate, consolidated source of information regarding the sequence of events 
that occurred in the first days of the accident.  The information contained in this report 
may be used for determining future U.S. and international industry corrective actions.   
 
Although INPO describes certain events and actions taken, those descriptions are not 
intended to reflect any analysis or assessment of the decisions made by any individual or 
entity.  This report does not assess or analyze the effectiveness of plant workers or others 
involved in response to the event. 
 
This report reflects the best available information, most of which was obtained from 
direct and ongoing interaction with TEPCO.  It focuses on the first days of the event for 
units 1, 2, and 3 and includes some information on units 4, 5, and 6 as well as the spent 
fuel pools.  Because of the extensive damage at the site, some details of the event remain 
unknown or have not been confirmed.  All times are provided as Japan Standard Time 
(JST).   
 
This report includes the following sections: 
 
Executive Summary – high-level description of event milestones 
Overview of Event – short description of key event factors 
Event Progression – unit-specific narrative of event progression  
Radiological Effects – radiological information, including radiological releases 
Additional Information – station design information, drawings, and supporting data 
 
This report was created from information provided by TEPCO, the Japanese government, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and several Japanese nuclear and safety 
organizations.  Some of the data included logs from the TEPCO Emergency Response 
Center, unit-specific parameter values and chart recorder indications, and personal 
accounts of the accident and plant conditions.  In some cases, specific questions were 
addressed through INPO employees working in the INPO Emergency Response Center in 
Atlanta or in the TEPCO offices in Tokyo.  Specific sources used to gather information 
are provided in the reference section of this report.  
 
TEPCO personnel have reviewed the content of this report for accuracy, based on their 
current understanding of the event.  Furthermore, TEPCO assisted in developing the unit-
specific timelines, provided in Section 8.0, as well as the design basis information in 
sections 7.1 and 7.2. 
 
TEPCO openly shared information with INPO, responded to questions in a timely 
manner, and provided resources when available to support the generation of this report.  INPO 11-005 
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The utility is working to share the facts of this event with the industry and with the 
Japanese public.  Without TEPCO’s assistance, this report would not have been possible. 
 
This report is based on information available to INPO as of November 1, 2011.  INPO 
has verified as much information as possible, but it makes no warranties as to the 
accuracy or reliability of the information.  The information in this report has not been 
verified through independent or on-site observations.  The values provided, such as 
reactor parameters and seismic intensity, are preliminary and may be revised as more 
information becomes available.  The effects containment conditions may have had on 
these indications have not been validated.  Numerical values that include tenths of a unit 
are not intended to imply accuracy or precision, but rather are a result of the conversion 
from metric to U.S. units.  
 
This report has been designated as “open distribution” and is available to the general 
public.  The information contained herein was provided to INPO without the expectation 
of confidentiality, and the report does not contain INPO proprietary information.  INPO 
members and participants may reproduce this document for business use.  This report is 
copyrighted, and written permission is needed for organizations other than INPO 
members and participants to reproduce the information. 
 
Copies of this report have been provided to TEPCO, the World Association of Nuclear 
Operators (WANO), and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
 
1.1  Site Description 
 
Fukushima Daiichi was the first of three nuclear generating stations operated by TEPCO.  
The station is located on an 860-acre site in the Fukushima prefecture, approximately 160 
miles (260 km) from Tokyo, on the northeast coast of Japan.  It was one of the largest 
generating stations in the world, consisting of six boiling water reactors capable of 
generating 5,480 MWe total.   
 
The units are designed such that 
units 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 
share common facilities and 
structures, such as a shared control 
room and turbine building.  The 
station also has a shared spent fuel 
pool and dry cask storage facility.  
The shared spent fuel pool is 
located on the inland side (west) of 
Unit 4.  The dry cask storage 
facility is located between units 1 
and 5 along the coast.   
 
Refer to Section 7.0 for additional 
station and design-specific 
information on each unit. INPO 11-005 
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2.0  Executive Summary  
 
On March 11, 2011, at 1446 (JST), a severe earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter 
Scale occurred 112 miles (180 km) off the coast of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Station.  The earthquake was the largest Japan has ever experienced.  It caused all of the 
operating units (units 1, 2, and 3) to automatically scram on seismic reactor protection 
system trips.  The earthquake damaged breakers and distribution towers, causing a loss of 
all off-site electrical power sources to the site.  The emergency diesel generators 
automatically started and provided AC power to emergency systems.  Three minutes after 
the earthquake, the Japan Meteorological Association issued a major tsunami warning, 
indicating the potential for a tsunami at least 3 meters high.  Station workers were 
notified of the warning and evacuated to higher ground. 
 
Forty-one minutes after the earthquake, at 1527, the first of a series of seven tsunamis 
arrived at the site.  The maximum tsunami height impacting the site was estimated to be 
46 to 49 feet (14 to 15 meters).  This exceeded the design basis tsunami height of 18.7 
feet (5.7 meters) and was above the site grade levels of 32.8 feet (10 meters) at units 14.  
All AC power was lost to units 14 by 1541 when a tsunami overwhelmed the site and 
flooded some of the emergency diesel generators and switchgear rooms.  The seawater 
intake structure was severely damaged and was rendered nonfunctional.  All DC power 
was lost on units 1 and 2, while some DC power from batteries remained available on 
Unit 3.  Four of the five emergency diesel generators on units 5 and 6 were inoperable 
after the tsunami.  One air-cooled emergency diesel generator on Unit 6 continued to 
function and supplied electrical power to Unit 6, and later to Unit 5, to maintain cooling 
to the reactor and spent fuel pool.   
 
With no core cooling to remove decay heat, core damage may have begun on Unit 1 on 
the day of the event.  Steam-driven injection pumps were used to provide cooling water 
to the reactors on units 2 and 3, but these pumps eventually stopped working; and all 
cooling water to the reactors was lost until fire engines were used to restore water 
injection.  As a result of inadequate core cooling, fuel damage also occurred in units 2 
and 3.  Challenges in venting containments contributed to containment pressures 
exceeding design pressure, which may have caused containment damage and leakage. 
 
Hydrogen generated from the damaged fuel in the reactors accumulated in the reactor 
buildingseither during venting operations or from other leaksand ignited, producing 
explosions in the Unit 1 and Unit 3 reactor buildings and significantly complicating the 
response.  The hydrogen generated in Unit 3 may have migrated into the Unit 4 reactor 
building, resulting in a subsequent explosion and damage.  The loss of primary and 
secondary containment integrity resulted in ground-level releases of radioactive material.  
Following the explosion in Unit 4 and the abnormal indications on Unit 2 on the fourth 
day of the event, the site superintendent directed that all nonessential personnel 
temporarily evacuate, leaving approximately 70 people on site to manage the event. 
 
During releases, dose rates as high as 1,193 millirem per hour (mrem/hr) (11.93 mSv/hr) 
were measured at the site boundary, approximately 0.6 miles (1 km) from units 14.  The INPO 11-005 
4 
windows for the emergency response center had to be covered with lead shielding to 
reduce dose rates in the center.  Organized off-site radiation surveys began on March 16.  
Radiation levels off site at that time ranged from 0.1 mrem/hr (1 µSv/hr) to 20 mrem/hr 
(200 µSv/hr).  Thirty-seven miles (60 km) northwest of the station, the dose rate was 0.8 
mrem/hr (8 µSv/hr).  Water and soil samples indicated the presence of strontium, iodine, 
and cesium.  Food and water restrictions were implemented in some areas as a result of 
radioactivity.  People within the 12.4 miles (20 km) surrounding the station were 
evacuated, and those living up to 18.6 miles (30 km) away were directed to shelter inside 
their homes as the releases of radioactive gases and materials increased as the event 
progressed and more fuel damage occurred.  Potassium iodide tablets and powder were 
distributed to local governments beginning March 21.  Because the evacuations had 
already been completed, however, the potassium iodide was not issued to the population. 
 
Radiation surveys of the on-site areas surrounding units 13 showed dose rates as high as 
13 rem/hr (0.13 Sv/hr) in areas around units 2 and 3.  More detailed surveys performed 
over the following weeks discovered localized dose rates greater than 1,000 rem/hr (10 
Sv/hr) around equipment and debris outside units 1 and 3. 
 
Some personnel who responded to the event received high doses of radiation.  Two 
control room operators received the highest dosesa calculated internal and external 
dose of 67.8 rem (0.678 Sv) and 64.3 rem (0.643 Sv).  The majority of dose received by 
these workers was internal (85-87 percent).  Potassium iodide was provided to some 
station personnel on March 13.  As of the end of March, approximately 100 workers had 
received doses of greater than 10 rem (0.1 Sv).   
 
The Fukushima event was rated as a level 7 event on the International Nuclear and 
Radiological Event (INES) scale.  The Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan estimated 
approximately 17 million curies (6.3 E17 Bq) of iodine-131 equivalent radioactive 
material was released into the air and 0.127 million curies (4.7 E15 Bq) into the sea 
between March 11 and April 5.  The 1986 accident at Unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant was the only other nuclear accident to have a level 7 INES rating.  According 
to the IAEA, the Chernobyl accident resulted in approximately 378.4 million curies (14 
E18 Bq) of radioactive material being released into the environment.
1 
 
The combination of the earthquake and tsunami caused considerable damage to the 
Japanese coast.  According to the government of Japan’s report to the IAEA, almost 
500,000 residential buildings were damaged or destroyed.  There was considerable 
damage to roads, railways, and public and industrial utilities.  Approximately 4 million 
homes lost electricity.  The total area inundated by the tsunami was approximately 217 
square miles (561 square km).  As of October 7, 2011, the Japanese Red Cross reports 
that almost 16,000 people are confirmed dead, and almost 4,000 remain missing.  
Approximately 90 percent of the deaths were reported to be caused by drowning. 
                                                 
1 Chernobyl’s Legacy:  Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts.  The Chernobyl Forum 2003-2005 
Second Revision INPO 11-005 
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3.0  Overview of Event  
 
3.1  Status of Units Just Before the Earthquake 
   
Unit 1 was in operation at rated power output before the event, with all safety systems 
and both emergency diesel generators operable.  High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) 
and both isolation condensers were available and in standby.  Reactor water level and 
pressure were normal for power operations.  Unit 1 had been in operation since 
September 27, 2010. 
 
Unit 2 was in operation at rated power output before the event, with all safety systems 
and both emergency diesel generators operable.  High pressure coolant injection and 
reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) were available and in standby.  Reactor water level 
and pressure were normal for power operations.  Unit 2 had been in operation since 
September 23, 2010. 
 
Unit 3 was in operation at rated power output before the event, with all safety systems 
and both emergency diesel generators operable.  Both high pressure coolant injection and 
RCIC were available and in standby.  Reactor water level and pressure were normal for 
power operations.  The startup transformer was out of service for planned modification 
work.   Unit 3 had been in operation since November 18, 2010. 
 
Unit 4 was shut down and had been in an outage since November 30, 2010.  All the fuel 
was in the spent fuel pool to facilitate reactor pressure vessel shroud work.  The cavity 
gate was installed, isolating the spent fuel pool from the upper pools.  The 4A emergency 
diesel generator was out of service for planned maintenance, with the 4B emergency 
diesel generator operable and in standby. 
 
Unit 5 had been shut down and in an outage since January 3, 2011.  Fuel had been loaded 
into the reactor and the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) reassembled.  Reactor water level 
was high, reactor coolant system temperature was 192.2°F (89°C), and reactor pressure 
was 1,037 psig (7.15MPa gauge) to support RPV leak testing.  Decay heat removal was 
secured at 0744 in preparation for the leak testing.  Both emergency diesel generators 
were operable. 
 
Unit 6 had been shut down and in an outage since August 14, 2010.  Fuel had been 
loaded into the reactor and the RPV reassembled.  Reactor water level was normal, and 
reactor coolant system temperature was 78.8°F (26°C) with the reactor coolant system 
depressurized.  Residual heat removal (RHR) system B was being used as needed for 
decay heat removal.  All three emergency diesel generators were operable. 
 
3.2  Earthquake 
 
On March 11, 2011 at 1446, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred off the eastern coast of 
Japan.  The epicenter of the earthquake was 112 miles (180 km) from the Fukushima 
Daiichi site and the hypocenter was 15 miles (24 km) under the Pacific Ocean.  The INPO 11-005 
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Table 3.2-1  Observed and Design Basis Seismic Data 
 
A gal is a unit of acceleration (cm/sec2) expressing the strength of an earthquake's tremors.  Observed data is 
interim and may be revised following further analysis.  (See Section 7.1 for seismic data.) 
 
earthquake lasted approximately three minutes and resulted in the Japanese coastline 
subsiding an average of 2.6 feet (0.8 meters).  
 
The peak acceleration measured at Fukushima Daiichi was 0.561g (550 gal) in the 
horizontal direction and 0.308g (302 gal) in the vertical direction at Unit 2.  This 
exceeded the design basis acceleration of 0.447g (438 gal) in the horizontal direction.  
The design basis maximum acceleration was also exceeded in units 3 and 5.  According 
to the government of Japan, the probability for exceeding the design basis acceleration 
was in the range of 10
-4 to 10
-6 per reactor-year.  The design basis maximum acceleration 
in the vertical direction was not exceeded in any of the units.  
 
The ground motion exceeded the reactor protection system setpoints, causing automatic 
scrams.  The power lines connecting the site to the transmission grid were damaged 
during the earthquake, resulting in a loss of all off-site power.  The emergency diesel 
generators started and loaded as expected in response to the loss of off-site power to 
supply electrical power, with the exception of one emergency diesel generator on Unit 4, 
which was out of service for planned maintenance.  Feedwater and condensate pumps, 
which are powered by nonvital AC sources, were not available because of the loss of AC 
power. 
 
As the shaking from the earthquake subsided, the operators began their scram response.  
Reactor pressure, reactor water level, and containment pressure indications for units 1, 2, 
and 3 appeared as expected following a scram and did not indicate any potential breach 
of the reactor coolant system (RCS) from the earthquake.  However, no detailed 
walkdowns or further investigation has been performed. 
                                                 
2 “Seismic Ground Motion Due to Great East Japan Earthquake and Seismic Ground Motion Accounted for in 
Seismic Safety Assessments,” provided by TEPCO 
Observation Point 
(the lowest 
basement of reactor 
buildings) 
Observed Data (interim)
2 
  
Maximum Response Acceleration 
Against Basic Earthquake Ground 
Motion (gal) 
Scram Setpoint 
(gal)  Maximum Response Acceleration 
(gal) 
Horizontal 
(N-S) 
Horizontal 
(E-W) 
Vertical  Horizontal 
(N-S) 
Horizontal 
(E-W) 
Vertical  Horizontal 
(E-W) 
Vertical 
Fukushima 
Daiichi 
Unit 1  460  447  258 
 
487  489  412 
135  100 
Unit 2  348  550  302  441  438  420 
Unit 3  322  507  231  449  441  429 
Unit 4  281  319  200  447  445  422 
Unit 5  311  548  256  452  452  427 
Unit 6  298  444  244  445  448  415 INPO 11-005 
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Figure 3.3-1  General Elevations and Inundation Level 
 
TEPCO activated its Headquarters for Major Disaster Countermeasures (Corporate 
Emergency Response Center) in Tokyo to assess damage from the earthquake and to 
support recovery efforts.  The Station Emergency Response Center was activated on site 
to respond to the event. 
 
In the time between the earthquake and the first tsunami, multiple seismic eventssome 
with magnitudes between 6.4 and 7.9occurred within 100 km of the initiating event.   
 
3.3  Tsunami 
 
The earthquake generated a series of seven tsunamis that arrived at the site starting at 
1527, 41 minutes after the earthquake.  The first wave was approximately 13 feet (4 
meters) high.  The height of this wave did not exceed the site design basis tsunami of 
18.7 feet (5.7 meters) and was mitigated by the breakwater.  A second wave arrived at 
1535; however, the wave height is unknown, because the tide gauge failed (maximum 
indicated level of the gauge is 24.6 feet or 7.5 meters).  At least one of the waves that 
arrived at the station measured approximately 46 to 49 feet (14 to 15 meters) high based 
on water level indications on the buildings.   
 
The tsunami inundated the area surrounding units 14 to a depth of 13 to 16 feet above 
grade (4 to 5 meters), causing extensive damage to site buildings and flooding of the 
turbine and reactor buildings.  Intake structures at all six units were unavailable because 
the tsunamis and debris heavily damaged the pumps, strainers, and equipment, and the 
flooding caused electrical faults.  The damage resulted in a loss of the ultimate heat sink 
for all units.  The diesel generators operated for a short time; but by 1541, the 
combination of a loss of cooling water, flooding of electrical switchgear, and flooding of 
some of the diesel generator rooms (located in the basement of the turbine buildings and 
not designed to withstand flooding) caused a loss of all AC power on site for units 15.  
(Refer to Figure 7.4-7.) 
 
Figure 3.3-1 shows the general elevations (typical for units 14) and the approximate 
inundation level.  The grade level of units 14 is 32.8 feet (10 meters) and is 42.7 feet (13 
meters) at units 5 and 6 above mean sea level (commonly referred to as OP, for the level 
in the Onahama Port).  The intake structures were at an elevation of 13.1 feet (4 meters) 
for all units. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 ft (14m) 
33 ft (10m) 
13 ft (4m) 
   Main Control Room 
   Battery Room 
   Switchgear 
   EDG Room INPO 11-005 
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3.4  Loss of Power 
 
In the control rooms, as plant equipment and distribution panels flooded, lighting 
gradually faded and instruments began to fail.  Station batteries, which were designed to 
last for 8 hours, were lost when the flooding grounded or damaged DC distribution 
systems.  The loss of DC power resulted in a loss of all lighting in the units 1-2 control 
room within 51 minutes after the scram.  (Note:  Units 1 and 2 share a common control 
room, as do units 3 and 4.)  Normal lighting in the units 3-4 control room was lost, and 
only emergency lighting remained.  Control room operators began checking to see which 
indications were still available.   
 
Three air-cooled emergency diesel generators (EDGs) had previously been installed at 
the station as a modification (2B, 4B, and 6B EDGs).  These EDGs had independent fuel 
systems and were capable of providing power to vital AC systems following a complete 
loss of the seawater ultimate heat sink.  Furthermore, AC distribution system cross-ties 
had been installed between units, which allowed power to be transferred among units 1-2 
and 3-4 or between units 5-6 for both the 6.9-kV and 480-V distribution systems.  The 
air-cooled EDGs were located above grade, and some of them survived the tsunami.  The 
distribution systems for the Unit 2 and the Unit 4 air-cooled EDGs, which were located 
below grade, flooded and failed during the tsunami.  The Unit 6 air-cooled EDG and 
portions of the electrical distribution system survived the tsunami and were used to 
reestablish cold shutdown on units 5 and 6.  Figure 7.4-7 illustrates the damage to the 
electrical distribution system caused by the tsunami. 
 
When all AC power was lost, TEPCO personnel notified the government that an 
emergency condition existed.  TEPCO corporate offices and the Japanese government 
arranged for delivery of portable electric generators to the Daiichi site.  The generators 
were located; however, damaged roads and congested traffic prevented the generators 
from reaching the site quickly.  Helicopters were considered, but the generators were too 
large and heavy to carry.  Ultimately, TEPCO was able to secure some mobile generators 
from the Tohoku Electric Power Company.  These generators, along with some TEPCO 
generators, began to arrive at the site late in the evening of March 11 and continued to 
arrive into the next morning.   
 
The portable generators were limited in their effectiveness because they could not be 
connected to the station electrical distribution system as a result of the extensive damage 
the tsunami and flooding caused.  Workers checked motors and switchgear in an attempt 
to find usable equipment to support cooling the reactors.  The testing revealed that the 
Unit 2 standby liquid control (SLC) pumps were not flooded or damaged.   
 
Based on the inspection results, the first mobile generator was placed adjacent to Unit 2, 
and workers began to lay temporary cables from the generator to the associated 
distribution panel for the SLC pumps.  The temporary power cables were approximately 
4 inches (10 cm) in diameter and 656 feet (200 meters) long and weighed more than 
1 ton.  Forty employees began to run the cables through the debris and flooded areas.  
The force of the tsunami had blown manhole covers off, resulting in unmarked openings 
in the ground.  Aftershocks and subsequent tsunami warnings further slowed progress.  In INPO 11-005 
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spite of the challenges, the workers completed the task on Unit 2 and terminated the 
temporary cable to the associated power panel on March 12 at 1530.   
 
At 1536, an explosion occurred in the Unit 1 reactor building.  This explosion was most 
likely caused by the buildup of hydrogen that had been generated in the Unit 1 reactor 
core and leaked into the reactor building.  The explosion injured five workers, and debris 
from the explosion struck and damaged the cables and mobile generator that had been 
installed to provide power to the standby liquid control pumps.  The debris also damaged 
the hoses that had been staged to inject seawater into Unit 1 and Unit 2.  Fieldwork was 
suspended as workers were evacuated to the Emergency Response Center for 
accountability.  Some of the debris was also highly contaminated, resulting in elevated 
dose rates and contamination levels around the site.  As a result, workers were now 
required to wear additional protective clothing, and stay times in the field were limited.  
The explosion significantly altered the response to the event and contributed to 
complications in stabilizing the units.   
 
3.5  Core Cooling 
 
Following the tsunami, Unit 1 lost all AC and DC power, control room lighting, control 
board instrumentation, and all cooling and high-pressure makeup water to the reactor.  
Operators had been cycling the A isolation condenser as needed to control reactor 
pressure and had just removed the condenser from service when the flooding began.  
Neither HPCI nor the isolation condensers were in service when DC power was lost.  
Unit 1 had no injection or core cooling in service.  While indicated reactor water level did 
not lower below the top of active fuel until the morning of March 12, calculations based 
on conservative estimates later revealed that the core may have uncovered as early as 
three hours after the earthquake, and fuel damage might have commenced approximately 
1.5 hours later.   
 
TEPCO estimates that there was no injection into the Unit 1 reactor for 14 hours and 9 
minutes after the isolation condenser was secured, approximately one hour after the 
reactor shut down.  Conservative calculations indicate that most of the core may have 
been damaged, and some of the fuel may have relocated to the bottom head of the reactor 
vessel, although this has not been confirmed.  Core cooling was eventually established 
when reactor pressure lowered sufficiently and a fire engine was used to inject fresh 
water, followed by seawater. 
 
Units 2 and 3 were relatively stable, with RCIC in operation after the tsunami.  However, 
injection was eventually lost on these units, resulting in core damage.   
 
TEPCO estimates that there was no injection into the Unit 2 reactor for 6 hours and 29 
minutes following the loss of RCIC, approximately 70 hours after shutdown.  The core 
began to uncover at approximately 1630 on March 14, three days after the tsunami.  
Inadequate core cooling resulted in subsequent fuel damage.  Conservative calculations 
indicate that some of the fuel may have relocated to the bottom head of the reactor vessel, 
although this has not been confirmed.  Core cooling was eventually established when a 
fire engine was used to inject seawater. INPO 11-005 
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On Unit 3, following the loss of high pressure coolant injection at 0242 on March 13, 
approximately 36 hours after shutdown, TEPCO estimates that there was no injection into 
the reactor for 6 hours and 43 minutes.  The core began to uncover at approximately 0400 
the second day after the tsunami.  Inadequate core cooling resulted in subsequent fuel 
damage.  Conservative calculations indicate that some of the core may have relocated to 
the bottom head of the reactor vessel, although this has not been confirmed.  Core cooling 
was eventually established when a fire engine was used to inject seawater. 
 
Based on the given plant conditions, it is expected that boiling occurred in the reference 
legs of the reactor water level instruments, resulting in nonconservative water level 
indications.  After the event, TEPCO confirmed that adverse conditions in the drywell 
may have resulted in boiling of the reference legs, causing indicated water levels to be 
higher than actual levels for all three units.   
 
In each of the three units, it is postulated that there is extensive damage with limited and 
localized melting of the fuel and internals and limited vessel damage.  The lack of core 
cooling to compensate for decay heat resulted in excessive fuel temperatures and 
oxidation of the zirconium cladding.  The oxidation of zirconium in a steam environment 
will create significant additional heat from the exothermic reaction and large quantities of 
hydrogen.  This hydrogen contributed to the increases in containment pressure and to the 
subsequent hydrogen explosions on units 1, 3, and 4. 
 
3.6  Containment Pressure Control 
 
During a severe accident, containment pressure must be controlled to prevent damage to 
the containment and to help remove energy to facilitate injecting water into the reactor 
with low-pressure systems.  Without heat removal systems (no AC power and a loss of 
ultimate heat sink), containment pressure and temperature will increase as energy from 
the reactor is transferred to the containment via safety relief valves or systems such as 
RCIC and HPCI. 
 
The TEPCO severe accident procedures provide guidance for venting containment.  The 
guidance directs venting when containment pressure reaches the maximum operating 
pressure if core damage has not occurred.  If core damage has occurred, venting the 
containment will result in a radioactive release, so containment is not vented until 
pressure approaches twice the maximum operating pressure.  In this case, the Emergency 
Response Center personnel could not verify the integrity of the core, and the associated 
guidance was applied in the decision to vent Unit 1. 
 
The severe accident procedures specify that the chief of the Emergency Response Center 
(site superintendent) shall determine if containment venting should be performed.  The 
site superintendent may solicit input and advice from station management when making 
this decision.  Although government permission is not specifically required before 
containment is vented, government concurrence is desired. 
 INPO 11-005 
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In the case of Unit 1, the site superintendent informed the government of his intention to 
vent the containment.  Following this, he received concurrence from government 
agencies to vent containment following a press conference, which was planned for 0300 
on March 12.  The associated evacuations were reported as complete at 0903, and the 
operators were directed to vent containment at 0904.   
 
A review of the applicable procedures revealed that the accident management guidelines 
do not specifically require evacuations to be completed before venting.  The procedures 
do, however, require management to be knowledgeable about the status of evacuations 
and to coordinate venting containment with local authorities.  The procedure wording has 
typically been interpreted as encouraging the operators to verify evacuations are 
completed before venting. 
 
The first indication of increasing containment pressure was not available until 2350 on 
the night of the event, when workers connected the temporary generatorwhich was 
being used to provide some control room lightingto the containment pressure 
instrument.  The indication read 87 psi (600 kPa).  By this point, access to the reactor 
building had already been restricted because of high dose rates.  The lack of available 
containment pressure indications early in the event may have prevented the operators 
from recognizing the increasing pressure trend and taking action earlier in the event. 
 
Unit 1 containment was not vented successfully until approximately 1430 on March 12.  
Additional challenges occurred because of high dose rates and a lack of contingency 
procedures for operating the vent system without power, as well as the lack of prestaged 
equipment, such as an engine-driven air compressor.   
 
The decision to complete evacuations before venting containment, and the subsequent 
equipment and radiological challenges encountered as operators attempted to establish a 
vent path, delayed injection of water into the Unit 1 reactor.  At approximately 0230 on 
March 12, as Unit 1 depressurized, pressure in the reactor and in containment equalized 
at approximately 122 psia (0.84 MPa abs).  This pressure is above the discharge pressure 
of the station fire pumps and fire engines.  Once pressure had equalized, further 
reductions in reactor pressure were not possible until containment pressure had lowered.  
As a result, little to no injection was achieved until after the containment was vented 
successfully, which occurred at approximately 1430 on March 12.   
 
High containment pressures in Unit 1 contributed to the amount of time Unit 1 did not 
have adequate core cooling.  In units 1, 2, and 3, the extended duration of high 
temperature and pressure conditions inside containment may have damaged the drywell 
head seals, contributing to hydrogen leaks and the subsequent explosions.  Containment 
leakage also contributed to ground-level radiation releases from units 1, 2, and 3. 
 
See figures 7.4-4 and 7.4-5 for simplified drawings of the containment vent systems. 
   INPO 11-005 
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3.7  Spent Fuel Pools and Dry Cask Storage 
 
Fukushima Daiichi had spent fuel stored in pools at each unit, in a common spent fuel 
pool, and in on-site dry cask storage.  Spent fuel pool cooling flow was lost for all spent 
fuel pools following the loss of off-site power and was not immediately restored when the 
emergency diesel generators started.  Unconfirmed reports were that sloshing of the water 
in the spent fuel pools resulted in a loss of some water during the earthquake.  The 
explosion in the Unit 4 reactor building caused structural damage to the Unit 4 spent fuel 
pool, but it is not clear if the integrity of the pool liner was compromised. 
 
Subsequent analysis and inspections performed by TEPCO personnel determined that the 
spent fuel pool water levels did not drop below the top of fuel in any spent fuel pool and 
that no significant fuel damage had occurred.  Current investigation results indicate that 
any potential fuel damage was likely caused by debris from the reactor building 
explosions.   
 
The dry cask storage building was damaged by the tsunami, and some of the casks were 
wetted.  An inspection confirmed that the casks were not damaged by the event. 
 
3.8  Alternative Injection Sources 
 
Fukushima Daiichi had three fire engines available that had been added to improve fire-
fighting capabilities following the 2007 Niigata-Chuetsu-oki earthquake that had affected 
the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power station.  These fire engines could also be used as 
an alternative low-pressure water source for injecting into the reactors; however, one was 
damaged by the tsunami and a second could not reach units 14 because of earthquake 
damage to the road.  Only one fire engine was immediately available to support the 
emergency response on units 14.  This fire engine was blocked from accessing Unit 1 by 
a fuel oil tank that had been displaced into one road by the tsunami and by the inability of 
workers to open a deenergized security gate on the other road.  Workers broke through a 
gate between units 2 and 3, allowing the truck to access Unit 1.   
 
Although modifications had been made previously to allow fire engines to inject water 
into the core spray system, establishing injection was still difficult.  The fire engine did 
not have sufficient discharge pressure to overcome the elevation differences and reactor 
pressure.  To compensate for this, the truck loaded water at the fire protection tank, then 
drove to the Unit 1 reactor building to inject into the fire protection system.  This 
operation was slowed by debris and because the route took the fire engine under a 
building that had partially collapsed. 
 
After some trial and error, workers established continuous injection by routing a suction 
hose from a fire protection tank to the truck, then discharging to the fire protection 
system piping and into the reactor via an installed modification to the low pressure 
coolant injection system.  The fire protection tank, however, only had one hose 
connection.  As a result, injection into the reactor had to be stopped each time the tank 
needed to be refilled so another fire engine, now available, could attach a hose and fill the INPO 11-005 
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tank.  Seawater injection was eventually switched to a flooded pit, then to the harbor 
itself. 
 
3.9  Working Conditions 
 
In the days after the earthquake and tsunami, a group of TEPCO employees, members of 
the Japan Self-Defense Force, and other volunteers worked to stabilize the damaged 
reactors.  This group worked through extremely adverse conditions to complete their 
assigned tasks. 
 
The workers faced multiple challenges and hazards.  The tsunami had caused 
considerable damage.  Large areas of the site were flooded or littered with debris.  The 
force of the tsunami coming ashore had blown manhole covers off, leaving unguarded 
openings.  Without power available, much of the work was performed in complete 
darkness.  Passageways or rooms in some areas of the plant were dark and flooded.  
Elevated dose rates challenged worker ability to perform tasks in the plant and in the 
field.  For some of the higher dose jobs, such as the attempt to open the suppression 
chamber vent valve on Unit 1, operators volunteered to perform the taskregardless of 
the potential hazards. 
 
Operators worked to restore or maintain cooling to the reactors, sometimes using 
unconventional or unique methods.  Some of the tasks that were accomplished were not 
based on existing procedure guidance or formal training.  The workers were placed in 
conditions that were beyond the design basis for the station and had to rely on their 
fundamental knowledge and creativity to recover indications or operate systems.  While 
these efforts were not always successful on the first attempt, workers continued their 
efforts until the desired results were achieved. 
 
Ongoing aftershocks and tsunami warnings further challenged the workers.  As expected 
following a major earthquake, hundreds of aftershocks occurred in the days after the 
initial event.  Two of the aftershocks on March 11 were larger than magnitude 7.0. 
 
After the explosion in Unit 1, radiological conditions continued to degrade, and workers 
were subjected to elevated and continuously changing dose rates and contamination 
levels.  Under the threat of subsequent explosions in other units, they continued their 
efforts to stabilize the reactors.   
 
Because of the tsunami and earthquake damage to the surrounding communities, little 
outside assistance was initially available.  Some workers lost their homes and families to 
the earthquake and tsunami, yet continued to work.  Many workers slept at the 
stationusually on the floor.  Because of food shortages, workers were commonly only 
provided with a biscuit for breakfast and a bowl of noodles for dinner.  Some of these 
workers remain on site today, still working to keep the reactors cool and prevent the 
spread of contamination.   
 
Two operators were killed when they became trapped while performing inspections in the 
Unit 4 turbine building when the tsunami inundated the site and flooded the building.INPO 11-005 
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4.0  Unit-Specific Event Narrative 
 
4.1  Unit 1 Narrative 
 
On March 11 at 1446 (T=0), an earthquake caused a loss of off-site power and an 
automatic reactor scram.  All control rods inserted; and several actions occurred, 
including a loss of feedwater and condensate and main steam isolation valve closures, as 
expected because of the loss of off-site AC power.  The emergency diesel generators 
started and loaded in response to the loss of off-site power and supplied power to the 
safety systems.  While reactor water level initially dropped because of the collapsing 
steam voids, reactor water level was within the normal band and the operators did not 
need to initiate high pressure coolant injection (HPCI).   
 
Six minutes after the scram (1452), the isolation condensers (ICs) automatically initiated 
on increasing pressure in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), resulting in a decrease in 
reactor pressure as cooler water circulated through the reactor core from the ICs.   
 
At 1503 (T plus 17 minutes), operators recognized that Unit 1 was exceeding cooldown 
rate limitations and manually removed the isolation condensers from service by closing 
the cold leg return containment outboard isolation motor-operated valves (MO-3A and B) 
(see Figure 7.4-1).  These actions were consistent with procedure limitations of not 
exceeding a 100
oF/hr (55
oC/hr) cooldown rate.  Operators determined that only one IC 
was needed to control reactor pressure between 870 and 1,015 psig (6 to 7 MPa gauge).  
Operators cycled the A IC system by opening and closing the motor-operated valve (MO-
3A) to control reactor pressure.  Chart recorders indicate that the operators manually 
started and stopped the IC system three times between 1510 and 1534 as RPV pressure 
cycled and that the A IC was removed from service at approximately 1534, just minutes 
before the loss of all AC and DC power. 
 
At 1527 (T plus 41 minutes), the first tsunami arrived at the station.  The subsequent 
tsunamis flooded and damaged the intake structure; and by 1537 (T plus 51 minutes), the 
tsunami had begun to flood the turbine building basement.  The flooding wetted or 
submerged the emergency diesel generators and the AC and DC distribution systems, 
resulting in a gradual loss of all AC and DC power.  Between 1537 and 1550, the loss of  
power caused a loss of normal control room lighting, indications, and controls.  The 
indications for HPCI and the IC systems faded and went out.  TEPCO made an 
emergency declaration because of the loss of all AC power and notified the government 
and associated authorities. 
 
The isolation condenser was the only system available to cool the reactor; and without 
DC power, this system needed to be operated locally.  The IC also required a source of 
makeup water to the condenser to continue to function beyond 8 hours.  Without power, 
this makeup water would have to be provided using a diesel-driven fire pump.  However, 
the operators did not immediately place the IC in service.  As a result, Unit 1 had no 
injection or core cooling in service. 
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At 1636, another emergency was declared because of the inability to determine reactor 
water level and the status of injection into the core.  Batteries and cables were taken to 
the control room in an attempt to restore control board instruments, with work focused on 
restoring reactor water level indication.  With no core cooling and extensive damage to 
the site, workers began to investigate methods for venting containment without power 
and reviewing methods for injecting water into the reactor using the fire protection 
system or fire engines.  The diesel-driven fire pump was started and allowed to idle in 
standby, ready to provide injection into the reactor when needed.  In complete darkness, 
operators began to align the alternative water injection valves from the fire protection 
system to the core spray system by manually opening the valves in the reactor building.  
Injection could not be achieved, however, until after the RPV was depressurized below 
100 psig (0.69 MPa gauge). 
 
Instruments and indications periodically appeared to function but would soon lose power 
and fail again.  On one occasion, the valve position indications for the IC MO-2A and 
MO-3A motor-operated valves began working.  The operator noticed that the valves both 
indicated closed.  At 1818, the operator opened both valves using their main control room 
switches in an attempt to place the isolation condenser in service.  While some steam was 
initially seen coming from the condenser, the steam faded.  At 1825, the operator closed 
the MO-3A valve to remove the system from service.  The reason for this action has not 
been determined.  As a result, there was no cooling method aligned to remove decay heat 
from the reactor.   
 
Because the control room had no working indications, operators checked reactor pressure 
locally in the reactor building.  At 2007, reactor pressure indicated 1,000 psig (6.9 MPa 
gauge).  Reactor water level was still unknown. 
 
At 2049 (T plus 6.1 hours), workers restored some temporary control room lighting in the 
units 1-2 control room when a small portable generator was installed. 
 
At 2050 (T plus 6.1 hours), the Fukushima prefecture began to direct residents living 
within 1.2 miles (2km) of the station to evacuate. 
 
Water level indication was restored in the control room at 2119 (T plus 6.5 hours).  
Indicated reactor water level was approximately 8 inches (200 mm) above the top of 
active fuel (TAF).   
 
At 2123 (T plus 6.6 hours), the Prime Minister expanded the evacuation zone to 1.9 miles 
(3 km), with residents living within a 6.2 mile radius (10 km) directed to take shelter.   
 
Operators placed the A IC back in service at about 2130 (T plus 6.7 hours), when once 
again the indications began to work.  By this point, no cooling or injection had been 
provided to the reactor for almost 6 hours, and core damage was most likely occurring.  
While steam was observed coming from the condenser vent, it is not clear that the IC 
went into service as expected.  Inspections performed in September 2011 revealed that INPO 11-005 
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the A IC valves did open but the water level in the secondary side remained at 65 percent, 
indicating that the system may not have functioned as designed.   
 
Dose rates in the reactor building increased to such a level that, by 2151 (T plus 7.1 
hours), access to the building was restricted.  By 2300 (T plus 8.2 hours), dose rates as 
high as 120 mrem/hr (1.2 mSv/hr) were detected outside the north reactor building 
personnel air lock door.  Dose rates in the control room also increased. 
 
Just after midnight on March 12 (T plus 9.3 hours), the site superintendent directed the 
operators to prepare to vent the primary containment vessel.  In the control room, 
operators assembled piping and instrumentation drawings, the accident management 
procedures, valve drawings, and a white board.  Because there was no procedure to 
operate the vent valves without power, the operators began to develop a plan for venting, 
including how to operate the valves manually.  They determined that both the motor-
operated containment vent valve (MO-210) and the small suppression chamber air-
operated vent valve (AO-90) could be operated manually (see Figure 7.4-4).  At 2350 (T 
plus 9.1 hours), containment pressure indicated 87 psia (0.6MPa abs), exceeding the 
containment design pressure of 62.1 psig (0.428 MPa gauge). 
 
At 0130 (T plus 10.7 hours), TEPCO officials informed the Prime Minister, the Minister 
of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency of plans 
to vent containment.  All concurred with the venting of units 1 and 2 containments.  The 
government planned a 0300 press conference to announce the venting.  The TEPCO 
corporate Emergency Response Center instructed the station to vent the containments 
following the press conference.  The operators continued preparations to vent the 
containments.   
 
At 0148 (T plus 11 hours), the installed diesel-driven fire pump that had been running in 
standby to inject into the reactor stopped operating.  To restart the fire pump, workers 
carried diesel fuel to the pump and refilled the fuel tank, but attempts to start the engine 
depleted the batteries.  Workers then retrieved spare batteries that were stored in an office 
and attached them, but the engine still would not start.   
 
In parallel, efforts to use a station fire engine as an injection source to the reactor were 
ongoing.  The damage from the earthquake and tsunami made this task difficult.  The 
earthquake and tsunami also damaged fire hydrants and caused fire system leaks.  While 
workers were able to close valves and isolate the leaks, the damage made it impossible to 
use filtered water as a water source.  Fire protection tanks remained available for use as a 
water source.  
 
The station had three fire engines, but only one was available to support injecting water 
into the Unit 1 reactor.  One fire engine was damaged by the tsunami and was not 
functional.  The second was parked adjacent to units 5 and 6 but could not be driven to 
Unit 1 because of earthquake damage to the road and debris from the tsunami.  The 
remaining fire engine, which was located near units 3 and 4, was functional.  Workers 
had to clear obstacles and debris to move the fire engine to Unit 1.  A heavy fuel oil tank, INPO 11-005 
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which had been displaced by the tsunami, made one access road impassable.  A security 
gate that had lost power and would not open blocked another road that provided access to 
Unit 1.  Workers broke a lock on the gate between units 2 and 3, allowing the fire engine 
to arrive at Unit 1.   
 
Alternatives for injecting water via fire protection lines were reviewed, and additional 
fire engines and water transportation by the Japanese Self-Defense Force were also 
considered. 
 
By 0230 (T plus 11.7 hours), indicated containment pressure had increased to 122 psia 
(0.84MPa abs), which is approximately twice design pressure.  Indicated reactor pressure 
decreased to 116 psig (0.8 MPa gauge), and reactor water level indicated 19.7 inches 
(500 mm) above TAF by the lowest indication.  At this pressure, the containment had 
equalized with reactor pressure and was still greater than the discharge pressure of the 
diesel-driven fire pump lined up to inject water into the reactor.  There was no steam flow 
from the reactor to cool the fuel, and there was no source of injection into the reactor.   
 
TEPCO is not sure how the Unit 1 reactor depressurized.  Because reactor and 
containment pressure equalized, it appears the reactor depressurized because of either a 
stuck-open relief valve or a breach of the reactor coolant system or reactor pressure 
vessel.  The isolation condenser may have helped with the pressure reduction; however, 
had the isolation condenser caused the depressurization, reactor pressure likely would 
have continued to decrease until the shell-side boiled dry.  Then the reactor coolant 
system would have repressurized and would not have equalized with containment 
pressure. 
 
At approximately 0300, a press conference was held to announce the venting of the 
containments.  At the station, however, workers were not directed to perform the 
evolution, and indicated primary containment pressure remained well above the 62.1 psig 
(0.428 MPa gauge) design pressure.  Allowing the containment to be exposed to 
pressures above design pressure may have caused containment penetrations and seals to 
degrade and leak, but this has not been verified.  Indicated containment pressure began to 
decrease unexpectedly and stabilized near 113 psia (0.78 MPa abs) without venting. 
 
As the morning progressed, plant conditions continued to degrade.  In preparation for 
venting the containment, workers attempted to enter the reactor building to perform 
surveys.  When the reactor building air lock door was opened, the workers saw steam and 
closed the door.  No surveys were performed.  
 
The first indications of an off-site release were detected at 0450 (T plus 14.1 hours) when 
a dose rate of 0.1 mrem/hr (1µSv/hr) was measured at the site boundary.  The source of 
this release has not been confirmed, but the timing correlates with an unexplained slow 
reduction in containment pressure without venting.  By 0500 (T plus 14.2 hours), workers 
were directed to wear full face masks with charcoal filters and coveralls in both the 
control room and in the field.  Increasing dose rates in the Unit 1 control room caused 
operators to periodically move to the Unit 2 side of the room where dose rates were INPO 11-005 
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lower.  At 0514 (T plus 14.5 hours), workers noted an increase in radiation dose rates in 
the plant concurrent with the decrease in containment pressure.  Workers believed this 
may have indicated a leak from the containment.  This was reported to the government.  
Over the next 30 minutes, radiation levels at the site boundary increased.  At 0544 (T plus 
15 hours), the Prime Minister expanded the evacuation zone to 6.2 miles (10 km).  
 
As reactor pressure and containment pressure slowly decreased, a fire engine began 
injecting fresh water from a fire protection water storage tank into the reactor via the core 
spray system.  Although reactor pressure was not recorded, containment pressure was 
approximately 107 psia (0.74 MPa abs).  The low discharge pressure of the fire pump 
was only slightly higher than reactor pressure, so the injection flow rate was low.  
Complications in maintaining the injection lineup further reduced injection rates.  
Initially, the fire engine refilled with water at the fire protection water storage tank, then 
drove close to the reactor building and injected water through a fire protection line 
connected to a core spray line.  This was because the fire protection water storage tank 
was at a low elevation, and the workers were concerned about the discharge pressure of 
the fire engine being insufficient to overcome reactor pressure and inject into the core.  
Further complications, such as driving the fire engine under damaged buildings located 
between the tank and the unit, exacerbated these delays.  During these first few hours, the 
calculated fire engine injection rate was low, averaging less than 10 gpm (38 lpm). 
 
After some trial and error, workers established continuous water injection from the fire 
engine.  A hose was run from the suction of the fire engine to the fire protection water 
storage tank, allowing the fire engine to discharge water directly into the fire protection 
line system and into the reactor. 
 
An additional fire engine arrived on site and was used to repeatedly transport fresh water 
from the fire protection tank at Unit 3 to the fire protection tank at Unit 1.  The Unit 1 fire 
protection tank had only one hose connection; so to refill the tank, the fire engine that 
was injecting water into the reactor had to be disconnected from the tank.  As a result, 
water injection into the reactor was stopped each time the second fire engine needed to 
replenish the Unit 1 fire protection tank. 
 
At 0650 (T plus 16.1 hours), the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry ordered 
TEPCO to vent the Unit 1 containment.  TEPCO personnel, however, had just learned 
that some residents inside the evacuation zone were not sure which direction to evacuate, 
so they had not left yet.  The Prime Minister arrived at the station at 0711.  After some 
discussion, TEPCO confirmed its plans to vent containment at 0900 after evacuations 
were completed; and at 0804, the Prime Minister left the station.  By this time, indicated 
reactor water level had dropped below the top of active fuel by the lowest indicated 
reading.   
 
TEPCO informed the local governments that venting would start at approximately 0900.  
Venting was being coordinated with the local governments in an attempt to ensure 
evacuations were completed before venting commenced.  Station procedures for venting 
containment did not specifically state that evacuations be completed before venting.  The INPO 11-005 
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procedures stated that venting containment should be coordinated with local governments 
and that the station should be knowledgeable about the status of evacuations.  These 
statements had been interpreted as providing guidance to verify evacuations were 
completed before venting. 
 
The control room operators formed three teams to perform the venting, with two 
operators on each team (one to perform actions and the other to assist by holding 
flashlights and monitoring dose rates, as well as for other safety concerns, such as 
ongoing aftershocks).  Because there were no means of communicating with the field 
teams, they were dispatched one at a time, with the next team leaving only after the 
preceding team returned.   
 
In preparation for manual venting of the containment, a radiological evaluation of 
working conditions in the torus room was provided to the Emergency Response Center.  
Based on radiation levels of 30 rem/hr (300 mSv/hr), workers were limited to 17 minutes 
stay time to remain below the emergency response radiation exposure limit of 10 rem 
(100 mSv).  Workers were required to wear a self-contained breathing apparatus with a 
20-minute air supply and were given potassium iodide tablets. 
 
At 0903 (T plus 18.2 hours), evacuations south of the plant were confirmed as being 
completed, and the first team was dispatched to open the motor-operated containment 
vent valve (MO-210) (see Figure 7.4-4).  The team opened the valve the desired amount.  
The operators received approximately 2.5 rem (25 mSv) each while performing the task.  
The team returned to the control room; and by 0930, the second team had been 
dispatched to open the air-operated suppression chamber vent valve in the torus room 
(AO-90).  To open this valve, the team would have to enter the torus room at one location 
and travel to the other side of the room to manipulate the valve.  The team was 
unsuccessful, as dose rates in the torus room quickly exceeded their limits; and the 
operators turned back.  One of the operators received 10.6 rem (106 mSv), exceeding his 
emergency dose limit of 10 rem (100 mSv).   
 
The control room operators decided not to dispatch the third team because of the doses 
received.  They notified the Emergency Response Center (ERC) of the inability to open 
the air-operated vent valve (AO-90).  As a result, TEPCO personnel had to devise a new 
method to open the air-operated valve.  The ERC began working on methods to open the 
large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve (AO-72).  This would require DC 
power and a temporary air source.  ERC personnel instructed the control room to attempt 
to operate the small air-operated suppression chamber vent valve remotely, assuming 
there would be sufficient residual air pressure in the system to operate the valve. 
 
Workers continued their efforts to vent containment, while other groups worked to install 
mobile generators and stage fire hoses to allow seawater injection into the reactor.  
Workers continued to inject fresh water using a fire engine.  
 
At 1017 (T plus 19.5 hours), workers had installed temporary batteries to provide DC 
power to the small air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-90).  Operators INPO 11-005 
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attempted to open the valve from the control room, relying on residual air pressure in the 
instrumentation air system.  Operators made three attempts to open the small air-operated 
valve (at 1017, 1023, and 1024).   
 
At 1040 (T plus 19.9 hours), radiation levels increased at the main gate and the 
monitoring post.  Workers initially believed the radiation levels indicated the small air-
operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-90) had opened.  However, by 1115 the 
radiation levels were decreasing and indicated containment pressure remained high, 
indicating that the venting was not fully effective.  While this has not been confirmed, the 
trend in radiation levels indicates that the small air-operated vent valve may have opened 
intermittently, and this may have resulted in some of the downstream system pressurizing 
and gases leaking from the system.  However, it is postulated that the valve did not 
remain open long enough to allow the pressure to blow the rupture disk and vent the 
containment through the ventilation stack.  
 
The ERC was informed that a small air compressor was available in a subcontractor’s 
office.  Workers retrieved drawings and took pictures of the connection point and planned 
how to install the compressor to enable remote operation of the large air-operated 
suppression chamber vent valve (AO-72) from the control room.  The temporary air 
compressor was located and transferred to the reactor building equipment bay.  By 1400 
(T plus 23.2 hours), the compressor was installed and started.  At 1430almost 24 hours 
after the event had begunthe rupture disk opened and containment venting commenced.   
 
Containment pressure began to decrease, and the injection flow rate of water into the 
reactor subsequently increased.  Calculations, based on the total volume of water injected 
into the reactor, demonstrate that the injection rate was approximately 50 gpm (189.3 
lpm).  By 1453, the Unit 1 fire protection tank was running out of water, so the site 
superintendent directed the injection of seawater into the reactor.  Water transfers from 
other sources continued, while workers staged hoses and prepared to inject seawater into 
the reactor.  Work to install a temporary generator, which would provide power to the 
Unit 2 standby liquid control and control rod drive pumps, was nearing completion.  This 
power could be cross-tied to the Unit 1 systems, providing injection sources in Unit 1 as 
well.   
 
At the same time, hydrogen generated from the high-temperature interaction of zirconium 
and steam was being released from the reactor into the containment.  Some of these gases 
found their way into the reactor building through leaks, most probably in the primary 
containment vessel penetrations because of the excessive pressure.  Other potential leak 
paths included possible damage to the hardened vent or backflow through the unit 
standby gas treatment system into the reactor building; however, the exact leak path has 
not been determined.  As the gases accumulated in the reactor building, an explosive 
concentration of hydrogen developed, resulting in an explosion at 1536 on March 12.  
The explosion breached the reactor building and allowed radioactive materials to be 
released to the environment; it also damaged temporary power cables, generators, fire 
engines, and the fire hoses that had been staged to inject seawater.  The five workers who 
were injured by the blast were carried to safety.  The remaining workers evacuated to the INPO 11-005 
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ERC for accountability.  Additionally, the debris spread by the explosion was highly 
radioactive, further complicating the event response.  The explosion also damaged the 
door to the control room, which had been opened to allow workers to install temporary 
power cables.  The open door allowed airborne radioactive material to enter the control 
room.  All injection into the core was lost. 
 
Less than an hour after the explosion, radiation dose rates at a station monitoring post 
along the site boundary had reached 101.5 mrem/hr (1,015 µSv/hr).  By 1825, the Prime 
Minister had expanded the evacuation zone to 12.4 miles (20 km).   
 
The operators lined up a fire engine to inject seawater into the reactor through the core 
spray system and commenced injecting seawater at 1904 on March 12.  Boron was then 
added to the water source to address criticality concerns.   
 
This situation continued over the next several days as site personnel attempted to restore 
electrical power to the unit.  Off-site power was restored to Unit 1 on March 20, nine 
days after the event.   
 
4.2  Unit 2 Narrative 
 
On March 11, 2011 at 1446 (T=0), an earthquake caused a loss of off-site power and an 
automatic reactor scram.  All control rods inserted and several actions occurred, including 
a loss of feedwater and condensate and main steam isolation valve closures, as expected 
because of the loss of off-site AC power.  The emergency diesel generators started and 
loaded in response to the loss of off-site power and supplied power to the safety systems.  
Reactor water level initially dropped because of the collapsing steam voids, as expected; 
and operators initiated reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) to maintain reactor water 
level after the scram.  One minute later, RCIC automatically shut down because of a high 
reactor water level.  The operators waited approximately 10 minutes for level to lower 
and then restarted RCIC.  Torus cooling and spray were started to cool the suppression 
chamber pool, removing the heat introduced by the RCIC turbine exhaust.   
 
At 1527 (T plus 41 minutes), the first of a series of seven tsunamis generated by the 
earthquake arrived at the station.  One minute later, RCIC again shut down because of a 
high reactor water level.  Operators waited for reactor water level to lower, then restarted 
RCIC. 
 
The subsequent tsunamis flooded and damaged the intake structure; and by 1541 (T plus 
55 minutes), the tsunami had begun to cause flooding in the turbine building basement.  
The flooding wetted or submerged the Unit 2A emergency diesel generator and the AC 
and DC distribution systems, resulting in a gradual loss of all AC and most DC power.  
The 2B emergency diesel generator (EDG), which is air-cooled and located away from 
the ocean in the common spent fuel pool building, did not flood and continued to operate.  
The electrical switchgear for the 2B EDG, however, is located below grade in the 
building, was wetted by the tsunami, and subsequently failed.  Lighting and indications 
were lost as AC and DC power systems failed, including all indications for HPCI and INPO 11-005 
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RCIC.  Control room lighting, including emergency lighting, failed completely, leaving 
the control room dark.  TEPCO management made an emergency declaration because of 
the loss of all AC power and notified the government and associated authorities. 
 
The operators were not sure if RCIC was still operating because the indicating lights had 
gone out.  High pressure coolant injection, which requires DC power to operate, became 
unavailable when flooding inundated the DC distribution system.  At 1636, another 
emergency was declared because of the inability to determine reactor water level and the 
status of injection into the core.  With the possibility of no core cooling and extensive 
damage to the site, workers began to investigate methods for venting containment 
without power and reviewing methods for injecting water into the reactor using the fire 
protection system or fire engines.   
 
Batteries and cables were taken to the control room.  After confirming the wiring using 
drawings, workers planned to connect batteries directly to instrument panels in the 
control room.  A top priority was to ascertain the status of water injection into the reactor 
pressure vessel.  Restoration work focused on connecting batteries to the reactor water 
level indicator, which uses DC power. 
 
Workers confirmed the submergence and damage of power panels (high-voltage 
switchgear) by measuring the insulation resistance.  They also confirmed two power 
centers were not damaged and could be energized.  They identified the possibility of 
high-pressure water injection using the control rod drive system and standby liquid 
control systems if portable generators could restore power. 
 
At 1712 (T plus 2.4 hours), the site superintendent directed workers to investigate 
methods for injecting water into the reactor using the fire protection system.  Emergency 
Response Center personnel discussed using alternative water injection, which was 
implemented as an accident management measure.  This included the use of fire 
protection tanks and fire engines, which had been deployed after the Niigata-Chuetsu-oki 
earthquake in 2007.  The operators established an alternative water injection flow path 
via the residual heat removal system by manually opening valves in the turbine and 
reactor building to establish an injection path after the reactor pressure decreased to 100 
psig (0.69 MPa gauge).  This pressure is sufficiently low to allow the fire pump to inject. 
 
At 2049 (T plus 6.1 hours), workers restored some temporary control room lighting in the 
units 1-2 control room when a small portable generator was installed.  Critical 
indications, such as reactor water level and the status of RCIC, remained out of service. 
 
Without functional indications, operators reported that reactor water level may lower 
below the top of active fuel (TAF).  TEPCO informed the government that the estimated 
time for Unit 2 reactor water level to lower to TAF was 2140.  Immediately following 
this report, the Prime Minister expanded the evacuation zone to a 1.9 mile (3 km) radius 
of the station and directed inhabitants within a 1.9 to 6.2 mile (3 to 10 km) radius to take 
shelter. 
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At 2150 (T plus 7.1 hours), workers restored multiple indications, including reactor water 
level indication, in the control room.  Indicated reactor water level was 134 inches (3,400 
mm) above TAF.  Both the restoration of indication and the indicated reactor water level 
were reported to the government.   
 
Workers next restored one channel of reactor pressure indication and containment 
pressure indication.  Unit 2 reactor pressure indicated 914 psig (6.3 MPa gauge) and 
containment pressure indicated 20 psia (0.14 MPa abs) at 2325 (T plus 8.7 hours). 
 
Dose rates in the control room (shared with Unit 1) started increasing, most likely as a 
result of ongoing core damage and releases from Unit 1.  Operators continued to work on 
restoring indications while lining up a fire engine to supply another injection source.   
 
Just before midnight, the first of several power supply vehicles (mobile generators) began 
to arrive on site.  The generators were limited in their effectiveness because they could 
not be connected to the station electrical distribution system as a result of the extensive 
physical damage caused by the tsunami and flooding.  The first mobile generator was 
placed adjacent to Unit 2, and workers began to lay temporary cables from the generator 
to the associated distribution panel for the standby liquid control pumps.   
 
Operators reviewed drawings to determine if they could open the valves required for 
venting.  Based on their reviews of piping and instrumentation diagrams, accident 
management procedures, and the venting procedure, operators developed a method for 
venting containment.  They prepared a venting plan and began to review the locations of 
the vent valves. 
 
To confirm the operation of RCIC, operators were sent to locally inspect the system.  
Wearing breathing protection and boots, workers attempted to verify the condition of 
RCIC, but field conditions made this very difficult.  Work that would normally take 
approximately 10 minutes required more than one hour to complete.  The RCIC room 
was dark, and the water level in the room came nearly to the top of the worker's boots, so 
they turned back without getting close enough to check system operation.  While the 
workers could not get close to the system, they could hear faint metallic sounds, which 
they interpreted as indicating the system was operating.  Because of the lack of 
communication methods, the workers had to return to the control room to report their 
findings.   
 
At about 0200 on March 12, workers made another attempt to verify RCIC operation.  On 
this attempt, the workers discovered that the water level in the RCIC room had increased, 
and they could not enter the room.  They checked reactor pressure and RCIC pump 
discharge pressure on an instrument rack in the reactor building.  The RCIC pump 
discharge pressure was high, so the workers concluded RCIC was operating.  The 
workers returned to the control room to report that RCIC was in operation on Unit 2.  
With this information, opening the Unit 1 containment vent valves was made a priority.  
Operators proceeded with the lineup to vent Unit 1 and, at the same time, monitored 
parameters on Unit 2. INPO 11-005 
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By 0500 (T plus 14.2 hours), workers were directed to wear full face masks with charcoal 
filters and coveralls in both the control room and in the field.   Increasing dose rates in 
the Unit 1 control room caused operators to periodically move to the Unit 2 side of the 
room.  By this point, the level in the condensate storage tank was likely to be low and the 
suppression chamber level high, so the RCIC water supply switched from the condensate 
storage tank to the suppression chamber. 
 
At 1530 (T plus 24.7 hours), the temporary cable connection between Unit 2 and the 
power supply vehicle was completed.  Operators were only moments away from 
energizing the Unit 2 standby liquid control system when, at 1536, an explosion occurred 
in the Unit 1 reactor building.  Debris struck and damaged the cable and the power supply 
vehicle, and the generator stopped.  A review of satellite pictures revealed that the 
explosion also caused a blowout panel in the Unit 2 reactor building to open, which 
resulted in a loss of secondary containment integrity.  Fieldwork was suspended and 
workers evacuated to the Emergency Response Center (ERC).  The next day, workers 
attempted to start the power supply vehicle; however, the current surge relay actuated and 
the generator failed. 
 
At 1730 (T plus 26.7 hours), the site superintendent ordered preparations to proceed for 
venting the Unit 2 containment.  Injection with RCIC continued and indicated 
containment pressure remained relatively stable at 29–44 psia (200-300 kPa abs).  
Concurrent preparations started for lining up to vent both the units 2 and 3 containments.  
Considering the complications on Unit 1, operators planned to manually open the vent 
valves while the dose in the field was low, aligning the suppression chamber vent to the 
rupture disk.   
 
The motor-operated containment vent valve (MO-271) was opened at 0810 on March 13 
(T plus 41.4 hours).  At the time, containment pressure indicated approximately 50.8 psia 
(0.35 MPa abs).  At 0855, indicated containment pressure reached 52.9 psia (0.365 MPa 
abs), below the design pressure of 55.1 psig (0.38 MPa gauge), then began to lower.  The 
venting lineup was not yet complete.  At 1015 (T plus 43.5 hours), the site superintendent 
directed operators to vent the Unit 2 containment (see Figure 7.4-5).  Workers used the 
small generator in the control room, which had been installed to restore some lighting, to 
energize the solenoid for the large air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-
205).  At 1100 (T plus 44.2 hours), the vent lineup was completed but indicated 
containment pressure was lower than the 62 psig (427 kPa gauge) pressure necessary to 
open the rupture disk and allow venting, and the rupture disk remained intact.  The site 
superintendent then ordered workers to prepare for seawater injection into the reactor.   
 
Reactor water level continued to be maintained by RCIC, but conditions were degrading 
and operators monitored reactor water level for indications of a RCIC failure.  At the 
direction of the site superintendent, workers began staging hoses and equipment to 
support injecting into the Unit 2 reactor using fire engines when needed.  Plans were 
made to depressurize the reactor quickly when needed, allowing operators to switch core 
cooling to seawater via the fire protection system rapidly. INPO 11-005 
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On March 14 at 1101 (T plus 68.3 hours), a hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 3 
reactor building.  The explosion damaged the temporary power supply used to open the 
Unit 2 suppression chamber vent valve (AO-205), causing the valve to fail closed.  
Indicated containment pressure was stable around 66.7 psia (460 kPa abs), just below the 
rupture disk pressure.  Debris damaged the fire engine and hoses that had been staged to 
inject seawater into the reactor.  All field work was stopped and workers evacuated to the 
ERC for accountability.   
 
In the ERC, workers became concerned about the ability to depressurize the reactor to 
inject water with fire engines.  The suppression chamber was saturated, indicating 301
oF 
(149.3
oC) and 70.5 psia (486 kPa abs).  With the suppression chamber saturated, the 
safety relief valves (SRVs) may not provide a quick reduction in reactor pressure needed 
to switch core cooling to the fire protection system.  Based on this concern, TEPCO 
decided to vent Unit 2 containment first to remove energy, then open a safety relief valve 
(SRV) to reduce reactor pressure and switch from RCIC to seawater injection. 
 
Work to prepare fire engines and hoses recommenced at 1305 (T plus 70.3 hours).  
Because of scattered radioactive debris, workers shifted the seawater source to the 
shallow draft quay (harbor) instead of the main condenser backwash valve pit of Unit 3.  
In the high radiation environment surrounded by scattered rubble, workers prepared a 
new water injection line using available fire engines and hoses. 
 
At 1318 (T plus 70.5 hours), reactor water level began to trend downward.  By 1325, 
operators concluded that RCIC had failed and core injection was lost.  Attempts to restart 
RCIC were unsuccessful.  At the time of the trip, indicated reactor water level was 
approximately 95 inches (2,400 mm) above the top of active fuel (TAF) and containment 
pressure was 67 psia (465 kPa abs).  Calculations revealed that reactor water level would 
reach the top of active fuel at approximately 1630.  Workers continued to focus on 
venting containment, but ongoing aftershocks and evacuations delayed the work. 
 
Because of delays in opening the suppression chamber vent valve (AO-205), TEPCO 
changed the priority from venting containment to depressurizing the reactor.  At 
approximately 1600 (T plus 73.2 hours), an evacuation order was lifted, which allowed 
field work to recommence; and the site superintendent directed that the efforts to vent 
containment be performed in parallel with reactor depressurization.  Indicated reactor 
water level had now decreased to 12 inches (300 mm) above TAF.  By 1620, workers 
realized that a temporary air compressor was not providing sufficient air pressure and that 
the large air-operated suppression chamber vent valve was not opening.   
 
At 1630, indicated reactor water level had decreased below the top of active fuel, and 
operators began work to open an SRV and align seawater injection into the reactor.  High 
radiation levels on site, caused by the radioactive debris from the units 1 and 3 reactor 
building hydrogen explosions, precluded continuous manning of the fire engines.  
Workers started a fire engine and lined up injection so water would flow when reactor 
pressure was low enough.  Periodic tours were conducted to check fire engine operation.   INPO 11-005 
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Because of a lack of power, temporary batteries were necessary to open the SRV.  
Batteries were gathered from cars, carried to the control room, and connected.  However, 
the voltage was insufficient, so additional batteries were scavenged and added.  Operators 
attempted to operate several SRVs without success.  With no injection, reactor water 
level decreased.  The lack of core cooling likely resulted in core damage and the 
generation of hydrogen from the high-temperature interaction of steam and zirconium 
inside the reactor.   
 
Efforts to depressurize the reactor continued to about 1800 (T plus 75.2 hours), when 
enough batteries had been installed and sufficient power existed to open the SRV.  The 
high suppression chamber temperature resulted in reactor pressure lowering more slowly 
than desired.  Reactor pressure indicated 1,015 psig (6.998 MPa gauge) at 1634 and 881 
psig (6.075 MPa gauge) at 1803 and lowering; but the open SRV resulted in additional 
inventory loss from the reactor, and indicated reactor water level continued to lower.  At 
1822 (T plus 75.6 hours), indicated reactor  water level decreased to 146 inches (3,700 
mm) below TAFoffscale low, indicating the core may have been completely 
uncovered.  The open SRV resulted in an energy transfer into containment, and hydrogen 
and radioactive gases escaped from the reactor and accumulated inside containment.  
However, indicated containment pressure remained relatively constant.  It is postulated 
that some of these gases entered the reactor building from leaks in the containment.  The 
open blowout panel in the reactor building prevented the hydrogen from reaching an 
explosive level; however, it allowed the subsequent escape of radioactive materials to the 
environment.   
 
Workers had still not been able to establish a containment vent path.  TEPCO personnel 
now suspected that the solenoid on the air supply valve had failed, preventing the large 
air-operated suppression chamber vent valve from being opened.  Workers attempted to 
open the small air-operated suppression chamber vent valve to vent the containment.  
Reactor pressure continued to lower slowly; and by 1903 (T plus 76.3 hours), reactor 
pressure had reached 91 psig (0.63 MPa gauge), below the discharge pressure of the fire 
engine.  The injection of seawater should have commenced; but at 1920, a worker touring 
the area discovered the fire engine had run out of fuel.  Workers added fuel and restarted 
the engine at 1954, establishing seawater injection into the core.  A second fire engine 
was started and aligned to inject at 1957, but reactor water level remained below the 
indicating range. 
 
At 2100 (T plus 78.2 hours), operators opened the small suppression chamber air-
operated vent valve (AO-206), establishing the venting lineup (other than the rupture 
disk).  Indicated containment pressure remained slightly lower than the 62 psig (427 kPa 
gauge) working pressure of the rupture disk, so venting did not occur. The vent valves 
remained open, and operators monitored containment pressure. 
 
Between 2037 and 2118, reactor pressure began to increase and exceeded the discharge 
pressure of the fire engine.  At 2120, operators opened a second SRV to increase the rate 
of reactor depressurization.  Forty minutes later (2200), indicated reactor water level INPO 11-005 
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recovered to 63 inches (1,600 mm) below TAF.  However, containment pressure was 
now increasing.  Near the site boundary, dose rates increased to as high as 76 mrem/hr 
(760 µSv/hr). 
 
At 2240, another unexpected increase in reactor pressure occurred.  Reactor pressure 
indications increased from 62 psig (0.428MPa gauge) at 2240 to 264.4 psig (1.823MPa 
gauge) at 2250.  At the same times, indicated reactor water level lowered from 27.6 
inches (700 mm) below TAF to 63 inches (1,600 mm) below TAF.  The cause of the 
increase in reactor pressure has not been identified.  With reactor pressure above the 
shutoff head for the fire engines, reactor water level again began to decrease, exposing 
more of the fuel.  At approximately 2330, indicated reactor pressure again began to trend 
down, but reactor water level indication remained off-scale low.  As the reactor 
depressurized, containment pressure increased, indicating a peak value of 108.8 psia 
(0.75 MPa abs) at 2344. 
 
Operators began to recognize some abnormalities in their indications.  Containment 
pressure was well above the rupture disk pressurebut the rupture disk had not failed.  
Additionally, indicated drywell pressure was trending upward and had increased above 
102 psia (0.7 MPa abs), whereas indicated suppression chamber pressure was stable at 
about 43.5 to 58 psia (300-400 kPa abs), below the rupture disk pressure.  The non-
unified pressures indicated a problem.  As indicated suppression chamber pressure was 
lower than the working pressure of the rupture disk and indicated drywell pressure 
increased above the design pressure, the operators decided to open the small air-operated 
drywell vent valve (AO-208) to vent directly from the drywell to reduce pressure. 
 
Two minutes after midnight on March 15, the operators opened the small air-operated 
drywell vent valve (AO-208).  The vent line lineup was complete, except for the rupture 
disk that remained closed.  Containment pressure remained stable at approximately 109 
psia (750 kPa abs).  The operators rechecked their lineup and found that the small air-
operated drywell vent valve had already failed closed.  They continued to work toward 
establishing a containment vent path for Unit 2; but at about 0600 (T plus 87.2 hours), a 
loud noise was heard in the area around the torus and suppression chamber pressure 
indication failed low.  At approximately the same time, a hydrogen explosion occurred in 
the Unit 4 reactor building.  The loud noise in Unit 2 was widely reported as another 
explosion, which was accompanied by torus pressure lowering to atmospheric 
pressurebut this was later determined to be incorrect.  A review of the seismic 
instrumentation revealed that, if something did fail in Unit 2, the failure did not generate 
the same shock wave or force as an explosion.  Additionally, the suppression chamber 
pressure reading 0.0 psia (0.0 MPa abs) is an indication of a failed instrument, not an 
indication of atmospheric pressure.  Indicated drywell pressure remained stable at 
approximately 106 psia (0.73 MPa abs) and reactor water level indicated 110 inches 
(2,800 mm) below TAF.  The Unit 2 containment was not vented, and the cause for the 
containment pressure changes has not been determined. 
 
Following the explosion in the Unit 4 reactor building, dose rates at the main gate 
increased to 58.4 mrem/hr (583.7 µSv/hr).  All nonessential personnel (approximately INPO 11-005 
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650 people) were evacuated to Fukushima Daini (approximately 4.3 miles, (7 km) away), 
leaving 70 people at the station.  Shift operators periodically went to the control room to 
log containment pressure and other critical parameters, but no values were recorded from 
0720 until 1125.  When containment pressure was checked at 1125, it indicated 22.5 psia 
(0.155 MPa abs).  With no reports of steam being discharged from the Unit 2 vent stack 
and no changes to the venting lineup, TEPCO suspects the loud noise, instrument failure, 
and subsequent containment depressurization to be indicative of a potential breach of the 
containment. 
 
As the day continued, the operators lined up a fire engine to inject seawater into the 
reactor through the core spray system and commenced injecting seawater at 1954 on 
March 14.  Injection was occasionally challenged as reactor pressure varied.  Boron was 
added to the water source to address criticality concerns.   
 
This situation continued over the next several days as site personnel attempted to restore 
electrical power to the unit.  Off-site power was restored to Unit 2 on March 20, nine 
days after the event.   
 
4.3  Unit 3 Narrative 
 
On March 11, 2011 at 1446 (T=0), an earthquake caused a loss of off-site power and an 
automatic reactor scram.  All control rods inserted and several actions occurred, including 
a loss of feedwater and condensate and main steam isolation valve closures, as expected 
because of the loss of off-site AC power.  The emergency diesel generators started and 
loaded in response to the loss of off-site power and supplied power to the safety systems.  
After waiting for the shaking from the earthquake to stop, the operators manually tripped 
the main turbine because of high vibrations and subsequently broke main condenser 
vacuum to help stop the main turbine.   
 
After the scram, reactor water level initially dropped as expected because of the 
collapsing steam voids.  At 1505, operators initiated RCIC to maintain reactor pressure 
and water level after the scram.  Twenty minutes later, RCIC automatically shut down 
because of a high reactor water level.  With reactor water level high in the control band, 
the operators monitored reactor water level and waited for the level to lower before 
restarting RCIC.   
 
At 1527 (T plus 41 minutes), the first of a series of seven tsunamis, generated by the 
earthquake, arrived at the station.  The second tsunami, which arrived at 1535, flooded 
and damaged the intake structure.  By 1538 (T plus 52 minutes), the tsunami had begun 
to cause flooding in the turbine building basement.  The flooding wetted or submerged 
the Unit 3A and 3B emergency diesel generators and the electrical distribution systems, 
resulting in a gradual loss of all AC and most DC power.  Lighting and indications were 
lost as AC and DC power systems failed.  Normal control room lighting failed 
completely, but some DC power remained for emergency lighting and indications.  
TEPCO management made an emergency declaration because of the loss of all AC power 
and notified the government and associated authorities.  Two field operators were noted INPO 11-005 
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as missing from the units 3 and 4 operating crew.  The operators were later found to have 
drowned after being trapped in the Unit 4 turbine building basement when the tsunami 
flooded the building. 
 
While the tsunami caused the loss of some DC power systems, including some of the 
control board instrumentation and controls, the operators had indication of reactor 
pressure and reactor water level.  Both HPCI and RCIC remained available for injection.  
Operators used safety relief valves as needed to control reactor pressure. 
 
At 1603 (T plus 1.3 hours), indicated reactor water level had lowered and RCIC was 
restarted to restore reactor water level.  With RCIC in service, reactor water level was 
maintained approximately 157 inches (4,000 mm) above TAF by narrow range 
indication.  At 2158, a small portable generator was used to restore lighting in the units  
3-4 control room.  These conditions were maintained through the evening. 
 
The next day (March 12) at 1136, RCIC shut down unexpectedly and could not be 
restarted.  At this time, no water was being injected into the reactor.  Operators requested 
that a fire engine be dispatched to prepare for injecting water into Unit 3, but all fire 
engines were being used to mitigate the ongoing accident in Unit 1.  Requests for off-site 
fire engines were initially unsuccessful because the roads were impassable.  Primary 
containment pressure indication slowly increased, peaking at 57 psia (0.39 MPa abs), 
below the design pressure of 55 psig (0.38 MPa gauge). 
  
At 1235 (T plus 21.8 hours ), an hour after RCIC tripped, HPCI automatically started on 
a low-low reactor water level signal and began to restore reactor water level.  Operators 
throttled open full-flow test valves to return some of the HPCI flow to the suppression 
chamber, possibly in an attempt to prevent a high-level trip.  By 1635, indicated reactor 
water level had recovered to 15.7 inches (400 mm) by wide range indication, or 
approximately 180 inches (4,570 mm) above TAF.  The HPCI system was drawing a 
considerable amount of steam off the reactor, and reactor pressure had begun to decrease 
significantly.  At 1700 (T plus 26.2 hours), reactor pressure indicated 421 psig (2.9 MPa 
gauge) and lowering.   
 
The site superintendent ordered preparations to proceed for venting the containment.  
Knowing that venting would be required eventually, operators commenced preparations 
for lining up to vent the Unit 2 and Unit 3 containments.  Operators planned to manually 
open the vent valves while the dose rates in the reactor building were currently low. 
 
As the evening continued, station batteries depleted, and DC-powered instruments began 
to degrade and fail.  At 2027, the accident management indications for drywell pressure, 
suppression chamber pressure, and suppression chamber water level failed.  Nine minutes 
later, at 2036, reactor water level indication was lost.  The last indicated reactor water 
level before the failure was 53 inches (1,350 mm) by wide range instrument (217 inches 
or 5,520 mm above TAF) , but only 16 inches (400 mm) above TAF by fuel zone 
instruments. 
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After 2100 (T plus 30.2 hours), operators started a review of the vent procedures to 
identify the sequence and location of vent valves, which were written on a whiteboard.  
Emergency response workers reviewed the vent procedure for Unit 1.  Based on the 
review and the accident management procedure for Unit 3, they developed a plan to 
manually vent Unit 3 and provided the plan to the control room operators. 
 
At 0242 on March 13 (T plus 35.9 hours), the HPCI system tripped.  At the time of the 
trip, DC power was failing and reactor pressure was low, indicating approximately 84 
psig (0.58 MPa gauge).  Operators attempted to restart HPCI but were unsuccessful 
because the batteries were exhausted.  Operators were unable to restart RCIC locally.  
They next attempted water injection by diesel-driven fire pump, but reactor pressure was 
too high.  With HPCI isolated and with no safety relief valves (SRVs) available because 
of the loss of DC, reactor pressure quickly increased well above the discharge pressure of 
the fire pump, preventing water injection. 
 
Injection into the reactor was lost, and at approximately 0415 on March 13 the reactor 
core started to uncover.  As the core uncovered, core damage commenced, and the high-
temperature interaction of steam and zirconium began, generating large amounts of 
hydrogen in the reactor.   
 
The operators understood they needed to depressurize the reactor but had no method of 
opening an SRV.  All of the available batteries had already been used, so workers were 
sent to scavenge batteries from cars and bring them to the control room in an attempt to 
open an SRV.  
 
At 0450 (T plus 38.1 hours), workers attempted to open the large air-operated 
suppression chamber containment vent valve (AO-205).  To open the valve, workers used 
the small generator to provide power to the valve solenoid.  An operator checked the 
valve indication locally in the torus room, but the valve indicated closed.  The torus room 
was very hot because of the previous use of RCIC, HPCI, and SRVs; and the room was 
completely dark, which made a difficult working environment.  By 0500, reactor pressure 
had exceeded 1,070 psig (7.38 MPa gauge), reactor water level indicated 79 inches 
(2,000 mm) below TAF and lowering, and containment pressure indicated 52.2 psia (0.36 
MPa abs).   
 
At 0515 (T plus 38.5 hours), the site superintendent instructed operators to complete the 
lineup for venting the containment (see Figure 7.4-5).  The operators energized the 
solenoid for the large air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-205), but the 
vent valve remained closed.  Operators determined that there was insufficient air pressure 
to operate that valve.  The operators replaced the temporary air bottle, and the valve 
opened.  The motor-operated vent valve, however, had not yet been opened, so the vent 
lineup was not complete.   
 
With no ability to inject into the reactor, and containment pressure indicating 66.7 psia 
(0.46 MPa abs) and increasing, operators aligned a fire engine to the containment spray 
system in an attempt to reduce containment pressure.  Containment pressure, however, INPO 11-005 
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continued to increase.  While not confirmed, the high containment temperature and 
pressure may have caused the drywell head seal and containment penetrations to degrade 
and begin to leak.  By 0735 (T plus 40.8 hours), indicated reactor water level had lowered 
to the bottom of the fuel zone indication, indicating the core may have been completely 
uncovered. 
 
At 0835 (T plus 41.8 hours), operators opened the motor-operated containment vent 
valve.  At 0841, they opened the large air-operated suppression chamber vent valve, 
completing the vent lineup except for the rupture disk.  A short time later, steam was 
observed discharging from the vent stack and dose rates at the site boundary increased to 
88.2 mrem/hr (882 µSv/h).  The containment vent rupture disk had opened, and pressure 
began to decrease.  The maximum indicated containment pressure was 92.4 psia 
(0.637 MPa abs) at 0910. 
 
At approximately the same time, workers had scavenged enough batteries to power the 
SRVs, and the operators opened an SRV to depressurize the reactor.  By 0925, reactor 
pressure had decreased sufficiently to start borated fresh water injection.  Reactor water 
level recovered and increased above the top of active fuel. 
 
By 1030 (T plus 43.7 hours), knowing that the site was low on fresh water, the site 
superintendent ordered workers to be ready to commence injection using seawater.  
Workers staged equipment in preparation for a quick transition to seawater injection.  
They looked for seawater sources, including accumulated water in the basement of the 
Unit 4 turbine building.  Workers broke through the truck bay doors and attempted to 
move a fire engine into place, but this plan was unsuccessful.  They also considered 
taking water from the discharge channel of Unit 4 or the training center pool, but this also 
did not work.  Workers elected to use a Unit 3 circulating water reversing valve pit, 
which had been flooded by the tsunami, as the water source for the fire engines.   
 
A short time later, at 1117, the air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-205) 
was found closed.  The air cylinder being used to provide air was depleted because of 
leakage.  The workers attempted to lock open the valve locally, but they were not 
successful because of the adverse conditions in the torus room.  The room was dark and 
hot, and the torus was shaking because of the open SRV.  Workers eventually replaced 
the air bottle, and the air-operated valve was reopened.  Similar problems challenged the 
containment vent lineup over the next few days.  An engine-driven air compressor was 
later installed to resolve these issues. 
 
The fresh water supply was depleted at 1220 (T plus 45.6 hours), and injection into the 
reactor stopped.  Workers had prepared to make a swift change to seawater injection, but 
an aftershock and subsequent evacuation order occurred while the work was being carried 
out, so the swap was delayed.  By 1300, indicated reactor pressure had decreased to 28 
psig (0.19 MPa gauge), and reactor water level indicated approximately 79 inches (2,000 
mm) below TAF by the lowest indication.   
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Seawater injection was established at 1312.  However, indicated reactor water level 
remained below the top of active fuel.  The dose rates measured at the air lock to Unit 3 
increased to 30 rem/hr (300 mSv/hr).  By 1530, indicated reactor water level was 
74.8 inches (1,900 mm) below TAF.  Dose rates in the Unit 3 side of the control room 
reached 1.2 rem/hr (12 mSv/hr), and operators moved to the Unit 4 side of the room in an 
attempt to minimize their exposure.   
 
At 0110 on March 14 (T plus 58.4 hours), injection was stopped when the water level in 
the reversing valve pit became low.  Workers began refilling the pit using other fire 
engines.  Reactor water level indicated 88.6 inches (2,250 mm) below TAF.   
 
At 0200 (T plus 59.2 hours), operators noticed that containment pressure was trending 
upward, indicating at 38.4 psia (0.265 MPa abs) and increasing.  Because of ongoing 
problems with the large air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-205), workers 
decided to open the small air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-206).  
Containment pressure continued to increase.  The workers could not maintain the valve 
open because of a loss of air pressure and a loss of DC power to the solenoid.   
 
To restore injection into the reactor, workers moved the fire engine around, allowing the 
suction hose to drop deeper into the valve pit.  At 0320 (T plus 60.6 hours), seawater 
injection into the reactor was restored.  The injection rate was not sufficient, and 
indicated reactor water level continued to lower.  By 0430, reactor water level was below 
the indicating range of the fuel zone instrument, indicating the core may have been 
completely uncovered.   
 
Additional fire engines, which had been requested previously, began to arrive around 
sunrise.  The fire engines were delayed because the drivers needed to be changed to 
station workers off site because of the contamination and radiation levels at the site.  
Workers began using two fire engines that had arrived from off site to pump seawater 
from the shallow-draft quay (harbor) into the reversing valve pit.  At 1053 (T plus 68.1 
hours), seven 5-ton Self-Defense Force water supply vehicles arrived and began to refill 
the reversing valve pit.  However, continued problems with the containment vent lineup 
had resulted in indicated containment pressure increasing and stabilizing at 
approximately 75.4 psia (0.52 MPa abs). 
 
A large hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 3 reactor building at 1101 on March 14.  
The explosion destroyed the secondary containment and injured 11 workers.  The large 
amount of flying debris from the explosion damaged multiple portable generators and the 
temporary power supply cables.  Damage to the fire engines and hoses from the debris 
resulted in a loss of seawater injection.   Debris on the ground near the unit was 
extremely radioactive, preventing further use of the main condenser backwash valve pit 
as a source of water.  With the exception of the control room operators, all work stopped 
and workers evacuated to the Emergency Response Center for accountability. 
 INPO 11-005 
33 
An undamaged fire engine was moved to the shallow-draft quay, and at 1630 a new 
injection lineup was completed.  Fire engines and hoses were rearranged to inject 
seawater directly from the quay into both units 2 and 3 reactors.   
 
This situation continued over the next several days as site personnel attempted to restore 
electrical power to the unit.  Off-site power was restored to Unit 3 on March 22, 11 days 
after the event.   
 
4.4  Unit 4 Narrative 
 
Unit 4 was shut down and had been in a refueling outage since November 30, 2010.  All 
of the fuel had been removed from the reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool to 
facilitate shroud work.  The reactor was disassembled with the head off at the time of the 
earthquake.  The cavity gates were installed, isolating the spent fuel pool from the upper 
pools.  Spent fuel pool temperature was approximately 80.6
oF (27
oC). 
 
Following the earthquake and tsunami, the operators in the units 3-4 control room 
focused the majority of their efforts on stabilizing Unit 3.  Because of the low decay heat 
load in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool, operators may not have been immediately concerned 
with taking action to fill or cool the spent fuel pool.   
 
On March 15, however, a hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 4 reactor building.  
This was unexpected, as workers did not believe there was enough decay heat in the pool 
to result in overheating and the subsequent high-temperature interaction of zirconium and 
water to produce hydrogen gas.  After the explosion, however, some people suspected 
that the spent fuel was overheating, and they became concerned about subsequent 
hydrogen explosions caused by the fuel in the spent fuel pools on other units.  Some 
resources may have been diverted from attempts to stabilize the reactors, as extensive 
actionssuch as helicopter water drops and the use of water cannonswere taken in an 
attempt to refill the pools.  Subsequent analysis and inspections determined that the water 
level in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool never dropped below the top of fuel and that no 
significant fuel damage had occurred.   
 
There are various theories regarding the cause of the hydrogen explosion in Unit 4.  
Hydrogen water chemistry was used at Fukushima Daiichi, and hydrogen was also used 
to cool the main generators.  Both of these sources of hydrogen were reviewed, and it 
appears that neither source caused the Unit 4 explosion.   
 
The most widely accepted theory is associated with the backflow of gases from Unit 3 
during venting.  The containment vent exhaust piping from Unit 3 is connected to the 
Unit 4 exhaust piping.  The dampers on the Unit 4 standby gas treatment system (SGTS) 
are air-operated and fail open on a loss of power or air (except the cross-connect between 
SGTS filter trains).  Additionally, the system does not have a backflow damper installed 
in the piping that connects to Unit 3.  With no power or air, and no fans in service to 
direct the gases from Unit 3 up the exhaust stack, the exhaust gases from Unit 3 would be 
directly aligned to the Unit 4 SGTS filters.  This piping arrangement may have allowed INPO 11-005 
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gases from the Unit 3 containment to be vented to the Unit 4 reactor building via reverse 
flow through the Unit 4 standby gas treatment system.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.4-1  Unit 4 Standby Gas Treatment System Hydrogen Flow Path 
 
To confirm this theory, on August 25 TEPCO personnel performed radiation surveys on 
the Unit 4 SGTS filters.  The survey results, shown in Figure 4.4-2, revealed higher 
radiation levels at the locations closer to Unit 3.  These survey results support the 
conclusion that there was backflow from Unit 3 to Unit 4.  Further inspections are needed 
to confirm this theory; but based on this information, it is postulated that the hydrogen 
explosion in the Unit 4 reactor building was caused by hydrogen from Unit 3.  INPO 11-005 
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Figure 4.4-2  Unit 4 Standby Gas Treatment System Filter Survey Results 
 
4.5  Spent Fuel Pools and Dry Cask Storage 
 
Unit  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Number of fuel assemblies 
     
  
   
   In the reactor  400  548  548  0  548  764 
   Spent fuel assemblies 
in the spent fuel pool  292  587  514  1,331  946  876 
  
New fuel assemblies 
in the spent fuel pool 
100  28  52  204  48  64 
Water volume (ft
3)  36,021  50,323  50,323  50,323  50,323  52,866 
Table 4.5-1  Spent Fuel Pool Data 
 
Background 
 
As shown, the spent fuel pools (SFPs) for units 14 contained different amounts of spent 
fuel at the time of the event, generating different heat loads.  The Unit 4 SFP had the 
greatest heat load because the entire core had been offloaded into the SFP to support 
ongoing outage work. 
 
Approximately 60 percent of the spent fuel on site is stored in a separate building in a 
common spent fuel pool.  This pool contained 6,375 fuel assemblies (about 80 percent of 
pool capacity), but the heat load was very low because the assemblies were stored in their 
respective units’ SFPs for 19 months or longer before being set in the common pool.  
Calculations determined that cooling can be lost to this pool for 30 days before it INPO 11-005 
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becomes a concern.  The common spent fuel pool uses fans and air for cooling, so 
cooling is maintained if the seawater ultimate heat sink is lost; however, AC power is 
required to power the fan motors and circulating pumps. 
 
Dry cask storage is also used for spent fuel.  At the time of the event, the station had nine 
casks containing 408 spent fuel assemblies. 
 
There are no mixed-oxide fuel assemblies in any of the spent fuel pools or in the dry cask 
storage facility.   
 
Event Progression 
 
Spent fuel pool cooling flow was lost for all pools because of the loss of off-site power 
and was not restored after the emergency diesel generators started.  The existing water 
inventory in the spent fuel pools provided sufficient cooling to remove decay heat, as 
long as the fuel remained covered.  Unconfirmed reports were that sloshing of the water 
in the SFPs during the earthquake resulted in a loss of some inventory; however, this has 
not been verified.  After the tsunami impacted the site, operators were able to use the 6B 
emergency diesel generator (EDG) to provide power to cooling systems for the Unit 6 
spent fuel pool.  After installing temporary cables, the 6B EDG provided power to Unit 5 
spent fuel pool cooling. 
 
Hydrogen explosions in the units 1, 3, and 4 reactor buildings, coupled with the loss of 
the blowout panel in Unit 2, resulted in the SFPs of all units being exposed to 
atmosphere.  The explosions may have also caused additional inventory to be lost from 
the pools.  After the explosion on Unit 4, a concern arose that the SFP may have boiled 
dry and resulted in fuel damage and hydrogen generation.  In response to this concern, 
station personnel took numerous actions to ensure the spent fuel had sufficient cooling.   
 
Fire engines from the surrounding area, including water cannons from the Japan Self-
Defense Force, were brought to the site to spray water into the SFPs to keep the fuel 
assemblies covered.  The water cannons could only reach the floor surrounding the SFP, 
so little water got into the pool.  On March 17, helicopters attempted to drop large loads 
of water into the SFPs.  Because of high radiation levels, the helicopters needed to 
maintain a high altitude; and that, coupled with the prevailing winds, resulted in this 
effort not being successful.  
 
Concrete pumping trucks were flown to Japan for use in pumping water into the SFPs.  
These trucks, which have long, articulated booms normally used for transferring concrete, 
were lined up to pump water into the spent fuel pools on March 18.  This operation was 
successful; however, the trucks did not start refilling the SFPs until several days after the 
event began.  The delay in refilling the SFPs may have contributed to increased radiation 
levels in the area around the spent fuel pools because less shielding was provided with 
the reduced water level.  The exact impact, however, was not known because radiation 
levels were not monitored as the pools were refilled. 
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Subsequent analyses and inspections determined that the spent fuel pool water levels 
never dropped below the top of fuel in any spent fuel pool and that no significant fuel 
damage had occurred.  Current investigation results indicate that any potential fuel 
damage may have been caused by debris from the reactor building explosions.   
 
An inspection of the dry cask storage facility revealed that, while the building was 
damaged by the tsunami, the dry storage casks do not appear to be damaged.  The casks 
were wetted by the tsunami, but they were not moved from their storage locations by the 
force of the waves or debris.  The fuel stored inside the dry casks has not yet been 
inspected.INPO 11-005 
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5.0  Radiological Overview 
 
Capabilities for monitoring radiological conditions effectively both on site and off site 
were severely hampered by the effects of the earthquakes and tsunamis.  The earthquake 
did not damage on-site monitoring systems, but few remained following the tsunamis.  
For example, most electronic personnel dosimeters, computer systems for activating and 
recording dose from these devices, installed contamination monitors, and many portable 
survey instruments were lost to the flooding.  Installed radiation monitors essential for 
monitoring core, containment, and spent fuel pool conditions were lost when the tsunamis 
wetted the electrical distribution equipment.  In addition, radiological effluent, 
environmental, and meteorological monitors were lost. 
 
During the event, Fukushima Prefecture officials directed several evacuations.  Evacuees 
were screened for contamination upon reporting to shelters.  The screening criterion for 
evacuees reporting to shelters was originally 100,000 counts per minute (cpm).  The 
screening criterion was revised on March 20 to 0.1 mrem/hr at 4 inches (10 cm) to align 
with IAEA standards.  Between March and June, 195,354 people were screened, with 102 
persons being decontaminated below the limits.   
 
Following the event, Japanese government officials estimated the amount of radioactivity 
discharged into the air between March 11 and April 5 was equivalent to 1.7 E7 curies (6.3 
E17 Bq). 
 
On April 2, very high concentrations of radioactivity were identified in the harbor of the 
station.  The source was water accumulating in the turbine building, flowing through a 
trench, and leaking into the harbor.  The magnitude of this release was estimated at 1.3 
E5 curies (4.81 E15 Bq).  This source was stopped after a couple of days.  The ocean 
around the plant was sampled daily following this discovery, and the maximum 
concentration in late July was approximately 1 E3 pCi/l (3.7 E1 Bq/l) of cesium-137.   
 
5.1  On-Site Capabilities 
 
The loss of personnel monitoring capabilities resulted in the need for initial emergency 
responders to share dosimeters, with only one worker on a team wearing dosimetry for 
many missions.  The limited number of electronic dosimeters made measuring worker 
dose difficult because individual passive dosimeters, such as thermoluminescent 
dosimeters, are normally not worn at the station.   
 
With no process radiation monitoring indications available, operators were not aware of 
changes in radiological conditions until personnel in the field noted them.  For example, 
when returning the Unit 1 isolation condenser to service at 2130 on March 11, dose rates 
in the reactor building increased more than expected.  This is an indication that fuel 
damage may have already begun and likely created the first radiological release to the 
environment.  However, operators were not aware of this condition until workers in the 
plant reported increases in their dose and elevated dose rates were measured outside the 
reactor building personnel air lock.  Later on March 12, operators were unsure if attempts INPO 11-005 
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to vent Unit 1 were successful because the radiological monitor on the plant vent stack 
was inoperable.   
 
The loss of installed radiological monitoring equipment and meteorological 
instrumentation also contributed to TEPCO and off-site agencies relying on postulated 
core damage scenarios to perform off-site dose projections.   
 
5.2  Site Boundary and Off-Site Capabilities 
 
Radiological monitors installed off site and at the site boundary (approximately 0.62 
miles (1 km) from the plant) were also lost from either the widespread loss of power that 
resulted from the earthquake or from the tsunamis.  Twenty-three of 24 off-site 
monitoring posts, the off-site central monitoring facility, and all 8 site boundary 
monitoring posts were out of service.  Additionally, local government personnel who 
were responsible for collecting off-site radiological data either could not be located 
following the earthquake and tsunami or were supporting other disaster duties.  This 
resulted in no organized off-site radiological monitoring until March 16, when Ministry 
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology personnel, the ministry 
responsible for environmental radiation monitoring, assumed this responsibility. 
 
To compensate for the loss of installed monitors at the site boundary, station personnel 
had a vehicle equipped with radiological and meteorological instruments.  Monitoring 
began at the site boundary on the inland side of the plant at 1700 on March 11.  This 
monitoring was normally limited to a single location.  Although valuable data was 
obtained, air samples were not taken; and, as the event progressed, the data was often not 
collected in close proximity to the plume.   
 
5.3  On-Site Dose Rates and Protective Measures 
 
After off-site evacuations had been reported as complete at 0903 on March 12, operators 
entered the Unit 1 reactor building in an attempt to vent containment.  The reactor 
building had elevated dose rates and a steam-filled environment.  The operators wore 
fire-fighting turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus and were provided with 
electronic dosimeters set to alarm at 10,000 mrem (100 mSv) and potassium iodide for 
thyroid protection.  The first team opened a valve on the second floor of the reactor 
building, but elevated dose rates in the torus room required the second team to turn back 
before completing its mission.  One of the operators received a dose of 10,630 mrem 
(106.30 mSv) while in the torus room.  This was reported to the authorities as an 
overexposure because it was above the 10,000 mrem emergency exposure limit. 
 
The explosion on Unit 1 at 1536 on March 12 spread highly radioactive debris around the 
site.  The door to the units 1-2 control room, which had been opened to allow workers to 
run temporary power cables, was damaged by the explosion, allowing radioactive 
material into the control room.  The elevated dose rates and high levels of surface and 
airborne radioactivity around the site hampered efforts to stabilize units 2 and 3 and 
resulted in substantial dose to site workers.  Operators in the units 3-4 control room were INPO 11-005 
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directed to wear charcoal respirators after the Unit 1 explosion.  However, to 
continuously staff their posts, they needed to remove their respiratory protection on 
occasion, such as to eat.  In addition, a few of the operators wore conventional eyeglasses 
(spectacles kits were not a requirement), which prevented their respirators from sealing 
properly.  As a result, two operators in the units 3-4 control room received doses in 
excess of the initial 10,000 mrem (100 mSv) and later 25,000 mrem (250 mSv) 
emergency dose limit.  One received 67,808 mrem (678.08 mSv), of which 59,000 mrem 
(590 mSv) was internal.  The other received 64,307 mrem (643.07 mSv), with a total 
internal dose of 54,000 mrem (540 mSv).   
 
On March 13 at 1300, pressure in the Unit 3 drywell and torus began to decrease rapidly, 
indicating a release from the containment.  On-site dose rates as high as 30,000 mrem/hr 
(300 mSv/hr) were measured outside the Unit 3 personnel air lock.  Operators in the units 
3-4 control room had to move to the Unit 4 side because dose rates on the Unit 3 side 
reached 1,200 mrem/hr (12 mSv/hr).  The TEPCO medical chief directed site personnel 
under 40 years of age to take potassium iodide, while older workers were given the 
option.  
 
On March 14, at 0700, Unit 3 containment was vented.  Indication on a Unit 3 drywell 
radiation monitor had been recovered briefly just before the venting, and a dose rate of 
16,700 rem/hr (167 Sv/hr) was recorded.  The Unit 3 explosion severely impacted work 
within the plant.  Debris on the ground had dose rates exceeding 1,000 rem/hr (10 Sv/hr), 
and workers establishing water injection for Unit 2 could no longer continuously monitor 
fire engines because of the elevated dose rates.   
 
On March 15, elevated dose rates around the site led TEPCO officials to evacuate 
nonessential personnel at the site to Fukushima Daini.  Seventy workers remained on site 
and 650 evacuated to Fukushima Daini.  
 
The high surface and airborne contamination levels around the site also resulted in the 
Emergency Response Center becoming contaminated early in the accident.  The buildup 
of contamination was not recognized until radiological surveys in the building were first 
performed on March 24.  As a result, controls were not in place to prevent uptakes, and 
some workers received substantial internal doses.  For example, a female worker in the 
building exceeded the 500 mrem (5 mSv) quarterly dose limit when she was determined 
to have received 1,350  mrem (13.50 mSv) of internal dose. 
 
On March 22 and 23, surveys of the airborne radioactivity and dose rates around the site 
began to be collected and documented.  The dose rates are documented on Figure 5.3-1.  
Localized dose rates as high as 1,000 rem/hr (10 Sv/hr) were later discovered. 
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Figure 5.3-1  Site Dose Rates 
 
Dose rates inside the reactor and turbine buildings were taken in April and May.  Dose 
rates 3.3 feet (1 m) above water that had accumulated in the turbine buildings ranged 
from 0.3 rem/hr (0.003 Sv/hr) in Unit 4 to 100 rem/hr (1 Sv/hr) in Unit 2.  The general 
area dose rates in the reactor buildings ranged from slightly below 1 rem/hr (0.01 Sv/hr) 
to approximately 43 rem/hr (0.43 Sv/hr) in Unit 2.  A localized area around a steam leak 
on Unit 1 had dose rates as high as 400 rem/hr (4 Sv/hr).  Air samples collected in the 
reactor buildings measured iodine-131 concentrations equivalent to as high as 3 rem/hr 
(0.03 Sv/hr) of thyroid dose if breathed by an unprotected worker.  Although high 
concentrations of strontium isotopes, a strong beta emitter, have been discovered off site, 
measurements of beta dose rates have not been documented in available plant surveys.  
As a result of the high beta contamination levels, two workers received beta burns when 
they stepped in turbine building water. 
 
5.4  Site Boundary and Off-Site Dose Rates and Protective Measures 
 
Evacuations in the area surrounding the plant were first ordered at 2050 on March 11 for 
the people living within 1.2 miles (2 km) of the site.  The evacuation was extended to a 
1.9 mile (3 km) radius at 2123, and those within 6.2 mile (10 km) were directed to shelter 
within their homes. 
 
The first increase in dose rates at the site boundary was detected at 0404 on March 12.  
Dose rates near the main gate increased from the normal background of 0.007 mrem/hr 
(0.07  Sv/hr) to 0.1 mrem/hr (1.0  Sv/hr).  This data, along with a decrease in drywell 
pressure, prompted Unit 1 control room personnel to conclude that a release had 
occurred.  At 0544, the Prime Minister extended the evacuation radius to 6.2 miles (10 
km), and a TEPCO press release at 0600 reported elevated dose rates around the site. 
 
At 1020 on March 12, while Unit 1 operators were attempting to open the containment 
vent valve, dose rates at the site boundary briefly reached as high as 38.5 mrem/hr (0.385 
mSv/hr).  Dose rates later spiked as high as 101.5 mrem/hr (1.015 mSv/hr) at the site 
boundary, and steam was seen leaving the plant stack after operators vented Unit 1 torus INPO 11-005 
42 
using a temporary air supply at 1410.  Dose rates at the site boundary remained elevated 
and had no discernable increase after the explosion that occurred on Unit 1 at 1536.  The 
evacuation radius was extended to 12.4 miles (20 km) at 1825.  Over the next day, dose 
rates remained elevated well above normal background with periodic increases, which 
indicated that radiological releases continued to occur. 
 
On March 13 at 1300, pressure in the Unit 3 drywell and torus began to decrease rapidly, 
indicating a release from the containment.  Dose rates at the site boundary increased to 
155.7 mrem/hr (1.557 mSv/hr).  
 
There were no appreciable changes in site boundary dose rates on March 14 following 
venting of the Unit 3 containment because the wind direction was blowing the plume 
toward the ocean.  However, the release was likely very large given that a Unit 3 drywell 
radiation monitor recovered briefly just before the venting indicated a dose rate of 16,700 
rem/hr (167 Sv/hr).  The wind continued to blow toward the ocean, and site boundary 
dose rates did not increase when a hydrogen explosion occurred on Unit 3 at 1101.  Dose 
rates at the site boundary did increase to as high as 313 mrem/hr (3.13 mSv/hr) later in 
the evening, and elevated dose rates were measured 62 miles (100 km) south of the plant. 
 
On March 15 at 0820, site boundary dose rates began to increase rapidly to 821 mrem/hr 
(8.21 mSv/hr).  This increase occurred approximately two hours after the pressure in the 
Unit 2 drywell began to decrease.  This release is likely responsible for much of the 
elevated dose rates later discovered off site because of deposition that occurred from the 
rainfall in many areas during this release.  Government officials directed that inhabitants 
between 12.4 miles (20 km) and 18.6 miles (30 km) of the site remain sheltered.  The 
highest dose rates recorded at the site boundary were measured on March 16, when dose 
rates reached 1,085 mrem/hr (10.85 mSv/hr).   
 
Routine dose rate surveys began to be collected in the area outside the 12.4 mile (20 km) 
radius of the plant on March 16.  The highest dose rate of 17 mrem/hr (0.17 mSv) was 
measured 19 miles (30.5 km) northwest of the station.  The first air samples from the site 
boundary, on March 22 and 23, had iodine-131 concentrations that were equivalent to 
approximately 80 mrem (0.8 mSv) of thyroid dose each hour if inhaled by an unprotected 
individual.  The concentration remained between 25 and 200 percent of this value until 
April 18, 2011.  Surveys inside 12.4 miles (20 km) began on March 30.  The map shown 
in Figure 5.4-1, which was created based on survey results, is representative of these 
initial surveys. 
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Figure 5.4-1  Initial Off-Site Survey Results 
 
Government officials issued the first directive for the public to take potassium iodide and 
restrictions on consumption of food and water on March 21.  The directive for the 
mandatory issuance of potassium iodide included the inhabitants of several villages and 
towns within the affected area.  Enough potassium iodide for 900,000 people was 
distributed within a 31-mile (50 km) radius of the plant.  Because the evacuations had 
already been completed, however, the potassium iodide was not issued to the population. 
 
Food restrictions included the distribution of such items as spinach and raw milk from 
Fukushima and a few nearby prefectures.  While food restrictions have continued to be 
added and lifted since the event, all water restrictions that had gone into effect were lifted 
by April 1, 2011, except in one small village where they remained until May 10, 2011 for 
infants. INPO 11-005 
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7.0  Additional Information 
 
7.1  Earthquake Design Basis 
 
The seismic design criteria for Japanese nuclear power plants is established by the 
Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) of Japan, as documented in NSC Regulatory Guides 
for Power-generating Light Water Reactors.  The seismic design criteria at Fukushima 
Daiichi include geological survey information and calculate the design values based on 
ground motion from known and hypothetical sources.  The seismic design basis for 
Fukushima Daiichi was derived from the 1938 Shioyazaki offshore earthquake, which 
occurred in the vicinity of the site and was considered as a specified interplate earthquake 
that had the most significant impact on the site.  The hypothetical source is based on the 
relative uncertainty associated with geological conditions and the inability to fully 
evaluate all probable earthquakes that could occur near the site.  The probability of 
exceeding the design basis seismic ground motion was calculated to be 10
-4 to 10
-6.   
 
The March 11 earthquake occurred over the area where multiple smaller individual 
earthquakes had previously occurred.  The interaction over a large area contributed to the 
earthquake being the largest Japan has ever experienced and the fourth largest recorded 
earthquake in the world.  The design basis seismic analysis had not considered the 
possibility of ground motion across several areas.  The March 11 earthquake exceeded 
the maximum acceleration value for units 2, 3, and 5 in the east-west direction, as 
measured from the reactor building base slab seismometers. 
 
The earthquake damaged breakers in the units 1 and 2 switchyard, causing a loss of off-
site power to both units.  A protective relay actuated, causing breakers in the Shin 
Fukushima Power Substation to open, resulting in a loss of off-site power to units 3 and 4 
(the Unit 3 startup transformer was out of service for planned modification work before 
the earthquake).  Units 5 and 6 lost power when a transmission line tower that carried 
both 66-kV lines (tower Number 27) collapsed.  As a result, the earthquake caused a loss 
of all off-site power to units 1 through 6.  
 
While no formal seismic walkdowns have been performed, a review of plant indications 
and operator logs does not indicate any seismic damage that affected the operator 
response to the earthquake.  Before the tsunami, all emergency diesel generators that 
were operable started and loaded as expected, and each emergency core cooling system 
the operators used appeared to function as designed.  Reactor pressure, reactor water 
level, and containment pressure indications for units 1, 2, and 3 appeared as expected 
following a scram and did not indicate any potential breach of the reactor coolant system 
from the earthquake.   
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Preliminary Seismic Data – Fukushima Daiichi reactor building slab seismic instrument
3 
 
Figure 7.1-1   Preliminary Seismic Data 
Graphs indicate the observed values as compared to the design basis seismic criteria.   
  Ss-1:  Design basis for inland crustal earthquakes and interplate earthquakes 
  Ss-2:  Design basis for oceanic intraplate earthquakes 
  Ss-3:  Design basis for hypothetical (unspecified) sources 
                                                 
3 “Seismic Ground Motion Due to Great East Japan Earthquake and Seismic Ground Motion Accounted for in Seismic Safety Assessments,” provided by TEPCO INPO 11-005 
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7.2  Tsunami Design Basis 
 
In the 1960s, when TEPCO applied for the construction permit at Fukushima Daiichi, it 
was common practice to adopt historical tsunami records as the design basis tsunami 
height.  Numerical simulation of tsunamis based on tsunami generation methods 
(earthquakes) did not begin until the mid-1970s.  The original design basis tsunami for 
Fukushima Daiichi was based on the Chilean tsunami of 1960, which resulted in a 
historic high water level of 10.2 ft (3.122 m) at the Onahama port, just north of the plant.  
Based on this, 10.2 ft (3.122 m) was the design basis for Fukushima Daiichi when the 
construction permit was issued.   
  
The tsunami design basis for Fukushima Daiichi considered only the inundation and 
static water pressures, and not the impact force of the wave or the impact of debris 
associated with the wave.  The design included a breakwater, which ranged in height 
from 18 ft (5.5 m) to as high as 32.8 ft (10 m), as shown in Section 1.1.   
 
Following the publishing of Tsunami Assessment Methods for Nuclear Power Plants in 
Japan by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE) in 2002, TEPCO voluntarily 
reassessed its tsunami design basis.  Using these new deterministic evaluation techniques, 
however, TEPCO determined the design basis tsunami would result in a maximum water 
level of 18.7 ft (5.7 m).  Because these changes were done voluntarily and not at the 
direction of the regulator, the licensing basis did not change.  According to the 
evaluation, the elevation of the Unit 6 seawater pump motor for the emergency diesel 
generator was raised 7.9 in (20 cm), and the seawater pump motor for high pressure core 
spray was raised 8.7 in (22 cm).  These changes ensured all vital seawater motors were 
installed higher than the new inundation level of 18.7 ft (5.7m).  The new analysis did not 
consider or require the station design to mitigate hydrodynamic impact forces.  The 
breakwater was not modified when the new tsunami height was implemented because it 
was not intended to provide tsunami protection, but rather to minimize wave action in the 
harbor. 
 
The 2002 analysis considered tsunamis generated from eight different near-field sources 
off the coast of Japan.  The March 11 earthquake was a rupture across several of these 
areas, resulting in a larger-than-expected tsunami.  Tsunamis caused by ruptures across 
several areas had not been considered as credible in the analysis.  The tsunami was the 
largest in the history of Japan.   
 
In 2006, TEPCO performed a study on the development of probabilistic tsunami hazard 
analysis, which used the Fukushima coast as an example.  The study estimated the 
probability of the Fukushima coast experiencing a tsunami greater than 19.7 ft (6 m) to be 
less than 1.0 E-2 in the next 50 years. 
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7.3  Station Specifications 
Table 7.3-1:  Fukushima Daiichi Unit Information (U.S. units)converted from source document provided in Table 7.3-2 
   
 
Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3  Unit 4  Unit 5  Unit 6 
Main 
Specifications 
Electric Output (MW)  460  784  784  784  784  1,100 
Start of Construction  Sep-67  May-69  Oct-70  Sep-72  Dec-71  May-73 
Start of Commercial Operation  Mar-71  Jul-74  Mar-76  Oct-78  Apr-78  Oct-79 
Reactor Type  BWR3  BWR4  BWR4  BWR4  BWR4  BWR5 
Containment Type  Mark I  Mark II 
Main Contractor  GE  GE/Toshiba  Toshiba  Hitachi  Toshiba  GE/Toshiba 
Nuclear Reactor 
Heat Output (MW)  1,380  2,381  3,293 
Number of Fuel Assemblies   400  548  764 
Full Length of Fuel Assemblies (in)  171  176  176 
Number of Control Rods  97  137  185 
Reactor 
Pressure Vessel 
(RPV) 
Inner Diameter (in)  189  220  252 
Height (in)  787  866  906 
Total Weight (short ton)  485  551  827 
Design Pressure (psi)  1194.8  1249.9 
Design Temperature (F)  572  576 
Primary 
Containment 
Vessel (PCV) 
Height (ft.)  105.0  108.3  111.5  157.5 
Diameter of Cylindrical Portion (ft.)  32.8  36.1  32.8 (top) 
Diameter of Spherical Portion (ft.)  59.1  65.6  82.0 (bottom) 
Suppression Pool Water Amount (kgal)  462.3  787.2  845.4 
Design Pressure (psig)  62.4  55.1  40.6 
Design Temperature (F)  284  280  340 (DW) 221 (SC) 
Steam Turbine 
Number of Revolutions (rpm)  1,500 
Steam Temperature (F)  540 
Steam Pressure (psig)  950 
Fuel 
Type  uranium dioxide (Unit 3 contains MOX) 
Uranium (ton)  69  94  132 
AC Distribution 
Emergency Diesel Generators (* indicates air-cooled EDG)  2  1/1*  2  1/1*  2  2/1* 
Electrical Grid  4 - 275-kV lines  2 - 500-kV lines INPO 11-005 
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Table 7.3-2:  Fukushima Daiichi Unit Information (metric units)
4 
                                                 
4 Overview of facility of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/index-e.html 
 
Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3  Unit 4  Unit 5  Unit 6 
Main 
Specifications 
Electric Output (MW)  460  784  784  784  784  1,100 
Start of Construction  Sep-67  May-69  Oct-70  Sep-72  Dec-71  May-73 
Start of Commercial Operation  Mar-71  Jul-74  Mar-76  Oct-78  Apr-78  Oct-79 
Reactor Type  BWR3  BWR4  BWR4  BWR4  BWR4  BWR5 
Containment Type  Mark I  Mark II 
Main Contractor  GE  GE/Toshiba  Toshiba  Hitachi  Toshiba  GE/Toshiba 
Nuclear Reactor 
Heat Output (MW)  1,380  2,381  3,293 
Number of Fuel Assemblies   400  548  764 
Full Length of Fuel Assemblies (m)  4.35  4.47  4.47 
Number of Control Rods  97  137  185 
Reactor 
Pressure Vessel 
(RPV) 
Inner Diameter (m)  4.8  5.6  6.4 
Height (m)  20  22  23 
Total Weight (metric ton)  440  500  750 
Design Pressure (MPa)  8.24  8.62 
Design Temperature (℃)  300  302 
Primary 
Containment 
Vessel (PCV) 
Height (m)  32  33  34  48 
Diameter of Cylindrical Portion (m)  10  11  10 (top) 
Diameter of Spherical Portion (m)  18  20  25 (bottom) 
Suppression Pool Water Amount (ton)  1,750  2,980  3,200 
Design Pressure (MPa gauge)  0.43  0.38  0.28 
Design Temperature (℃)  140  138  171 (DW) 105 (SC) 
Steam Turbine 
Number of Revolutions (rpm)  1,500 
Steam Temperature (℃)  282 
Steam Pressure (kg/cm2g)  66.8 
Fuel 
Type  uranium dioxide (Unit 3 contains MOX) 
Uranium (ton)  69  94  132 
AC Distribution 
Emergency Diesel Generators (* indicates air-cooled EDG)  2  1/1*  2  1/1*  2  2/1* 
Electrical Grid  4 - 275-kV lines  2 - 500-kV lines INPO 11-005 
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Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3 
Core Spray 
(CS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Flow (gpm per system)  2422  4491  5024 
Number of pumps per system  2  1  1 
Pump discharge pressure (psig)  284  501  501 
Containment 
Cooling (CCS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Flow (gpm per system)  3104  13032  11447 
Number of pumps per system  2  2  2 
Number of heat exchangers per system  1  1  1 
High Pressure 
Coolant 
Injection 
(HPCI) 
Number of systems  1  1  1 
Flow (gpm per system)  3003  4249  4249 
Number of pumps per system  1  1  1 
Low Pressure 
Coolant 
Injection (LPCI) 
Number of systems 
  
2  2 
Flow (gpm per system)  7705  8013 
Number of pumps per system  2  2 
Residual Heat 
Removal (RHR) 
Pump 
  
     
Number of pumps  4  4 
Flow (gpm)  7705  8013 
Total pump head (ft)  420  420 
Seawater pump       
Number of seawater pumps  4  4 
Flow (gpm)  4306  4306 
Total pump head (ft)  761  761 
Heat exchanger       
Number of units  2  2 
Heat transfer capacity (kcal/hr)  7760000  7760000 
Shutdown 
Cooling (SHC) 
Pump    
     
Number of pumps  2 
Flow (gpm)  2050 
Pump head (ft)  150 
Heat exchanger    
Number of heat exchangers  2 
Heat exchanging capacity (kW)  4400 
Table 7.3-3:  Fukushima Daiichi System Information (U.S. units)converted from source 
document provided in Table 7.3-4 
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Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3 
Reactor Core 
Isolation 
Cooling (RCIC) 
Steam turbine 
  
     
Number of steam turbines  1  1 
Reactor pressure (psig)  1045-150  1045-150 
Output (HP)  500-80  500-80 
Speed (rpm)  5000-2000  5000-2000 
Pump       
Number of pumps  1  1 
Flow (gpm)  418  427 
Total pump head (ft)  2788-525  2788-525 
Speed (rpm)  Variable  Variable 
Isolation 
Condenser (IC) 
Number of systems  2 
      Tank water retention capacity (gal/tank)  28002 
Steam flow (short ton/hr per tank)  116 
Standby Gas 
Treatment 
(SGTS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Number of fans per system  1  1  1 
Exhaust capacity (cfm per unit)  1101  1589  1589 
Iodine filtration efficiency (%)  >97  >99.9  >99.9 
Safety Valves 
Number of valves  3  3  3 
Total capacity (short ton/hr)  992  992  992 
Blowout pressure (psig) 
1235.4 
1251.1  
(2 valves) 
(1 valve) 
1241.1  1241.1 
Blowoff area  Drywell  Drywell  Drywell    
Main Steam 
Safety Relief 
Valves 
Number of valves  4  8  8 
Total capacity (short ton/hr)  1202  3197  3197 
   Pressure  Valves  Pressure  Valves  Pressure  Valves 
Relief valve function (psig) 
1056.1  1  1080.3  1  1080.3  1 
1066.1  2  1090.2  3  1090.2  3 
1076.0  1  1100.2  4  1100.2  4 
Safety valve function (psig) 
1110.2  2  1110.2  2 
   1120.1  2  1120.1  3 
   1130.1  3 
Blowoff area  Suppression Chamber  Suppression Chamber  Suppression Chamber 
Table 7.3-3 (continued)   
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Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3 
Core Spray (CS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Flow (T/hr per system)  550  1020  1141 
Number of pumps per system  2  1  1 
Pump discharge pressure (kg/cm2g)  20  35.2  35.2 
Containment 
Cooling (CCS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Flow (T/hr per system)  705  2960  2600 
Number of pumps per system  2  2  2 
Number of heat exchangers per system  1  1  1 
High Pressure 
Coolant Injection 
(HPCI) 
Number of systems  1  1  1 
Flow (T/hr per system)  682  965  965 
Number of pumps per system  1  1  1 
Low Pressure 
Coolant Injection 
(LPCI) 
Number of systems 
  
2  2 
Flow (T/hr per system)  1750  1820 
Number of pumps per system  2  2 
Residual Heat 
Removal (RHR) 
Pump 
  
     
Number of pumps  4  4 
Flow (T/hr)  1750  1820 
Total pump head (m)  128  128 
Seawater pump       
Number of seawater pumps  4  4 
Flow (m3/hr)  978  978 
Total pump head (m)  232  232 
Heat exchanger       
Number of units  2  2 
Heat transfer capacity (kcal/hr)  7760000  7760000 
Shutdown 
Cooling (SHC) 
Pump    
     
Number of pumps  2 
Flow (m3/hr)  465.5 
Pump head (m)  45.7 
Heat exchanger    
Number of heat exchangers  2 
Heat exchanging capacity (kcal/h)  3800000 
Table 7.3-4:  Fukushima Daiichi System Information (metric units)
5 
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Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3 
Reactor Core 
Isolation Cooling 
(RCIC) 
Steam turbine 
  
     
Number of steam turbines  1  1 
Reactor pressure (kg/cm2g)  79-10.6  79-10.6 
Output (HP)  500-80  500-80 
Speed (rpm)  5000-2000  5000-2000 
Pump       
Number of pumps  1  1 
Flow (t/h)  95  97 
Total pump head (m)  850-160  850-160 
Speed (rpm)  Variable  Variable 
Isolation 
Condenser (IC) 
Number of systems  2 
      Tank water retention capacity (m3/tank)  106 
Steam flow (metric ton/hr per tank)  100.6 
Standby Gas 
Treatment 
(SGTS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Number of fans per system  1  1  1 
Exhaust capacity (m3/hr per unit)  1870  2700  2700 
Iodine filtration efficiency (%)  >97  >99.9  >99.9 
Safety Valves 
Number of valves  3  3  3 
Total capacity (metric ton/hr)  900  900  900 
Blowout pressure (kg/cm2g) 
86.8  
87.9  
(2 
valves) 
(1 
valve) 
87.2  87.2 
Blowoff area  Drywell  Drywell  Drywell 
Main Steam 
Safety Relief 
Valves 
Number of valves  4  8  8 
Total capacity (metric ton/hr)  1090  2900  2900 
   Pressure  Valves  Pressure  Valves  Pressure  Valves 
Relief valve function (kg/cm2g) 
74.2  1  75.9  1  75.9  1 
74.9  2  76.6  3  76.6  3 
75.6  1  77.3  4  77.3  4 
Safety valve function (kg/cm2g) 
78  2  78  2 
   78.7  2  78.7  3 
   79.4  3 
Blowoff area  Suppression Chamber  Suppression Chamber  Suppression Chamber 
Table 7.3-4 (continued) 
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7.4  Fukushima Daiichi Simplified System Drawings/Descriptions 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4-1 Isolation Condensers on Unit 1
6 
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Figure 7.4-2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) – Typical Arrangement, Units 13
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Figure 7.4-3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) – Typical Arrangement, Units 2 and 3
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Primary Containment Vessel Vent System Description 
 
Between 1999 and 2001, TEPCO modified the design of the containment vent system by 
adding new vent pipes extending from the suppression chamber and drywell to the stacks.  
These vent pipes were added to provide a method of venting containment during severe 
accidents.  The modified ventilation piping bypassed the standby gas treatment system 
(SGTS) to allow operators a method of venting containment even when the pressure is 
high.  The piping connection with the ventilation stack is provided with a rupture disk.  
(See figures 7.4-4 and 7.4-5.) 
 
Figure 7.4-4 Overview of Unit 1 Containment Vent System
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Figure 7.4-5 Overview of Units 2 and 3 Containment Vent System
10 
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Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 through 4 before the event 
Figure 7.4-6 Simplified Electrical System
11 
Systems highlighted in green were in service (energized).  The 4A EDG and Unit 3 startup transformer were out of service for planned 
maintenance at the time of the event. 
                                                 
11 “Fukushima Nuclear Accident Interim Report,” September 13, 2011, Tokyo Electric Power Company 
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Fukushima Daiichi 
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Figure 7.4-7 Fukushima Daiichi Electrical Distribution Damage
12 
                                                 
12 “Overview of Accident at TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations,” July 22, 2011 - Tokyo Electric Power 
Company Co. 
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Figure 7.4-8:  Generic cross-section of a BWR4 with a Mark I containment (similar to 
Fukushima Daiichi) 
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7.5  Organizational Structure and Staffing 
 
Fukushima Daiichi uses one shared control room for each two units on site (three control 
rooms; five shift crews per control room).  One operating crew is responsible for each 
control room and the two associated units.  The crew rotation is a standard five-crew, 12-
hour shift rotation with 10 days of training after every fifth rotation.  The chain of 
command is configured in the following manner (units 1-2 shown). 
 
 
   
Operations Department General 
Manager (Units 5-6) 
Unit Superintendent (Units 5-6) 
Site Superintendent 
Operations Department General 
Manager (Units 1-4) 
Unit Superintendent (Units 1-4) 
Shift Supervisor 
Assistant Shift Supervisor 
Unit 1 Senior 
Operator 
Unit 2 Senior 
Operator 
Unit 1 Main Shift Operator 
 
Assistant Senior 
Operator 
Unit 2 Main Shift Operator 
 
Auxiliary Operator  Auxiliary Operator  Auxiliary Operator  Auxiliary Operator INPO 11-005 
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Approximate equivalent positions for U.S. nuclear units (not exact equivalent): 
 
  Japan        U.S. 
shift supervisor    shift manager 
assistant shift supervisor  control room supervisor 
unit senior operator  at-the-controls operator (similar to senior reactor 
operator level in Japan) 
unit main shift operator  balance-of-plant reactor operator (reports to unit 
senior operator) 
assistant senior operator  field supervisor 
auxiliary operator    nonlicensed operator 
 
During severe accident conditions, the site supervisor is in charge of site Emergency 
Response Center supervision.  The shift supervisors will report directly to the site 
superintendent during these conditions. 
 
Operations Staffing at the Time of the Event 
 
The operating crews consisted of the following: 
 
  Units 1 and 2 had 11 operators and 1 trainee.  
  Units 3 and 4 had 8 operators and 1 trainee.  (Unit 4 minimum shift staffing was 
reduced because of the refueling outage.) 
  The normal operating shift organization for each of the two unit crews includes 
one shift supervisor, one assistant shift supervisor, two senior operators, one 
assistant senior operator, two main shift operators, and four auxiliary operators. 
  One crew in training reported to the station to assist in the response. 
 
Station Staffing at the Time of the Event 
 
  Immediately after the tsunami, approximately 400 people (about 130 operators 
and 270 maintenance personnel) were available for the recovery process. 
  About 70 TEPCO employees (maintenance workers) and about 40 people from 
affiliated companies were engaged in the initial field work to recover units 1 
through 3.  Most of the work was recovery of instrumentation and power supplies. 
 
7.6  Operator Training 
 
Initial operator training programs for reactor operators and above are provided by BWR 
Training Center Corporation (BTC), which is located close to Fukushima Daiichi.  
TEPCO is one of the shareholders of the company.  The site superintendent certifies 
initial qualifications for senior operators, main shift operators, and auxiliary operators on 
site.  By law, shift supervisors are required to be licensed.  The licensing process includes INPO 11-005 
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an evaluation of their knowledge and skills.  The Japan Nuclear Technology Institute 
(JANTI) performs this evaluation and issues the license. 
 
Continuing training programs are developed and implemented at the station.  Operators 
receive approximately 80 hours of continuing training per year.  A training curriculum 
review committee selects the training subject material for continuing training.  The 
training topics are typically based on operator fundamentals, performance improvement, 
operating experience, and changes in job performance requirements.  Training is 
performed in the classroom and simulator, as well as in on-the-job training settings.  
Some training is performed for specific positions, such as the shift supervisor (SS), senior 
operator (SO), and main shift operator (MSO).  Continuing training topics include the 
following: 
 
  Topic               Population        Location     Time (hours) 
Team Operation (Reactor Startup, AOP/EOP)  ALL    SIM    30 
Plant Systems, AOP/EOP        MSO/SO  Class/SIM  24 
AOP/EOP/SOP          SS    Class/SIM  3  
Fundamentals           ALL    Class    9  
Technical Specifications        ALL    Class    9  
Human Performance, Expectations      ALL    Class    3 
 
During continuing training, all operators are required to maintain and enhance their 
performance to support safe and reliable operation.  To ensure this goal is met, operator 
knowledge and skills are evaluated through written examinations, simulator evaluations, 
and task-performance evaluations.  The examination standard includes requirements for 
higher-order learning objectives, such as demonstrating the ability to diagnose plant 
conditions and prioritize response actions. 
 
Fukushima Daiichi has one full-scope simulator, which models Unit 3 (BWR-4 with a 
Mark I containment); and a limited-scope simulator, which models Unit 1 (BWR-3 with a 
Mark I containment).  Operators in TEPCO also use two full-scope simulators at the 
BTC, which models units 3 and 4 (BWR-4 with a Mark I containment). 
 
The diagram shown below illustrates the typical progression and training requirements 
for operators.  The times shown indicate the approximate time spent in each position. INPO 11-005 
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Figure 7.6-1 Operator Progression and Training Requirements 
 
7.7  Regulatory Structure 
 
Governmental responsibility for the safe operation of Japan's nuclear power plants is 
divided between multiple government agencies.  These agencies, and their 
responsibilities, are as follows: 
 
  The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has jurisdiction over 
commercial nuclear power reactor facilities in Japan.  The Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency (NISA), which operates under the authority of METI, is 
responsible for the safety of nuclear energy.  NISA’s mission is to ensure the 
safety of the people’s livelihoods through the regulation of the energy industry 
and related industries.   
 
  In October 2003, the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) was 
established.  JNES inspects nuclear facilities and provides technical support safety 
reviews and assessments. 
 
  The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) has 
various responsibilities, including environmental radiation monitoring.  MEXT is 
divided into two basic groups:  the research and development bureau and the 
science and technology policy bureau.  The research and development bureau is 
responsible for the promotion of nuclear energy, and the science and technology INPO 11-005 
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policy bureau is responsible for nuclear safety regulation.  MEXT is also 
responsible for dose limits for occupational exposure and helps local governments 
perform environmental surveys following an accident.   
 
  The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) is an independent agency that operates 
under the cabinet office.  The NSC is an administrative organization that provides 
supervision and audits the safety regulation by the MEXT and METI, thus 
providing independent verification over the administration of nuclear regulations 
in Japan.  The NSC has a range of missions, including planning, deliberation, and 
making decisions on regulations and policies related to nuclear safety as well as 
prevention of radiation hazards, based on expert knowledge on nuclear 
technologies and radiological protection.  The NSC has the authority to make 
recommendations to the regulatory bodies via the Prime Minister.  The NSC also 
promotes communications with the public for enhancing the credibility of nuclear 
safety. 
 
NISA occupies an off-site center, which must be located within 10 km of the station.  
Each nuclear station is required to have its own center, even when stations are in close 
proximity.  These centers are equipped to monitor plant and meteorological conditions.   
 
The JNES analyzes the data and makes recommendations on sheltering or evacuation.  
JNES makes the recommendation to NISA, which takes that recommendation and passes 
it along to the various government organizations. 
 
Emergency Plan 
 
Emergency preparedness and implementation in Japan involve many organizations, 
including on site, off site, national government, local government(s), regulators, and 
contractors.  Processes, organizations, and activities include responses to reportable 
events and nonreportable emergencies, as defined below.  A drawing is provided to 
demonstrate some of these relationships. 
 
One large-scale national emergency response drill is conducted each year to exercise the 
associated organizations and ensure the emergency plan is capable of fulfilling its 
intended function. INPO 11-005 
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Figure 7.7-1:  Nuclear Emergency Response Organization Relationships
13 
 
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act 
 
The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (commonly 
referred to as the Nuclear Disaster Law) was established in 1999 in response to the 
September 30, 1999 inadvertent criticality accident at the Tokai uranium processing 
plant.  The accident resulted in overexposure of three plant workers and additional 
unplanned exposures to 66 plant workers, local inhabitants, and emergency support 
personnel.   
 
The Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act provides guidance for responding to a nuclear 
emergency.  The act is intended to provide a closely coordinated response among the 
relevant organizations.  It includes the following guidance: 
                                                 
13 Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, June 2011 
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1)  Licensee notification to the Minister of METI is required following declaration of 
a “special event” as stipulated in Article 10 of the Nuclear Emergency 
Preparedness Act. 
 
2)  Upon receiving notification, the Minister shall initiate required actions and 
support local governments to prevent further escalation of a disaster. 
 
3)  If the Minister recognizes that a “special event” has degraded and conditions 
exceed predetermined thresholds associated with a nuclear emergency situation, 
the Minister shall immediately notify the Prime Minister. 
 
4)  The Prime Minister is responsible for declaring a “nuclear emergency situation” 
and directing local governments to take protective measures, such as evacuation, 
sheltering, and the administering of potassium iodide. 
 
5)  The Prime Minister shall establish and head the Nuclear Emergency Response 
Headquarters (NERHQ) in Tokyo and establish the local NERHQ at the 
associated off-site location. 
 
6)  The NSC shall convene an organization composed of commissioners and 
advisors, known as the Technical Advisory Organization in an Emergency, which 
will provide technical advice to the Prime Minister. 
 
7)  Local governments shall establish their own emergency response headquarters. 
 
8)  The Joint Council for Nuclear Emergency Response shall be established to share 
information between national and local governments and related organizations. 
TEPCO also has a corporate emergency response manual.  This manual defines three 
alert conditions for when a disaster occurs or is likely to occur.  The station emergency 
response organization is temporarily activated when these alert conditions are declared.  
The three levels of alert are as follows: 
 
  Alert level 1 is declared when a disaster is predicted or has occurred. 
  Alert level 2 is declared when a large-scale disaster is predicted or has occurred. 
  Alert level 3 is declared when a large-scale disaster has occurred that may require 
a lengthy recovery. 
 
The emergency response organization works out of a station Emergency Response 
Center.  This is a new building that was added following the Niigata-Chuetsu-oki 
earthquake in 2007.  The building was seismically designed, is at an elevated location, 
and has backup generators to provide power, so it withstood both the earthquake and the 
tsunami.  This is the work location for the site superintendent when fulfilling the role of 
emergency director.   
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Following an emergency declaration, the corporate office will activate the corporate 
emergency response center in Tokyo.  The corporate emergency response center is 
staffed to advise and instruct the station as needed and to support with media relations.  
The media release briefing room is located just outside the TEPCO Head Office Nuclear 
Emergency Headquarters.   
 
Station Emergency Response Organization Training 
 
According to TEPCO, the station emergency response organization conducts several 
integrated exercises each year.  The number of scenarios is sufficient to ensure that every 
member of the emergency response organization participates in at least one drill per year.   
 
Lower-level or specific drills, such as emergency medical treatment, evacuations, and 
communications exercises, are also performed throughout the year.  The operators will 
also participate in at least one emergency response organization emergency preparedness 
drill each year in the simulator.   
 INPO 11-005 
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7.8  Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviations   
Units of Measure 
AMG  accident management guidelines 
 
abs  absolute 
AOP  abnormal operating procedure 
 
AC  Alternating Current 
BWR  boiling water reactor  
 
Bq  Becquerel 
EDG  emergency diesel generator 
 
C  Celsius 
EOP  emergency operating procedure 
 
cm  centimeters 
ERC  Emergency Response Center 
 
cpm  counts per minute 
HPCI  high pressure coolant injection 
 
DC  Direct Current 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Association 
 
F  Fahrenheit 
IC  isolation condenser 
 
ft  feet 
INES  International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 
 
gal   galileo (seismic intensity) 
INPO  Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 
 
gal   gallon (volume) 
JANTI  Japan Nuclear Technology Institute  
 
gpm  gallons per minute 
JNES  Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization  
 
km  kilometers 
JST  Japan Standard Time 
 
kPa  kilopascals 
M/C  metal clad switchgear 
 
kV  kilovolts 
METI  Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry  
 
lpm  liters per minute 
MEXT  Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
 
MPa  Megapascals  
MSO  main shift operator    MWe  megawatts electric 
NERHQ  Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters 
 
m  meters 
NISA  Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency 
 
uSv  microsievert 
NPP  nuclear power plant 
 
mm  millimeters 
NSC  Nuclear Safety Commission  
 
mrem  millirem 
P/C  power center 
 
mSv  millisievert 
PCV  primary containment vessel 
 
psi  pounds per square inch 
RCIC  reactor core isolation cooling 
 
psia  pounds per square inch absolute 
RHR  residual heat removal 
 
psig  pounds per square inch gauge 
RPV  reactor pressure vessel 
     
SFP  spent fuel pool 
     
SGTS  standby gas treatment system 
     
SIM  simulator 
     
SLC  standby liquid control 
     
SO  senior operator       
SOP  standard operating procedure 
     
SRO  senior reactor operator 
     
SRV  safety relief valve 
     
SS  shift supervisor       
TAF  top of active fuel 
     
TEPCO  Tokyo Electric Power Company 
     
UHS  ultimate heat sink       Unit 1 Validated Event Timeline   INPO 11-005 
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8.0  Event Progression and Timeline 
 
8.1  Unit 1  
 
Date  Time  Unit 1 Actions 
11-Mar  1446  Ground motion exceeds the setpoint of seismic sensor C. 
11-Mar  1446  Ground motion exceeds the setpoint of seismic sensor B. 
11-Mar  1446  Automatic reactor scram signal on seismic trip 
11-Mar  1447  Plant computer indicates all control rods have fully inserted. 
11-Mar  1447  Inboard and outboard main steam isolation valves close because of loss of off-site power. 
11-Mar  1447  Automatic turbine trip on high vibration 
11-Mar  1447  6.9-kV bus 1D power loss 
11-Mar  1447  6.9-kV bus 1C power loss 
11-Mar  1447  EDG 1B starts and loads, energizing the 6.9-kV bus 1D; 6.9-kV bus 1D power loss clears. 
11-Mar  1447  EDG 1A starts and loads, energizing the 6.9-kV bus 1C; 6.9-kV bus 1C power loss clears. 
11-Mar  1447  Reactor water level initially dropped because of the collapsing steam voids.  Reactor water level was within the 
normal band and the operators did not need to initiate high pressure coolant injection. 
11-Mar  1452  The reactor mode switch was in shutdown. 
11-Mar  1452 
Both isolation condensers (ICs) started automatically.  Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure begins to decrease as 
cooler water is recirculated through the reactor core from the IC.  Reactor water level was in the normal level range, 
and high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) was not required to control level.    
11-Mar  1502  The reactor was confirmed subcritical. 
11-Mar  1503  The operators manually removed the isolation condensers from service.  
11-Mar  1503 
Workers removed the IC from service by closing the cold leg return drywell outboard isolation motor-operated valves 
(MO-3A and B).  These actions were taken because cooldown rate was exceeding the 100
oF/hr (55
oC/hr) limit 
specified in technical specifications. 
11-Mar  1506  The Headquarters for Major Disaster Countermeasures was established in the TEPCO office in Tokyo to assess 
damages from the earthquake and recover from the electric outage in TEPCO's service area.  
11-Mar  1507  Torus cooling and spray were reported in service (1507-1510). 
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Date  Time  Unit 1 Actions 
11-Mar  1510 
Operators determined that only one train of IC was needed to control reactor pressure in the 870 and 1,015 psi (6 to 
7 MPa).  The A IC system was operated by the opening and closing of the motor-operated valve (MO-3A) to control 
reactor pressure. 
11-Mar  1527  The first wave of a series of tsunamis, generated by the earthquake, arrived at the station.  
11-Mar  1535  The second tsunami hit the station.   
11-Mar  1537  Loss of all AC power occurs.  Instrumentation and emergency systems gradually fail between 1537 and 1550. 
11-Mar  --  The loss of DC distribution systems results in the loss of control room indications and alarms. 
11-Mar  --  The control room lighting was lost and only emergency lighting remained.  
11-Mar  --  The control panel indications for HPCI were barely lit but slowly faded to black.  The operators determined HPCI was 
not operable because indicators on the control panel had gone out.  
11-Mar  --  Valve status of IC was lost on the control panel.   
11-Mar  1542 
TEPCO entered its emergency plan because of the loss of all AC power, in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 1 of 
the Nuclear Disaster Law.  Government offices were notified.  The corporate Emergency Response Center was 
established. 
11-Mar  --  Flooding caused a loss of the instrumentation power system, resulting in a major loss of control room indications, 
including the reactor water level indication 
11-Mar  1636 
Operators could not determine reactor water level or the status of injection into the reactor.  An emergency was 
declared because of the loss of emergency core cooling system injection sources, in accordance with Article 15, 
paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law.  The appropriate government agencies were notified at 1645.  
11-Mar  -- 
Temporary batteries and cables were gathered and carried to the units 1 and 2 control room.  After confirming the 
wiring layout using drawings, batteries were connected to instrument panels.  The top priority was to verify the 
status of water injection into the RPV, so efforts were focused on connecting batteries to the DC-powered reactor 
water level indicator.  
11-Mar  -- 
The Emergency Response Center (ERC) began reviewing the accident management procedures and checking the vent 
procedures to determine how to open the containment vent valves without power.  Workers in the ERC went 
through the administration building and retrieved drawings and manuals needed to develop the procedure. 
11-Mar  1645  Operators were able to determine reactor water level.  The emergency associated with the inability to determine 
reactor water level was cancelled, and the appropriate government agencies were notified at 1655. 
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Date  Time  Unit 1 Actions 
11-Mar  1707 
The operators again lost the ability to verify reactor water level or the status of water injection.  The emergency plan 
was reentered in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law.  The appropriate government 
agencies were notified at 1712.   
11-Mar  1712  The site superintendent directed workers to investigate methods of injecting water into the reactor using the fire 
protection system or fire trucks.  
11-Mar  --  Operators reviewed methods for alternative water injection using the accident management (AMG) procedures and 
confirmed the injection path using the installed fire pump into the RPV via the core spray system. 
11-Mar  1730  The installed diesel-driven fire pump was started and allowed to idle in standby.   
11-Mar  --  Operators lined up the alternative water injection valves from the fire protection system to the core spray system by 
manually opening the valves in the reactor building.  The work was performed in complete darkness. 
11-Mar  --  Injection could not be achieved until after the RPV was depressurized below 100 psi (0.69 MPa).  
11-Mar  1818  Somehow, DC power partially returned, which allowed the control board indication lights for the IC M0-3A and M0-
2A to energize.  The valves indicated closed.    
11-Mar  1818  Operators placed the isolation condenser in service by opening the MO-3A and MO-2A.  Steam was observed coming 
from the condenser. 
11-Mar  1825  The isolation condenser was removed from service by the closing of the MO-3A valve. 
11-Mar  2007  Because there were no working indications in the control room, operators checked reactor pressure locally in the 
reactor building.  Reactor pressure was 1,000 psi (6.9 MPa).  
11-Mar  2049  A small portable electric generator was installed, which restored some temporary lighting in the units 1-2 control 
room. 
11-Mar  2050  Authorities of the Fukushima prefecture ordered evacuation of the population within a 1.2 mile (2 km) radius of 
Fukushima Daiichi.   
11-Mar  2119  Water level indication was restored in the control room.  Reactor water level was approximately 8 inches (200 mm) 
above the top of active fuel (TAF).  
11-Mar  2123  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the population within a 1.9 mile (3 km) radius of the station and 
sheltering for the population within a 1.9 to 6.2 mile (3 km to 10 km) radius of the station. 
11-Mar  2130  Operators placed the isolation condenser in service by opening valve MO-3A.  The generation of steam was 
confirmed at the condenser. 
11-Mar  2151  Access to the reactor building was restricted because of high dose rates. 
11-Mar  2200  Reactor water level indicates 21.7 inches (550 mm) above the top of active fuel. 
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Date  Time  Unit 1 Actions 
11-Mar  2300 
A radiation survey identified dose rates of 120 mrem/hr (1,200 µSv/hr) in front of the reactor building north door on 
the first floor of the turbine building and 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) in front of the door to the south.  The government 
authorities were notified at 2340. 
11-Mar  2350  A restoration team from the ERC connected the temporary generator, used to provide some control room lighting, to 
the drywell pressure instrument.  The indication read 87 psi (600kPa). 
12-Mar  --  Late in the evening on March 11 and into the early morning of March 12, power supply vehicles from Tohoku Electric 
Power Company and TEPCO arrived at the site. 
12-Mar  0006  The site superintendent directed preparations to vent the primary containment vessel (PCV) because drywell 
pressure was likely to exceed 87 psi (0.6 MPa). 
12-Mar  -- 
In the control room, operators assembled piping and instrumentation drawings, the accident management 
procedures, valve drawings, and a white board.  The operators began to develop a procedure for venting, including 
how to manually operate the valves, and the associated sequence. 
12-Mar  0030  The government confirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) of the station.   
12-Mar  0049  An emergency declaration was made for an abnormal increase in drywell pressure because drywell pressure was 
likely to exceed 87 psi (0.6 MPa).  The appropriate government agencies were notified at 0055. 
12-Mar  0130 
At approximately 0130, TEPCO officials informed the Prime Minister, Minister of METI, and NISA of their proposal to 
vent the containment.  The Prime Minister, Minister of METI, and the NISA concurred.  The TEPCO corporate ERC told 
the station that at 0300, the Minister of METI and other associations would announce the venting; and that after the 
announcement, the station should vent. 
12-Mar  0145  The government reconfirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) of the station.   
12-Mar  0148 
At some point, the installed diesel-driven fire pump that was standing by to pump water into the reactor 
malfunctioned.  In an attempt to restart the fire pump, diesel fuel was carried to the pump and the fuel tank was 
refilled, and batteries stored in an office were carried to the room and installed; but the pump would not 
start.  Workers began considering using fire trucks to supply water to the plant fire protection system. 
12-Mar  -- 
Damage to fire hydrants and leaks from the fire system made it impossible to use filtered water as a water source for 
the fire engines to supply the RPV.  Isolation valves were closed to stop the leaks and maintain water level in the 
filtered water tanks.  The fire protection tank was confirmed available for use as a water source.  
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12-Mar  -- 
The station had three fire engines, but only one was available to support injecting water into the Unit 1 RPV.  One fire 
engine was damaged by the tsunami.  The second fire engine was at parked adjacent to units 5 and 6 but could not 
be driven to Unit 1 because earthquake damage to the road and debris from the tsunami had restricted access 
between units 1 through 4 and units 5 and 6. 
12-Mar  -- 
To use the available fire engine, workers had to clear obstacles and debris to move the fire engine close to Unit 1.  A 
heavy fuel oil tank, which had been displaced by the tsunami, blocked the road in front of the old administration 
building, making the road impassable.  The security gate had lost power and would not open, preventing access from 
that road.  The emergency response team broke a lock on the gate between units 2 and 3, allowing the fire engine to 
arrive at Unit 1.   
12-Mar  --  Alternatives for injecting water via a fire protection line were reviewed.  Additional fire engines and water 
transportation by the Self-Defense Force were also considered. 
12-Mar  0224 
In preparation for manually venting the containment, a radiological evaluation of working conditions in the torus 
room was provided to the ERC.  With radiation levels at 30 rem/hr (300 mSv/hr), workers were limited 17 minutes of 
time in order to remain below the emergency response radiation limit of 10 rem (0.1 Sv).  Workers were required to 
wear a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) with a 20-minute air supply and would be given potassium iodide 
tablets.  
12-Mar  0230  Containment pressure had increased to 122 psia (0.84 MPa abs).  The government was informed at 0247. 
12-Mar  0245  Reactor pressure decreased to 116 psi (0.8 MPa). 
12-Mar  0255  Unit 2 field workers returned to the control room and reported that RCIC was in operation on Unit 2.  Based on this 
report, venting the Unit 1 containment was given a higher priority. 
12-Mar  0306  A press conference was held to announce plans to vent the Unit 1 PCV.  
12-Mar  0345  Workers attempted to enter the reactor building airlock door to perform surveys.  As soon as the door was opened, 
workers saw steam and closed the door.  No surveys were performed. 
12-Mar  -- 
Operators in the control room repeatedly reviewed and confirmed actions needed to vent containment.  They 
reviewed how to operate the valves, the sequence of operation, the physical location of the valves, and so forth.  
Operators collected the equipment needed to perform the evolution, including fire-fighting turnout gear, SCBAs, 
dosimeters, survey meters, and flashlights. 
12-Mar  0401  Exposure estimates associated with venting were provided to the government and associated authorities. 
12-Mar  0419  PCV pressure unexpectedly decreased and stabilized near 113 psi (0.78 MPa) without venting. 
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12-Mar  0423 
Increasing radiation levels were observed in the area around the main gate.  Dose rates increased from 0.0069 
mrem/hr (0.069 µSv/hr) at 0400 to 0.059 mrem/hr (0.59 µSv/hr) at 0423.  This was reported to the government and 
other agencies at 0455. 
12-Mar  0430  The ERC informed the control room that field operations were prohibited because of tsunami warnings. 
12-Mar  0450  A dose rate of 0.1 mrem/hr (1 µSv/hr) is measured at the site boundary. 
12-Mar  0450  Workers were directed to wear full face masks with charcoal filters and coveralls when in the field.   
12-Mar  0500  Operators in the control room were directed to wear full face masks with charcoal filters and coveralls.  Dose rates 
in the control room increased to the point that operators moved to the Unit 2 side of the room. 
12-Mar  0514  Radiation dose rates increased in the plant concurrent with a decrease in drywell pressure.  Workers determined 
these parameters indicated a drywell leak.  This was reported to the government. 
12-Mar  0544  Radiation levels at the site boundary increased, and the Prime Minister expanded the evacuation zone around 
Fukushima Daiichi to 6.2 miles (10 km).  
12-Mar  0546  A fire engine began injecting fresh water from the fire protection water storage tank into the reactor via the core 
spray system. 
12-Mar  -- 
Initially, the fire engine was filled at the fire protection water storage tank, then driven close to the reactor building 
to allow water to be injected through the fire protection line that was connected to the core spray line.  The fire 
protection water storage tank was at a low elevation, and the discharge pressure of the fire engine pump was 
believed to be insufficient to overcome reactor pressure and inject into the core.  Further complications, such as 
having to drive under a half-collapsed building between the tank and the unit, further delayed injection. 
12-Mar  -- 
After some trial and error, continuous water injection was commenced by connecting the fire engine to the tank, 
without the fire engine having to be at the low elevation of the tank.  A hose was run from the suction of the fire 
engine to the fire protection water storage tank, and this allowed the fire engine to discharge water to the fire 
protection line into the RPV. 
12-Mar  -- 
An additional fire engine arrived on site and was used to transport fresh water from the fire protection tank at Unit 
3 to the fire protection tank at Unit 1 repeatedly.  The Unit 1 fire protection tank had only one hose connection, so 
water injection into the RPV had to be stopped each time the second fire engine needed to replenish the water in 
the tank.  
12-Mar  0552  A total of 264 gallons (1,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0630  A total of 528 gallons (2,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0633  TEPCO confirmed that some residents of Ookuma-machi, which is inside the evacuation zone, had not evacuated 
yet.   The residents had not left because they were not sure in which direction to evacuate. 
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12-Mar  0650  The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry ordered venting of units 1 and 2 containment in accordance with the 
Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. 
12-Mar  0711  The Prime Minister arrived at the station. 
12-Mar  0755  A total of 793 gallons (3,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0755  The lowest indicated reactor water level decreased to the top of active fuel (TAF) (indicating level was higher than 
actual level). 
12-Mar  0803  The site superintendent directed venting to start at 0900. 
12-Mar  0804  The Prime Minister left the station. 
12-Mar  0815  A total of 1,057 gallons (4,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0827  A TEPCO employee who had been dispatched to check the status of evacuations reported that the evacuation of 
Ookuma-machi was not yet completed. 
12-Mar  0830  A total of 1,321 gallons (5,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0837  The Fukushima Prefectural government was informed that venting would start at approximately 0900.  Venting was 
being coordinated to ensure the evacuation was completed prior to venting commencing. 
12-Mar  0903  Evacuations south of the plant (Ookuma-machii) were confirmed as completed.    
12-Mar  -- 
The control room operators formed three teams to perform the venting, with two operators on each team (one to 
perform actions and the other to assist by holding flashlights and monitoring dose rates and for other safety 
concerns, such as ongoing aftershocks).  Because there was no means of communicating with the field teams, the 
decision was made to dispatch one team at a time, with the next team leaving only after the preceding team 
returned.   
12-Mar  0904  The first team of operators was dispatched to open the motor-operated containment vent valve. 
12-Mar  0905  Venting of Unit 1 containment was announced to the press.   
12-Mar  0915  A total of 1,585 gallons (6,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0915  At approximately 0915, operators opened the motor-operated containment vent valve approximately 25 percent, as 
directed by the procedure.  The two operators involved each received a dose of 2.5 rem (25 mSv).   
12-Mar  0924  The second team of operators left the control room to open the torus vent valve. 
12-Mar  0930 
The second team of operators was unsuccessful in the attempt to manually open the suppression chamber air-
operated vent valve.  The operators entered the torus room but had to turn back because they expected they would 
exceed their 10 rem (100 mSv) dose limit. 
12-Mar  0940  A total of 5,548 gallons (21,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
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12-Mar  -- 
The control room operators decided not to dispatch the third team to the field because of the doses received and 
notified the ERC of the inability to open the air-operated vent valve.  The ERC then began working on methods to 
open the suppression chamber air-operated vent valve.  This would require DC power and a temporary air source.  
The ERC also instructed the control room to attempt to operate the small air-operated valve remotely, hoping there 
would be sufficient residual air pressure in the system to operate the valve. 
12-Mar  0953  TEPCO provided an evaluation of the potential exposure from attempting the venting operation to the government 
and associated authorities. 
12-Mar  1017 
Operators attempted to open the suppression chamber air-operated vent valve remotely with residual air pressure in 
the instrumentation air system and temporary DC supplied by batteries.  The control room operators attempted to 
open the small air-operated valve three times (1017, 1023, and 1024).  
12-Mar  1040  Radiation levels increased at the main gate and monitoring posts.  Workers assumed that this was probably from 
venting the Unit 1 PCV.  
12-Mar  1115  Radiation levels were decreasing, which indicated that the venting was not fully effective.  PCV pressure stabilized at 
approximately 109 psia (0.75 MPa abs). 
12-Mar  -- 
The ERC team was informed that a small air compressor was in a subcontractor’s office.  Workers retrieved drawings 
and took pictures of the connection point and planned how to install the compressor to enable remote operation of 
the air-operated valve in the vent system from the control room. 
12-Mar  1139  The government was notified that one of the operators who had entered the torus room to attempt to vent the PCV 
had received 10.6 rem (106 mSv) radiation dose. 
12-Mar  1205  Reactor water level decreased to 59 inches (1,500 mm) below TAF.   
12-Mar  1400 
A temporary air compressor was located and transferred to the equipment bay, and needed fittings were 
located.  The compressor was installed in the equipment bay to provide workers with some protection from 
increasing dose rates.  At approximately 1400, the compressor was installed and started. 
12-Mar  1430 
Operators opened the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve.   The venting evolution and release of 
radioactive materials was confirmed based on an indicated decrease in containment pressure.  It was reported to the 
government at 1518. 
12-Mar  1450  Venting resulted in containment pressure lowering to 84 psia (0.58 MPa). 
12-Mar  1453  Fire engines had injected a total of 80 tons of fresh water into the reactor. 
12-Mar  1454  The site superintendent directed the injection of seawater into the reactor. 
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12-Mar  --  The Unit 1 fire protection tank was running out of water.  Water transfers from other tanks continued, and work to 
pump seawater into the reactors commenced. 
12-Mar  -- 
Workers began using a main condenser backwash valve pit, which flooded during the tsunami, as a water source to 
supply the fire pumps.  The pit was closer to the units and at a higher elevation than the sea, making injection easier.  
Three fire engines were connected in series to increase the discharge pressure. 
12-Mar  1518 
The government was informed that the standby liquid control system was being recovered to allow borated water to 
be injected into the reactor as soon as the system was operable.  Seawater injection into the reactor through the fire 
protection piping was also planned to start as soon as the lineup was competed and power was available.  
12-Mar 
apx 
1530 
Work to provide temporary power from a mobile generator to the Unit 2 standby liquid control system was 
completed. 
12-Mar  1536  A hydrogen explosion occurred in the reactor building (secondary containment). 
12-Mar  1536 
The explosion caused extensive damage to the reactor building and injured five workers.  Debris ejected by the 
explosion damaged the temporary power cables, along with one of the large portable generators.   The temporary 
power supply for the standby liquid control system and the hoses that had been staged for seawater injection were 
damaged beyond use.  Although the fire engines were damaged, they were still usable.  The injured workers were 
carried to safety.  Station workers, including the personnel working on the standby liquid control system and laying 
temporary power cables, had to evacuate for an accountability.  The area surrounding Unit 1 was strewn with highly 
radioactive debris, so cleanup required support from radiation protection personnel.   
12-Mar  1627 
Radiation dose rates at the monitoring post reached 101.5 mrem/hr (1,015 µSv/hr), which exceeded the 50 mrem/hr 
(500 µSv/hr) limit specified in Article 15, clause 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency 
Preparedness (abnormal increase in radiation dose at the site boundary).  This was reported to the authorities. 
12-Mar  1720  Workers began inspecting the condition of fire trucks, buildings, and other facilities following the explosion.  
12-Mar  1825  The Prime Minister ordered the population within 12.4 mile (20 km) radius of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Station to evacuate. 
12-Mar  1830 
Field inspections revealed the area around the units was littered with debris, and the equipment that had been 
staged to provide power to the standby liquid control system and hoses staged to inject seawater had been damaged 
and were no longer usable. 
12-Mar  1904  The injection of nonborated seawater into the reactor commenced using the fire engines. 
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12-Mar  2045  Operators commenced injecting water into the reactor through the core spray lines with borated seawater using fire 
engines. 
12-Mar  2045  Workers began adding boron to the seawater being injected into Unit 1. 
14-Mar  0110  All injection to the reactor was stopped because of a low level in the main condenser backwash valve pit.     
19-Mar  --  A cable from a nearby transmission line was connected to the station.   
20-Mar  1546  A 480-volt emergency low-voltage switchboard (power center 2C) was energized using power supplied by a 
temporary line from the Tohoku nuclear station power line.  
23-Mar  --  Reactor injection was changed to the feedwater system because of indications that the core spray injection nozzles 
were clogging from salt accumulation. 
24-Mar  1130  Lighting was restored to the units 1-2 control room . 
25-Mar  1537  Reactor injection was changed from seawater to fresh water. 
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11-Mar  1446  Earthquake causes seismic motion in excess of the reactor protection system scram setpoints.  A level 3 state of 
emergency was automatically declared for the earthquake. 
11-Mar  1447  Automatic reactor scram signal on seismic trip 
11-Mar  1447  The main turbine automatically tripped. 
11-Mar  1447  Emergency diesel generators started and loaded. 
11-Mar  1450  Operators start reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) to control reactor water level and pressure.   
11-Mar  1451  RCIC automatically tripped due to high reactor water level. 
11-Mar  1501  Operators confirmed the reactor was subcritical. 
11-Mar  1502  Operators manually started RCIC. 
11-Mar  1506  The Headquarters for Major Disaster Countermeasures was established in the TEPCO office in Tokyo to assess damages 
from the earthquake and recover from the electric outage in TEPCO's service area.  
11-Mar  1507  Torus cooling was placed in service.   
11-Mar  1525  Torus spray was placed in service.   
11-Mar  1527  The first wave of a series of tsunamis, generated by the earthquake, arrived at the station.  
11-Mar  1528  RCIC automatically tripped on high reactor water level. 
11-Mar  1535  The second tsunami hit the station.   
11-Mar  1539  Operators manually restarted RCIC. 
11-Mar  1541  A loss of all AC power occurs.  
11-Mar  --  Lighting and indications were lost as AC and DC power systems failed.  Control room lighting, including emergency 
lighting, failed, leaving the control room completely dark.   
11-Mar  1542  TEPCO entered its emergency plan because of the loss of all AC power, in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 1 of the 
Nuclear Disaster Law.  Government offices were notified.   The corporate Emergency Response Center was established. 
11-Mar  -- 
Flooding caused a loss of the instrumentation power system, resulting in a major loss of control board instrumentation, 
including reactor water level.  The operating status of RCIC was unknown because of the control board instrumentation 
loss.  
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11-Mar  -- 
Inspections revealed that switchyard breaker damage would prevent off-site power from being restored soon.  Diesel 
generators were not operable and restoration was difficult because either the engines or the associated switchgear were 
submerged.  It was concluded that power restoration using power supply vehicles was necessary. 
11-Mar  -- 
Although high- and low-voltage power supply vehicles headed to Fukushima Daiichi, they were not able to drive to the 
site quickly because of traffic and damaged roads.  TEPCO considered transporting the power supply vehicles using 
helicopters, but the power supply vehicles weighed too much.  TEPCO requested that the Tohoku Electric Power Company 
dispatch power supply vehicles to Fukushima Daiichi. 
11-Mar  -- 
Visual inspections and insulation resistance tests were performed on metal clad switchgear (M/C) and power centers 
(P/Cs) to determine the extent of the damage from the tsunami.  All of the Unit 1 and Unit 3 M/C and P/Cs were 
inoperable.  At Unit 2, all of the M/C and some of the P/Cs at were inoperable.  Later, it was confirmed four of seven P/Cs 
were operable. 
11-Mar  -- 
TEPCO decided to connect a power supply vehicle to the primary side of a Unit 2 power transformer (6.9-kV/480V) to 
provide 480 volts to energize the control rod drive and standby liquid control pumps.  Considering the distance to the P/C 
of Unit 2 and the ability to run cables, the power supply vehicle was driven to the side of the Unit 2 turbine building.  
11-Mar  1636 
TEPCO again entered the emergency plan in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law because 
operators concluded they could not determine reactor water level and the status of injection into the reactor.  The 
government was notified at 1645. 
11-Mar  -- 
Temporary batteries and cables were gathered and carried to the units 1-2 control room.  After confirming the wiring 
layout using drawings, batteries were connected to instrument panels.  The top priority was to verify the status of water 
injection into the RPV, so efforts were focused on connecting batteries to the DC-powered reactor water level indicator.  
11-Mar  1712  The site superintendent directed workers to investigate methods of injecting water into the reactor using the fire 
protection system or fire trucks.  
11-Mar  --  Operators reviewed methods for alternative water injection using the accident management (AMG) procedures and 
confirmed the injection path using the installed fire pump into the RPV via the core spray system. 
11-Mar  -- 
Operators established an alternative water injection flow path via the residual heat removal system by manually opening 
valves in the turbine and reactor building to establish an injection path after the reactor pressure decreased to 100 psi 
(0.69 MPa).  This was done before the reactor was depressurized so the valves would be in the proper position should 
dose rates increase and access become difficult. 
11-Mar  2049  A small portable electric generator was installed, which restored some temporary lighting in the units 1-2 control room. 
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11-Mar  2050  The Fukushima Prefecture ordered evacuation of the population within 1.2 mile (2 km) radius of the station. 
11-Mar  2102 
Operators did not have reactor water level indication in the control room and were unable to verify the injection of water 
into the reactor using RCIC.  The operators notified the government of the potential for water level to lower to the top of 
active fuel (TAF). 
11-Mar  2113  The government was notified that reactor water level was estimated to reach TAF at 2140. 
11-Mar  2123  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of inhabitants within a 1.9 mile (3 km) radius of the station and sheltering for 
those within a 1.9 to 6.2 mile (3 to 10 km) radius. 
11-Mar  2150  Water level indication was restored in the control room; level indicated 134 inches (3,400 mm) above TAF. 
11-Mar  --  Late in the evening of March 11 and into the early morning of March 12, power supply vehicles from Tohoku Electric 
Power Company and TEPCO arrived at the site. 
11-Mar  --  TEPCO's power supply vehicles were given priority for connecting cables. 
11-Mar  2325  Drywell pressure indication was restored, and indicated pressure was 20 psia (0.141 MPa). 
12-Mar  -- 
Operators reviewed valve drawings to determine if they could open the valves required for venting manually, or whether 
they would need to attach some type of actuator to force the valve open.  Based on their reviews of the piping and 
instrumentation diagrams, accident management procedures, and the vent operating procedure, the operators 
developed a method for venting Unit 2.  The motor-operated valve could be opened manually, but the suppression 
chamber air-operated vent valve could not.  The operators prepared a venting procedure and reviewed the locations of 
the vent valves. 
12-Mar  0030  The government confirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) was completed.  
12-Mar  -- 
Wearing breathing protection and boots, workers attempted to verify the condition of RCIC, but field conditions made 
this very difficult.  Work that would normally take approximately 10 minutes required more than one hour to complete.  
At around 0100, operators went to the RCIC room. The room was dark, and the water level in the room came nearly to 
the top of the workers’ boots , so they turned back without getting close enough to check system operation.  However, 
they could hear faint metallic sounds, indicating the system was operating.  Because of the lack of communications 
methods, the workers had to return to the control room to report their findings.  
12-Mar  0130  At approximately 0130, TEPCO officials informed the Prime Minister, Minister of METI, and NISA of their proposal to vent 
the containment.  Concurrence was received from the agencies. 
12-Mar  0145  The government confirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) was completed.  
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12-Mar  0200 
At around 0200, workers made another attempt to verify RCIC operation.  This time, water flooding in the RCIC room had 
increased, and workers could not enter the room.  On this attempt, workers checked reactor pressure and RCIC pump 
discharge pressure on an instrument rack in the reactor building.  RCIC pump discharge pressure was high, so workers 
concluded RCIC was operating.   
12-Mar  0255 
Field workers returned to the control room to report that RCIC was in operation on Unit 2.  The control room operators 
forwarded this information to the Emergency Response Center.  Based on this report, venting of the Unit 1 containment 
was given a higher priority.  The operators proceeded with the lineup to vent Unit 1 and, at the same time, monitored 
parameters on Unit 2. 
12-Mar  0306  A press conference was held to announce plans to vent the PCV.  
12-Mar  0333  An evaluation of the potential off-site exposure from venting was provided to the government.  
12-Mar  0423 
Increasing radiation levels were observed in the area around the main gate.  Dose rates increased from 0.0069 mrem/hr 
(0.069 µSv/hr) at 0400 to 0.059 mrem/hr (0.59 µSv/hr) at 0423.  The government and associated authorities were notified 
at 0455. 
12-Mar 
apx. 
 0500 
Operators in the control room were directed to wear full face masks with charcoal filters and coveralls.  Dose rates in the 
control room increased to the point that Unit 1 operators moved to the Unit 2 side of the control room.  
12-Mar  0544  The Prime Minister ordered evacuation of the population out to 6.2 miles (10 km) from the station. 
12-Mar  0650  The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry ordered venting of units 1 and 2 containment in accordance with the Act on 
Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.  
12-Mar  0711  The Prime Minister arrived at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. 
12-Mar  0804  The Prime Minister departed Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. 
12-Mar  -- 
The cable was more than 4 inches (10 cm) in diameter; about 656 feet (200 meters) long, and weighed more than 1 ton.  
Laying this kind of cable usually takes days using machinery, but 40 TEPCO personnel laid the cable in four to five hours by 
hand.  It was very difficult work because of extremely bad working conditions, such as darkness, flooding from the 
tsunami, debris, and lost manhole covers.  It was challenging to locate cable penetrations in the dark, and some doors 
needed to be destroyed to route the cable.  Earthquake aftershocks and recurring tsunami warnings caused work to be 
interrupted periodically. 
12-Mar  --  Work to connect the cable to the power center was performed by several engineers, and the job took several hours. 
12-Mar  --  The lack of power challenged communications, causing workers to have to walk to communicate, which was very time-
consuming. 
   Unit 2 Validated Event Timeline      INPO 11-005 
85 
Date  Time  Unit 2 Actions 
12-Mar  1530  The primary side of the power cabinet was connected to the temporary cable, completing the lineup for temporary power 
to standby liquid control. 
12-Mar  1536 
An explosion occurred inside the Unit 1 reactor building, resulting in a large amount of flying debris.  The temporary 
cables, generators, and hoses that had been staged for injecting seawater were damaged.  Workers had to evacuate to 
the Emergency Response Center. 
12-Mar  1627 
The radiation dose rate at the monitoring post reached 101.5 mrem/hr (1.015 mSv/hr), which exceeded the 50 mrem/hr 
(500 µSv/hr) limit specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in 
radiation dose at the site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities. 
12-Mar  1730  The site superintendent ordered preparations to begin for venting the containment. 
12-Mar  -- 
RCIC injection continued, and drywell pressure was stable at 29–44 psia (200-300 kPa abs.).  Knowing that venting would 
be required eventually, operators commenced preparations for lining up to vent the Unit 2 and Unit 3 containments.  
Operators planned to manually open the vent valves (other than the rupture disk) because the dose in the field was 
currently low. 
12-Mar  1825  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the population within a 12.4 mile (20 km) radius of Fukushima Daiichi. 
13-Mar  0810 
The shift supervisor, wearing a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and protective equipment, opened the motor-
operated containment vent valve 25 percent in accordance with the procedure.  Containment pressure was 50.8 psia 
(0.35 MPa abs). 
13-Mar  0856 
The dose rate measured 88.2 mrem/hr (882 µSv/h) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0901. 
13-Mar  1015  The site superintendent ordered operators to vent the containment. 
13-Mar  1035  Drywell pressure indicated 1.45 psia (0.010 MPa  abs). 
13-Mar  1100 
Using the small generator installed for the temporary lighting in the control room as a power source, operators opened 
the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve.  The vent lineup was completed, but the rupture disk remained 
intact because drywell pressure remained below the 62 psig (427 kPa gauge) rupture pressure of the disk.   
13-Mar  1120  A press release was made to announce venting the Unit 2 containment.  
13-Mar  1205  The site superintendent ordered preparations for injecting seawater into the reactor.  
   Unit 2 Validated Event Timeline      INPO 11-005 
86 
Date  Time  Unit 2 Actions 
13-Mar  1415 
The dose rate measured 90.5 mrem/hr (905 µSv/h) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 1423. 
13-Mar  1518  The projected off-site dose associated with venting was reported to the authorities. 
14-Mar  0220 
The dose rate measured 75.1 mrem/hr (751 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the site 
boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0424. 
14-Mar  0240 
The dose rate measured 65 mrem/hr (650 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0537. 
14-Mar  0400 
The dose rate measured 82 mrem/hr (820 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0800. 
14-Mar  0912 
The dose rate measured 51.9 mrem/hr (518.7 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) 
limit specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at 
the site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0934. 
14-Mar  1101  The Unit 3 reactor building exploded.   
14-Mar  --  The explosion damaged the fire engine and hoses that had been staged to inject seawater into the reactor.   
14-Mar  --  The explosion knocked the power supply loose from the solenoid for the control air valve to the suppression chamber 
large air-operated vent valve, and the valve closed.  The venting lineup had to be performed again. 
14-Mar  --  After the explosion, all workers except the shift workers in the control room were evacuated to the Emergency Response 
Center.  The status of the work in the field had to be confirmed and resumption of work was delayed. 
14-Mar  1130  Containment pressure was stable around 65.3 psia (450 kPa abs) to 66.7 psia (460 kPa abs), stable below the pressure 
needed to open the rupture disk. 
14-Mar  -- 
Shortly after 1200, a site survey confirmed scattered contaminated rubble and equipment damage caused by the Unit 3 
explosion.  A decision was made to change the water supply and draw a suction directly from the shallow draft quay 
(harbor) instead of the main condenser backwash valve pit of Unit 3, which was now covered with contaminated debris.  
In the high radiation environment surrounded by scattered rubble, personnel prepared a new water injection line by 
using available fire engines and hose pipes. 
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14-Mar  1230 
Operators were concerned about the ability to depressurize the reactor with the suppression chamber saturated.  
Suppression chamber temperature was 301
oF (149.3
oC) and pressure was 70.5 psia (486 kPa abs).  Operators decided to 
vent containment first,  then open a safety relief valve (SRV) and start water injection. 
14-Mar  1305  Workers realigned fire hoses and fire engines in preparation for injecting seawater into the reactor. 
14-Mar  1318  Reactor water level was 94.5 inches (2400 mm) above TAF and trending downward.  The government and other 
authorities were notified of the ongoing preparations to inject seawater. 
14-Mar  1325 
Based on a lowering trend in reactor water level, operators concluded that RCIC may have failed.  TEPCO determined this 
constituted a loss of reactor cooling in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law.  The  
government and associated authorities were notified at 1338.  At the time of the trip, indicated reactor water level was 
approximately 94.5 inches (2,400 mm) above the top of active fuel and drywell pressure was 67 psi (465 kPa).     
14-Mar  1443  A fire engine was connected to the fire protection system. 
14-Mar  --  Between 1500 and 1600, frequent aftershocks made work difficult as workers repeatedly had to take refuge. 
14-Mar  1528  The government and associated authorities were notified that reactor water level was estimated to reach TAF at 1630.   
14-Mar  1600 
Because of delays in opening the suppression chamber vent valve, the priority for reactor depressurization was changed. 
The site superintendent directed that the work to open the suppression chamber vent valve be performed in parallel with 
reactor depressurization. 
14-Mar  -- 
Because of a lack of power, temporary batteries were necessary to open the SRV.  Batteries were gathered from cars,  
carried to the control room, and connected.  However, the voltage was not adequate, so additional batteries were 
scavenged and added.  Operators attempted to operate several SRVs.  Efforts to depressurize the reactor continued until 
around 1800, when depressurization began.  The high suppression chamber temperature and pressure resulted in the 
reactor depressurizing more slowly than desired.   
14-Mar  1600  After receiving permission to recommence work after the explosion, operators continue attempts to open the large 
suppression chamber air-operated vent valve. 
14-Mar  1600  Reactor water level decreased to 12 inches (300 mm) above TAF. 
14-Mar  1620  The large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve could not be opened because of insufficient air pressure from the 
air compressor. 
14-Mar  1620  Indicated reactor water level reached TAF. 
14-Mar  1630  The fire engine was started in preparation for injecting seawater to the reactor. 
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14-Mar  1634  The government and associated authorities were notified that in addition to the start of reactor depressurization, 
seawater injection would commence using the fire protection system.  Reactor pressure was 1,015 psi (6.998 MPa). 
14-Mar  1717  Reactor water level decreased to TAF.  This was reported to the authorities at 1725. 
14-Mar  1800  Reactor pressure was 1,035 psig (7.133 MPa gauge). 
14-Mar 
apx.  
1800  At approximately 1800, operators opened an SRV and began depressurizing the reactor. 
14-Mar  1803  Reactor pressure was 881 psig (6.075 MPa gauge). 
14-Mar  1822  Reactor water level lowered to 146 inches (3,700 mm) below TAF, the bottom of the indicating range, indicating the core 
was completely uncovered.  This was reported to the authorities at 1932. 
14-Mar  -- 
Despite attempts to vent containment, pressure remained stable.  Operators began work to open the small suppression 
chamber air-operated vent valve in addition to the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve to reopen the vent 
path.  However, the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve would not open.  Workers believed the solenoid 
on the control air valve had malfunctioned. 
14-Mar  1903  Reactor pressure stabilizes at approximately 91.4 psig (0.63 MPa gauge). 
14-Mar     The radiation on site was high, forcing workers to make rounds to check the operating status of the fire engines. 
14-Mar  1920  While touring to check the status of the fire engines, workers discovered that an engine had run out of fuel and no 
seawater was being injected into the reactor. 
14-Mar  1954  After a fire engine was refueled and started, seawater injection commenced into the reactor via the fire protection 
system. 
14-Mar  1957  A second fire engine was started to augment seawater injection into the reactor. 
14-Mar 
apx.  
2100 
Operators opened the small suppression chamber air-operated vent valve.  This established the venting lineup except the 
rupture disk.  Containment pressure was lower than the working pressure of the rupture disk at 62 psig (427 kPa gauge), 
so venting did not occur.  The vent valves remained open and operators continued to monitor containment pressure.  
Indicated containment pressure was 60.8 psia (0.419 MPa abs). 
14-Mar  2120  A second SRV was opened, and reactor water level trended up.  This was reported to the government and associated 
authorities at 2134. 
14-Mar  2130  Reactor water level was 118 inches (3,000 mm) below TAF.  
14-Mar  2135 
The dose rate measured by a monitoring car was 76 mrem/hr (760 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 2235. 
   Unit 2 Validated Event Timeline      INPO 11-005 
89 
Date  Time  Unit 2 Actions 
14-Mar  2200  Reactor water level recovered to 63 inches (1,600 mm) below TAF, trending up.   
14-Mar  2250 
Containment pressure increased to 78 psia (0.54 MPa abs), which exceeded the maximum  design pressure of 62 psig (427 
kPa gauge).  This represented an abnormal increase in containment pressure as specified in Article15, paragraph 1 of the 
Nuclear Disaster Law.  This was reported to the authorities at 2339. 
14-Mar  2250 
Reactor pressure increased unexpectedly, accompanied by a drop in reactor water level.  Reactor pressure increased from 
62 psig (0.428 MPa gauge) at 2240 to 264.4 psig (1.823 MPa gauge) at 2250.  At the same times, reactor water level 
lowered from 27.6 inches (700 mm) below TAF to 63 inches (1,600 mm) below TAF. 
14-Mar  2325  Containment pressure increased above 101.5 psia (0.7 MPa abs).   
14-Mar  2330  Reactor pressure again began to drop.  The highest reactor pressure was 456.9 psig (3.15 MPa gauge). 
14-Mar  -- 
Drywell pressure was trending up and reached 101.5 psia (0.7 MPa abs); but in contrast, suppression chamber pressure 
remained stable around 43.5 to 58 psia (300 to 400 kPa abs).  The pressure was not equalizing between the containment 
and the suppression chamber. 
14-Mar  --  Pressure in the suppression chamber was lower than rupture disk pressure and drywell pressure was increasing, so 
operators decided to open the small drywell air-operated vent valve. 
15-Mar  0002 
Operators opened the small drywell air-operated vent valve.  The vent line lineup was completed to vent from the 
drywell, except for the rupture disk, which remained closed.  Containment pressure remained stable at approximately 109 
psia (750 kPa abs).  A few minutes later, operators checked and noted that the small air-operated valve had closed. 
15-Mar  0128  Reactor pressure decreased to 91 psig (0.63 MPa gauge). 
15-Mar  0300  Containment pressure exceeded maximum design pressure, and operators again attempted to vent the containment to 
reduce pressure but were unsuccessful.  This was reported to the government and associated authorities at 0417. 
15-Mar  0600 
At around 0600, a loud noise was heard in the area around the torus.  While suppression chamber pressure dropped to 0 
psia (0 Mpa abs), indicating a potential instrument failure, drywell pressure remained high, indicating 105.9 psia (0.73 
MPa abs).  At that time, reactor water level was 110 inches (2,800 mm) below TAF.   
15-Mar  0650 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 58.4 mrem/hr (583.7 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0700. 
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15-Mar  0700 
The government was notified that all nonessential personnel (650 people) were evacuated to Fukushima Daini, leaving 70 
people at the station.  The shift operators periodically went to the control room to log containment pressure and other 
critical parameters. 
15-Mar  0811 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 80.7 mrem/hr (807 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal emission of radioactive materials 
from a fire or explosion.  This was reported to the authorities at 0836. 
15-Mar  0825  Workers observed steam rising from the area around the fifth floor of the reactor building.  This was reported to the 
authorities at 0918. 
15-Mar  1100  The Prime Minister directed that residents living between 12.4 and 18.6 miles (20 and 30 km) of the station take shelter. 
15-Mar  1125 
Containment pressure decreased from 106 psia (730 kPa abs) at 0720shortly after a loud noise was heard around the 
torusto 22.5 psia (155 kPa abs) at 1125.  No information is available regarding containment pressure between the two 
times. 
15-Mar  1600 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 53.2 mrem/hr (531.6 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 1622. 
15-Mar  2305 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 454.8 mrem/hr (4548 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 2320. 
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11-Mar  1446  An earthquake caused seismic motion in excess of the reactor protection system scram setpoints.  A level 3 state of 
emergency was automatically declared for the earthquake. 
11-Mar  1447  Automatic reactor scram signal on seismic trip 
11-Mar  1447  Operators manually tripped the main turbine.  
11-Mar 
apx. 
1448  Emergency diesel generators started and loaded. 
11-Mar  1451  Operators commenced breaking main condenser vacuum. 
11-Mar  1454  Operators confirmed the reactor was subcritical. 
11-Mar  1505  The operators manually initiated reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC). 
11-Mar  1506  The Headquarters for Major Disaster Countermeasures was established in the TEPCO office in Tokyo to assess damages 
from the earthquake and recover from the electric outage in TEPCO's service area.  
11-Mar  1515  Operators completed breaking main condenser vacuum. 
11-Mar  1525  RCIC tripped on high reactor water level. 
11-Mar  1527  The first wave of a series of tsunamis, generated by the earthquake, arrived at the station.  
11-Mar  1535  The second tsunami hit the station. 
11-Mar  --  Unnecessary DC loads were shed to extend battery life. 
11-Mar  1538  All AC power was lost. 
11-Mar  1542  TEPCO entered its emergency plan because of the loss of all AC power, in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 1 of the 
Nuclear Disaster Law.  Government offices were notified.  The corporate Emergency Response Center was established. 
11-Mar  1603  Operators manually restarted RCIC and prepared HPCI for startup. 
11-Mar  1636  The second emergency level was announced. 
11-Mar  2050  Fukushima Prefecture ordered evacuation of the population within a 1.2 mile (2 km) radius of the station. 
11-Mar  2123  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the population within a 1.9 mile (3 km) radius of the station and sheltering 
for the population within a 1.9 to 6.2 mile (3 km to 10 km) radius of the station. 
11-Mar  2158  A small portable electric generator was installed, which restored some temporary lighting in the units 3-4 control room. 
12-Mar  0030  The government confirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) was completed.  
12-Mar  0145  The government reconfirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) was completed.   
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12-Mar  0423 
Increasing radiation levels were observed in the area around the main gate.  Dose rates increased from 0.0069 mrem/hr 
(0.069 µSv/hr) at 0400 to 0.059 mrem/hr (0.59 µSv/hr) at 0423.  The government and associated authorities were 
notified at 0455. 
12-Mar  0544  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the population out to a 6.2 mile (10 km) radius. 
12-Mar  0711  The Prime Minister arrived. 
12-Mar  0804  The Prime Minister departed. 
12-Mar  1136  RCIC tripped.  
12-Mar  --  Station fire engines were being used to inject water into Unit 1.  Additional fire engines were requested but were not 
available. 
12-Mar  1210  Primary containment pressure had slowly increased, peaking at 57 psia (0.39 MPa abs). 
12-Mar  1235  HPCI automatically started on low reactor water level.   
12-Mar  1730  The site superintendent ordered preparations for venting the containment to proceed. 
12-Mar  -- 
HPCI injection continued.  Knowing that venting would be required eventually, operators commenced preparations for 
lining up to vent the Unit 2 and Unit 3 containments.  Operators planned to manually open the vent valves (other than 
the rupture disk) because the dose in the field was currently low. 
12-Mar  1825  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the population within a 12.4 mile (20 km) radius of the station. 
12-Mar  -- 
After 2100, operators started a review of the vent procedures to identify the sequence and location of vent valves, 
which were written on a whiteboard.  Emergency response workers reviewed the vent procedure for Unit 1.  Based on 
that review and the accident management procedure for Unit 3, they developed a procedure to manually vent Unit 3 
and provided it to the control room operators. 
13-Mar  0242  The HPCI system automatically tripped, which resulted in a loss of all water injection sources.  
13-Mar  -- 
Operators attempted to restart water injection by installed equipment but were unsuccessful.  HPCI could not be started 
because the batteries were exhausted.  Operators attempted to start RCIC locally, but it would not start.  They next 
attempted water injection by diesel-driven fire pump but could not because reactor pressure had increased as high as 
approximately 580 psi (4 MPa).  Attempts to restore power to the standby liquid control system were unsuccessful 
because the poor working conditions (darkness, debris, flooding) prevented temporary power installation from being 
completed. 
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13-Mar  -- 
To inject water by fire engines, it was necessary to decrease the reactor pressure by operating SRVs, but no SRVs were 
available because the batteries were depleted.  All of the available batteries had already been used, so workers 
scavenged batteries from  cars and connected them to instrumentation in the control room and used them to power an 
SRV. 
13-Mar 
apx. 
0450 
To open the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve, workers used the small generator that was installed to 
provide temporary lighting in the control room to provide power to the valve solenoid.  An operator checked the valve 
indication locally at the torus room, but the valve indicated closed.  The torus room was very hot and the room was 
completely dark, which made for a difficult working environment. 
13-Mar  0500  Reactor pressure increased to greater than 1,070 psi (7.38 MPa).   
13-Mar  0500  Reactor water level was 79 inches (2000 mm) below TAF and lowering.   
13-Mar  0510  Because the RCIC could not be restarted, TEPCO determined that a loss of reactor cooling had occurred in accordance 
with Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law.  Government offices were notified at 0558. 
13-Mar  0515  The site superintendent instructed operators to complete the lineup for venting the containment. 
13-Mar  0523 
The solenoid for the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve was energized, but the vent valve remained 
closed.  Operators determined that there was insufficient air pressure to operate the valve.  The operators replaced a 
temporary air bottle that had been installed to provide air pressure, and the valve opened. 
13-Mar  0550  A press release was made to announce venting. 
13-Mar  0619  TEPCO determined reactor water level reached the top of active fuel (TAF) at 0415, and a notification was made to the 
government offices. 
13-Mar  0735  The government offices were notified of the dose expected to be received during venting. 
13-Mar  0739  Containment spray was initiated in the containment using a fire engine.  The government was notified at 0756. 
13-Mar  0745  Reactor water level decreased to 118 inches (3,000 mm) below TAF, reactor pressure was 1,060 psig (7.310 Mpa gauge), 
and primary containment pressure increased to 67 psia (0.46 MPa abs).   
13-Mar  0835  Operators opened the motor-operated containment vent valve 15 percent, as directed by the procedure. 
13-Mar  0841  The operators opened the large air-operated torus vent valve, completing the vent lineup except the rupture disk.  The 
government was notified at 0846. 
13-Mar  0856 
The dose rate measured 88.2 mrem/hr (882 µSv/h) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0901. 
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13-Mar  0908  Workers had scavenged enough batteries to power the SRVs, and the operators opened an SRV to depressurize the 
reactor.  At 0920, the government was notified that water injection would be started through a fire protection line. 
13-Mar  0924  Containment pressure lowered from 92 psia (0.637 MPa abs) at 0910 to 78 psia (0.540 MPa abs).  The Emergency 
Response Center determined that venting had successfully started at about 0920. 
13-Mar  0925  Reactor pressure lowered to 50.8 psig (0.35 MPa gauge), and injection of borated fresh water into the reactor using the 
fire system began. 
13-Mar 
apx. 
0928 
The air cylinder providing air to the large air-operated vent valve was losing pressure.  Workers investigated and found a 
leak on one fitting, which they repaired. 
13-Mar  0936  Operators verified that containment pressure was decreasing and that the injection of water into the reactor had 
started.  The government was notified. 
13-Mar  1030  The site superintendent ordered workers to be ready to commence injection using seawater. 
13-Mar  1117  The air-operated torus vent valve was found closed.  The pressure in the air cylinder being used to provide air was 
decreasing. 
13-Mar  --  Attempts to lock open the valve were not successful because of the extreme adverse conditions in the torus room.  The 
room was dark and hot, and the torus was shaking because of the open SRV. 
13-Mar  1220 
Injection of fresh water was stopped as the water ran out.  Workers had prepared to make a swift change to seawater 
injection, but an aftershock and subsequent evacuation order occurred while the work was being carried out, so the 
swap was delayed.  Work was also ongoing to replenish the fresh water supply. 
13-Mar  1230  Workers replaced the air bottle, and the large air-operated torus vent valve was opened.   
13-Mar  1300  Reactor pressure decreased to 28 psi (0.19 MPa), and reactor water level was approximately 79 inches (2,000 mm) 
below TAF by the lowest indication. 
13-Mar  1312  Workers commenced injecting seawater into the reactor using fire trucks and the fire protection system. 
13-Mar  -- 
Requests for off-site fire engines were made, but it was difficult for those fire engines to reach the plant, because the 
roads were impassable and dose rates on the site were increasing.  When they finally were able to come, it took longer 
for the fire engines to come on station because the drivers needed to be changed to site workers off site. 
13-Mar  -- 
Other sources for seawater were considered, including accumulated water in the basement of the Unit 4 turbine 
building, which was accessed by breaking the entrance shutters of truck bay doors and moving fire engines into place.  
However, this was unsuccessful.  Workers also considered taking water from the discharge channel of Unit 4 or the 
training center pool, but this also did not work. 
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13-Mar  1415 
The dose rate measured 90.5 mrem/hr (905 µSv/h) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 1423. 
13-Mar  1431  Radiation dose rates over 30 rem/hr (300 mSv/hr) were measured at the north side reactor building air lock, with visible 
steam and 10 rem/hr (100 mSv/hr) at the south side air lock. 
13-Mar  1500  Containment pressure began to increase from 11.6 psia (0.08 MPa abs) to 13 psia (0.09 MPa abs). 
13-Mar  1528  The dose rate in the Unit 3 side of the control room reached 1.2 rem/hr (12 mSv/hr), and operators moved to the Unit 4 
side. 
13-Mar  1752  A temporary compressor became available for use.  Workers then began to attach the compressor to the instrument air 
system to keep the suppression chamber air-operated vent valve open. 
13-Mar  2010  A reduction in containment pressure indicated that the suppression chamber air-operated vent valve was open.  Over 
the next five days, losses of air pressure or DC power to the solenoid caused the valve to periodically close. 
14-Mar  0110  Injection into the reactor was stopped because of a low level in the main condenser backwash valve pit being used as a 
water source. 
14-Mar  0200  Containment pressure was trending upward at 38.4 psia (0.265 MPa abs).  Personnel decided to open the small 
suppression chamber air-operated vent valve. 
14-Mar  0220 
The dose rate measured 75.1 mrem/hr (751 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) 
limit specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at 
the site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0424. 
14-Mar  0240 
The dose rate measured 65 mrem/hr (650 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0537. 
14-Mar  0300  Containment pressure increased from 38.4 psia (0.265 MPa abs) at 0200, to 45.7 psia (0.315 MPa abs) at 0300. 
14-Mar  0310  Reactor water level decreased to 91 inches (2,300 mm) below TAF by the lowest indication.     
14-Mar  0320  Workers moved the fire engine around, allowing the hose to drop deeper into the valve pit; and seawater injection into 
the reactor was restored using a fire engine.   
14-Mar  0340  The solenoid valve for the small suppression chamber air-operated valve was energized in an attempt to lower PCV 
pressure.  Containment pressure was approximately 47.9 psia (0.33 MPa abs) and continued to trend up. 
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14-Mar  0400 
The dose rate measured 82 mrem/hr (820 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0800. 
14-Mar  0520  Work began to open the small air-operated valve for the suppression chamber.  By 0530, containment pressure was 56.6 
psia (0.39 MPa abs) and increasing.   
14-Mar  0610  The small air-operated suppression chamber vent valve was confirmed open. 
14-Mar  0610  After confirming that the small suppression chamber air-operated valve was open, the operators could not maintain the 
valve open because of a loss of air pressure and a loss of DC power to the solenoid.   
14-Mar  0912 
The dose rate measured 51.9 mrem/hr (518.7 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) 
limit specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at 
the site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0934. 
14-Mar  0920  Additional fire engines arrived around sunrise, and workers began using two fire engines that had arrived from off site to 
pump seawater from the shallow draft quay (harbor) into the main condenser backwash valve pit. 
14-Mar  1053  Seven 5-ton Self-Defense Force water supply vehicles arrived at the site and started to supply fresh water to the main 
condenser backwash valve pit. 
14-Mar  1101  The Unit 3 reactor building exploded.  The explosion damaged fire trucks and hoses.  Seawater injection into the reactor 
was lost. 
14-Mar  1101 
All workers except shift personnel in the control room stopped work and evacuated to the Emergency Response Center.  
Four TEPCO employees, 3 contractors, and 4 self-defense personnel were injured (11 total).  The explosion scattered 
highly radioactive debris around the site.  Because of the debris and radiation levels, the backwash valve pit was no 
longer usable as a water source. 
14-Mar  1200  Containment pressure began to increase from 52.2 psia (0.36 MPa abs) to 53.7 psia (0.37 MPa abs). 
14-Mar  1630 
The undamaged fire engine was moved to the shallow draft quay, and a new injection lineup was completed.  Fire 
engines and hoses were rearranged to inject seawater directly from the shallow draft quay into the reactor.  Connecting 
two fire engines in series allowed seawater to supply both units 2 and 3. 
14-Mar  1640  Containment pressure began to lower from 69.6 psia (0.48 MPa abs). 
14-Mar  2230  Containment pressure began to increase from 52.2 psia (0.36 MPa abs), and reactor pressure vessel pressure was 26.1 
psi (0.18 MPa) and increasing. 
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14-Mar  2135 
The dose rate measured by a monitoring car is 76 mrem/hr (760 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 2235. 
15-Mar  0650 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 58.4 mrem/hr (583.7 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0700. 
15-Mar  0700  Nonessential personnel were temporarily evacuated to Fukushima Daini.  Government offices were informed. 
15-Mar  0755  Steam was observed issuing from the upper part of the reactor building.  Government offices were informed. 
15-Mar  0811 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 80.7 mrem/hr (807 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal emission of radioactive materials 
from a fire or explosion.  This was reported to the authorities at 0836. 
15-Mar  1100  The Prime Minister directed that residents living between 12.4 and 18.6 miles (20 and 30 km) of the station take shelter. 
15-Mar  1600 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 53.2 mrem/hr (531.6 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 1622. 
15-Mar  1600  Workers noted that the suppression chamber vent valve had closed. 
15-Mar  1605  The suppression chamber vent valve was opened. 
15-Mar  2305 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 454.8 mrem/hr (4548 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 2320. 
16-Mar  0155  The bypass valve for the suppression chamber air-operated vent valve was opened.  
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I.  Introduction and Summary 
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) appreciates the opportunity to 
offer these comments on the Draft 2011 Integrated Energy Policy Report (IEPR). NRDC 
is a nonprofit membership organization with a long-standing interest in minimizing the 
societal costs of the reliable energy services that Californians demand. We represent our 
nearly 100,000 California members’ interests in receiving affordable energy services and 
reducing the environmental impact of California’s energy consumption.  
NRDC appreciates the ongoing effort of the California Energy Commission 
(Energy Commission or CEC) staff to address the numerous energy issues facing 
California and applauds the overall focus of the Draft IEPR on increasing energy 
efficiency and meeting renewable energy targets. We provide comments on a select 
number of chapters and recommend that the Commission adopt the 2011 IEPR with the 
following additional suggestions.  
II. Chapter 1: Renewable Electricity Status and Issues 
1.  NRDC recommends that Staff include a discussion of the offshore renewable 
energy work of the Marine Renewable Energy Working Group and highlight the 
need for improved policy commitment to clearing development hurdles.  
The Draft 2011 IEPR notes that the technical potential of wave and tidal power is 
32,763 MW and that of offshore wind is 75,400 MW (more than double the technical 
potential of onshore wind).
1  However, the Draft IEPR fails to mention important policy 
initiatives that will help California realize the potential of offshore renewable energy 
sources, while protecting and conserving ocean resources for broad public benefit.
2  
NRDC suggests adding the following language to the list of efforts to improve permitting 
for utility-scale and DG renewable projects, on page 35, to describe the California’s 
Ocean Protection Council’s Marine Renewable Energy working group.  This working 
group was created in March 2010 to address the information needs of state agencies to 
evaluate wave energy proposals, address uncertainty in regulatory processes for test 
                                                 
1 California Energy Commission, 2011. Draft 2011 Integrated Energy Policy Report. Publication Number: 
CEC-100-2011-001-LCD (Draft 2011 IEPR), p.33 
2 Id.    5 
projects, and to facilitate the development of agreements and joint state-federal 
committees to improve coordination of state and federal permitting processes.
3   
We provide the following suggested language for incorporation
4: 
  The Ocean Protection Council recently passed a resolution recommending that 
“ the Energy Commission should adopt an ocean renewable energy policy that 
guides the state’s goals for the development of these renewable energy 
technologies while balancing this development with the protection and 
conservation of ocean resources for broad public benefit” and to “consider 
adopting an ocean renewable energy policy for inclusion in the 2012 IEPR 
update”
5  
In addition to incorporating this language into the final 2011 IEPR, we also strongly urge 
the CEC to include implementation of this resolution as part of the forthcoming 2012 
IEPR scope and update. 
III. Chapter 2: Achieving Cost‐Effective Energy Efficiency for California: Assembly 
Bill 2021 Progress Report 
1.  NRDC urges the CEC to prioritize the recommendations that ensure the public 
utilities truly integrate energy efficiency into procurement planning, and that 
evaluations are sufficiently robust to support using energy efficiency as a 
resource as well as to improve future program planning.    
NRDC appreciates the hard work conducted by CEC staff and stakeholders, such 
as the Northern California Power Authority (NCPA), towards enabling the publicly 
owned utilities (POUs) to achieve all cost-effective energy efficiency. We also recognize 
the resource limitations faced by the utilities of all sizes and the challenges that additional 
requirements bring. However, efficiency is by far the most cost-effective source of 
energy (even after accounting for the additional requirements) that the utilities can use to 
provide electric services to their customers and reduce utility bills. The CEC has been 
and should continue to work on strategies that address the various constraints of the 
different sized utilities as one size does not fit all. The variety of the POUs requires 
additional consideration, but is not inherently a barrier to the CEC moving forward with 
their recommendations. 
                                                 
3 http://www.opc.ca.gov/2010/05/offshore-wave-energy-development/  
4 Throughout these comments, recommended new language is presented as underline and recommended 
language to be omitted is indicated by ”strikethrough” 
5http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/pdf/agenda_items/20111216/7._OceanRenewables/2011.12.16_Oce
anRenewables_Memo.pdf  6 
NRDC supports the recommendations in the Draft 2011 IEPR and will continue to 
be involved in designing improvements to add value to the efficiency work of the 
utilities. We urge the CEC that when implementing the recommendations of the IEPR, to 
prioritize the integration of efficiency into resource planning and to ensure evaluation is 
sufficient to provide critical information to resource and program planners. 
Integrating efficiency into resource planning 
While we appreciate the constraints on many of the utilities to provide additional 
data to the Energy Commission, the CEC and stakeholders cannot assess or support 
utility efforts to improve efficiency integration into resource planning unless there is 
sufficient information to understand the particular circumstances of individual utilities. 
This information is not only important to ensure all utilities are complying with state law, 
but it is also critical to support the POUs efficiency efforts to expand efficiency and save 
customers money. For many utilities, it seems that efficiency is essentially treated as an 
‘add-on’ subject to budget cuts in hard economic times. Instead, if efficiency were treated 
as a resource, the supply of energy efficiency (costing POUs about 2 cents/kWh)
6 would 
not be the first resource to be cut when the benchmark for conventional generation is 
around 9 cents/kWh.
7 If efficiency were truly included in the mix of supply side resource 
options considered when resource planners determine how they will meet the electricity 
needs of their customers, program planners would likely have larger and more consistent 
budgets, yielding greater bill savings for their customers and environmental benefits for 
California.     
In addition, given the resource constraints on both the CEC and the utilities, we 
suggest that if the CEC has not already done so, they should provide a template for their 
requested information to ensure that the data collected are consistent across utilities. 
Also, the CEC could hold a workshop or an informal roundtable on the mechanics of how 
to integrate efficiency into resource planning, including how to design strategies to 
overcome common barriers. The CEC could also work more closely with a few utilities 
during the resource planning process to ensure that efficiency is fully integrated. 
                                                 
6 CMUA, NCPA, SCPPA, Energy Efficiency in California’s Public Power Sector, A Status Report (March 
2011). Available at: http://www.ncpa.com/energy-efficiency-reports-7.html. 
7 CPUC, Energy Division, Resolution E-4298, Table 1: Adopted 2009 Market Price Referents (December 
17, 2009). Available at: http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_RESOLUTION/111386.pdf.  7 
We therefore urge the CEC to prioritize their recommendation to obtain 
comprehensive information on resource planning and suggest the following supplemental 
language on p.55:  
Staff requests that publicly owned utilities provide information by March 
2012…While some publicly owned utilities have performed recent 
integrated resource assessments, they usually treat efficiency as a load 
adjustment, not an equally comparable supply resource.  CEC staff should 
work with the utilities and stakeholders to identify the key barriers to 
integrating efficiency into resource planning and develop strategies for 
overcoming such barriers.  
Evaluation, Measurement, and Verification 
Equally as important and critical to ensuring that efficiency can be relied upon as 
a resource is the continuation of the CEC’s efforts to ensure robust independent 
evaluation. The CEC has conducted a number of workshops over the past year intended 
to aid the POUs in conducting sufficient evaluation, including how best to aggregate 
studies when possible as well as explored methodologies for rotating evaluations of 
programs when possible. The CEC should continue to prioritize this effort along with 
integration of efficiency into procurement to ensure that there is a strong understanding 
of and ability to rely on effective efficiency programs as a resource. We strongly support 
the recommendation in the Draft 2011 IEPR that the CEC will continue to engage with 
the POUs on this matter. 
2.  NRDC recommends that the CEC begin working on improvements to the target 
setting process as soon as possible to ensure the next round of targets are derived 
from sound potential studies. 
We strongly support the CEC’s request for more documentation of the potential 
estimates and energy efficiency targets adopted in order to increase the transparency of 
those processes.
8 Without understanding how models were modified, it is difficult to 
understand what the true potential is for efficiency, what the challenges are for the 
utilities, and how to address barriers to enable greater efficiency savings. While 
documentation is an important first step to understanding the methodology and process of 
the past target setting process, we urge the CEC to focus immediately on improvements 
                                                 
8 Draft 2011 IEPR at 56.  8 
for the next update to allow enough time for collaboration in determining how best to 
move forward and to address particular concerns.  
We provide the following language for incorporation: 
The CEC should convene the utilities and interested stakeholders at least 
18 months prior to the start of the next target setting process to build on 
the improvements to the recent potential model, identify key items that 
require additional guidance, develop a template of key information 
required to assess the potential model, and address other needs to ensure a 
sufficiently robust target setting process. 
 
3.  NRDC recommends the CEC confer with the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) to ensure the 2009 investor owned utility (IOU) data in the 
final 2011 IEPR is consistent with CPUC reports. 
We highlight that the 2009 IOU data presented in Table 5 is slightly different than 
Energy Division’s (ED) 2009 Evaluation Report.
9 According to ED’s 2009 report, total 
IOU expenditures were $786M,
10 energy savings were 3,315 GWh, demand savings were 
542 MW, and natural gas savings were 28 MMTherm.
11 We recommend reaching out to 
the CPUC to ensure that data sources are commensurate. 
IV.  Chapter 3: Achieving Energy Savings in California Buildings 
1.  NRDC recommends that the CEC modify its cost-effectiveness criteria to compare 
energy efficiency with the cost of avoided on-site renewable energy instead of the 
current generation mix.  
The Draft IEPR report states that “the goal is to minimize energy use as much as 
technologically possible through cost-effective efficiency measures, and then generate the 
balance of the building’s energy needs with onsite renewable electricity generation such 
as solar photovoltaic systems or wind-driven electricity generators.”
12  We support this 
approach, but note that the current path we are on would likely result in underachieving 
efficiency thereby requiring energy needs to be met through higher cost renewable 
energy. 
                                                 
9 Id. at 53.  
10 CPUC Energy Division, Energy Efficiency Evaluation Report for the 2009 Bridge Funding Period, 
Executive Summary, p.3 (January 2011).  Available at: 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/D66CCF63-5786-49C7-B250-
00675D91953C/0/EEEvaluationReportforthe2009BFPeriod.pdf. 
11 Id. at 4. 
12 Draft 2011 IEPR at 60.  9 
One way to truly value efficiency as the first procurement resource - and to ensure 
that we capture as much efficiency as possible - is to modify the cost-effectiveness to 
more accurately account for the avoided cost associated with energy efficiency. For 
example, Title 20 cost-effectiveness is currently considered relative to a flat rate of 
$0.14/kWh which corresponds to the current average retail rate of electricity in 
California. This rules out efficiency measures that may not be considered cost-effective 
currently, but may be considerably cheaper than the on-site renewable energy that would 
be needed to fulfill the Zero Net Energy (ZNE) mandate. In the context of ZNE, cost-
effectiveness should be defined as “cheaper than onsite renewable electricity” instead of 
“cheaper than the grid.” This would encourage the acceleration of energy efficiency 
measures so that ZNE buildings can be designed and built in the most cost-effective 
manner.  
The figure below illustrates the sweet spot for cost effectiveness as the intersection 
of the energy efficiency and on-site renewable energy cost curves: 
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  We recommend the following supplemental language to the first recommendation 
on p.67: 
The Energy Commission and the CPUC should work jointly on 
developing a definition of ZNE that incorporates the societal value of 
energy (consistent with the time dependent energy valuation approach 
used for California’s Building Energy Efficiency Standards) and includes 
a modified cost-effectiveness methodology to use on-site renewable 
energy as the appropriate value for avoided cost.  
 
2.  NRDC recommends that the CEC define specific goals for energy savings in each 
building energy load category, including plug loads, appliances, HVAC, lighting 
and water heating such that California achieves its Zero Net Energy goals in the 
most cost-effective manner. 
NRDC recommends that the Energy Commission, in consultation with the CPUC 
and interested stakeholders, determine its best-estimate for the most cost-effective 
combination of on-site renewable energy and energy efficiency, and use those estimates 
to set clear policy targets for each resource. Without quantified goals, we could end up 
with best-effort incremental efficiency improvements that yield sub-optimal energy 
reductions, leaving high and costly requirements for on-site renewable energy generation. 
This would at best create undue cost burden for California’s energy bill payers, and at 
worst jeopardize the achievement of ZNE objectives. For example (numbers for 
illustration purposes only), best-effort goals might yield 30% energy reduction, and 
require 70% renewable energy generation, when the most cost-effective combination 
might be a 70/30 ratio instead. Quantified goals are essential to drive the execution of the 
right level of policies in each area.  
In order to determine the optimal mix of energy reductions and on-site energy 
generation, it is necessary to determine the projected cost curves of efficiency in each 
area as well as that of renewable energy by 2020 and 2030, and to pick the combination 
that yields the lowest overall cost per kWh. We urge the CEC to include a specific 
recommendation in the final IEPR. We provide the following language for consideration:  
In consultation with the CPUC, other key agencies, and stakeholders, the 
CEC should establish specific goals for energy savings in each building 
energy load category, including plug loads, appliances, HVAC, lighting 
and water heating such that California achieves its Zero Net Energy goals 
in the most cost-effective manner. 11 
3.  NRDC recommends that the IEPR recognize the need for a strong acceleration of 
plug loads appliance standards development in order to achieve ZNE goals, and 
that Staff evaluates resource needs to enable that acceleration. 
The draft report points to completed standards for televisions, external power 
supplies, DVD players and compact audio devices. It also mentions the current 
rulemaking on battery chargers as well as a new scoping order for new standards and 
upgrading levels of existing standards. NRDC commends the Energy Commission for its 
leadership on appliance efficiency standards; however, we also recognize that the current 
pace of plug load efficiency standard development is not on track to enable ZNE in a 
cost-effective manner.  
EIA projects that plug load energy use will almost double by 2030, while other 
traditional building loads are projected to remain approximately stable. As buildings 
become more energy efficient, plug loads are projected to increase from 28% of home 
energy use today to 57% per the figure below: 
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The current trajectory for plug load efficiency does not support achieving ZNE at a 
reasonable cost. NRDC recommends that the Energy Commission evaluate the pace of 
appliance energy efficiency necessary to enable ZNE cost-effectively. Staff can then 
define a plan for accelerating plug load energy efficiency measures, including resources 
and other needs required for successful implementation. We offer the following language 
for inclusion: 
The CEC should evaluate the pace of appliance efficiency, determine 
whether it is sufficient to enable meeting the state’s ZNE goals, and if 
needed define a plan for accelerating plug load efficiency measures, 
including resources and other needs for successful implementation. 
V.  Chapter 6: Energy Commission Natural Gas Assessment 
1.  NRDC recommends that Staff consider the environmental concerns associated 
with natural gas production and the risks of expansion of production prior to the 
development of stronger health and safety regulations.  
While the precise role of natural gas in California’s energy portfolio remains to be 
seen, it is important to note the environmental and public health issues associated with 
natural gas production. NRDC recommends that Staff insert the following proposed 
language at the top of page 90 of the IEPR, between the paragraphs beginning with 
“Technology development dominates…” and “The Constrained Shale Gas Case is a…” 
in order to recognize natural gas production concerns and reduce avoidable health and 
safety threats: 
Production of natural gas comes with substantial environmental impacts including 
toxic air pollution and drinking water contamination.
13 The oil and gas production 
industry currently enjoys loopholes from important federal environmental 
measures that allow the industry to pollute more than other industries.
14 
Regulations are not strong enough at the state or federal level to sufficiently 
protect the environment and public health, and enforcement is too weak. New 
rules, and the resources for proper enforcement, are essential to reduce risk and 
help protect public health while we transition to cleaner energy sources that will 
power our nation into the future. 
                                                 
13 NRDC, Drilling Down: Protecting Western Communities from the Health and Environmental Effects of 
Oil and Gas Production, 2007. 
14 Ibid. 13 
VI. Chapter 7: Electricity and Natural Gas Demand Forecast  
1.  NRDC strongly urges the CEC to include expected energy efficiency in its 
projections of energy consumption.  
NRDC recommends that the CEC include expected energy efficiency in its 
projections of energy consumption as excluding such information produces an inaccurate 
energy demand forecast.  Over the last several years, CEC staff and stakeholders have 
done significant work to determine projected energy efficiency in the demand forecast.  
However, this work is not reflected in projections of energy consumption and demand.
15  
Currently, the Draft 2011 IEPR’s projections of future energy consumption excludes all 
savings from efficiency programs coming online in 2013-2022—nearly the entirety of the 
forecast period.
16  While these savings might not be considered “committed” by CEC 
definition, energy efficiency will continue to provide savings, as it has for the past 35 
years, and will continue to be California’s top priority resource.  Additionally, the CPUC 
includes projected energy efficiency in its projections of energy consumption.
17  In order 
to maintain consistency across state agencies and with state policy, the CEC should 
include the projected efficiency savings (what it deems “uncommitted”) in its projections 
of energy consumption. 
Excluding the savings from projected efficiency programs and policies not only 
counteracts state policy, but it creates an inaccurate forecast as the savings from 
efficiency are reasonably likely to occur (as seen through the inclusion of efficiency in 
the IOU procurement plans), which is the criterion for determining what should be 
included in the forecast.  Excluding future efficiency savings causes the forecasted 
growth to be off by 48%.  That is, energy growth from 2012-2022 is expected to be 
about half of what is presented in the statewide electricity consumption forecast, after 
accounting for future energy efficiency.
18  
                                                 
15 Draft 2011 IEPR, Table 8, Figures 7, 8, pp. 102-104.  
16 “[T]he Energy Commission does not yet consider this set of delivery mechanisms to be committed, so 
their estimated impacts are not included in the forecasts presented in previous chapters.” Preliminary 
Forecast, p. 182.   
17 CPUC, Long Term Procurement Plan Proceeding, Revised Scoping Memo Assumptions, R.10-05-006, 
Populated Load & Resource Tables for System, (2011).  Available at: 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Procurement/LTPP/LTPP2010/2010+LTPP+Tools+and+Spreadshe
ets.htm. 
18 Energy growth from 2012-2022 in the Mid Case is 37,260 GWh. Preliminary Forecast, Form 1.1, Mid 
Statewide Demand Preliminary Forecast. Available at: 14 
Figure 1: CEC Projected Energy Demand Growth With and Without Energy Efficiency
19 
 
 
While there might be settings in which energy consumption without energy 
efficiency is needed,
20 the context of the IEPR is one in which including energy 
efficiency is essential.  The IEPR is intended to give an overview of the state of energy in 
California, which includes projected energy consumption.  There are a myriad of factors 
that lead to increased and decreased energy consumption.  To systematically exclude 
energy efficiency, which decreases energy consumption, creates an inaccurate projection 
of future energy consumption. In order to improve the accuracy of the demand forecast 
and treat efficiency as a resource, the CEC should incorporate projected efficiency into 
the general forecasts of electricity consumption. 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011_energypolicy/documents/2011-08-30_workshop/mid-
case/01_Mid_Statewide_Demand_Preliminary_Forecast_Forms.xls.   Incremental uncommitted 
efficiency is expected to reduce that by 17,828 GWh in the Mid Case.  Preliminary Forecast, Table A-8, 
Energy Efficiency/Conservation Consumption Savings (GWh), Residential and Non-residential Mid 
Demand Scenario. Available at: http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011_energypolicy/documents/2011-08-
30_workshop/mid-
case/10_Mid_Electricity_Efficiency_Conservation_Savings_by_Planning_Area_and_Sector.xls. Energy 
growth would be 48% lower (17,828/37,260) if incremental uncommitted efficiency were included. 
19 Id.; See Nick Fugate, IEPR Committee Workshop Presentation, “Efficiency/Conservation,” Slide 13 
(August 30, 2011). Available at: http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011_energypolicy/documents/2011-08-
30_workshop/presentations/02_Nick_Fugate_Efficiency_Conservation_Self-Generation.pdf. 
20 See NRDC, Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) on the 2012-2022 Preliminary 
Staff Electricity and Natural Gas Demand Forecast, (September 15, 2011) (showing the numerous 
reasons why excluding energy efficiency from the overall graph of projected consumption is incorrect). 
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2.  NRDC urges the CEC to refrain from distorting the historical record of 
evaluation measurement and verification (EM&V) at the CPUC and to strike the 
inaccurate language.  
There is a clear and consistent record of CPUC-adopted efficiency program 
achievements since 1993,
21 supported by the largest set of evaluation studies up to that 
time. These study results were reviewed twice in CEC-sponsored summary studies and 
found to be generally unbiased and accurate. In contrast, just last year the CPUC 
explicitly rejected Energy Division’s 2006-08 study results, citing the “substantial 
controversy surrounding their accuracy, and their magnitude.”
22  The CPUC has a long 
history of protocols for reporting and evaluating savings, as well as requirements for ex-
ante assumptions used in reporting.  Additionally, the California Measurement Advisory 
Council (CALMAC), established to assess savings, has provided over 800 research 
studies of savings that date back to 1990.
23  Savings estimates at the CPUC were adopted 
following formal public proceedings and it is inappropriate for the CEC to retroactively 
second-guess that process, especially with no newer, nor better, evaluations of those 
historical savings. 
For these reasons, NRDC recommends that the CEC strike the following 
statement: 
  “Because a clear, consistent record of evaluated efficiency program 
achievements is not readily available, at least not prior to the 2006‐2008 
CPUC energy efficiency program cycle, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
around any estimate of historical program impacts. This uncertainty, along 
with uncertainty around attribution of savings among standards, programs, 
and price effects, has been the subject of debate in recent Demand Analysis 
Working Group meetings. Some parties have insisted that Energy 
Commission demand forecasts incorporate historical program impacts that are 
vastly underestimated and/or credit too much savings to standards and price 
                                                 
21 “[In 1993] by Decision (D.) 93-05-063, the Commission established the AEAP as the forum for 
evaluating earnings claims for utility energy efficiency (EE) and low income energy efficiency (LIEE) 
programs.  The Commission also designated the AEAP as the proceeding for the utilities to submit 
annual reports on EE and LIEE accomplishments, and measurement and evaluation activities.” CPUC, 
Opinion Addressing 2005 and 2006 Annual Earnings Assessment Proceedings, D-06-09-038, at 1 
(September 21, 2006). Available at: http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/60064.pdf. 
22  The Commission chose not to rely on the Energy Division’s recommended savings numbers in D. 10-12-
049 citing the “substantial controversy surrounding their accuracy, and their magnitude,” and the CPUC 
has not yet resolved those disputes.  CPUC, Decision Regarding The Risk/Reward Incentive Mechanism 
Earnings True-Up For 2006-2008, R.09-01-019, D.10-12-049, (December 16, 2010).  
23 “More than 800 MA&E research reports dating from 1990 can be found in our Searchable Database.” 
CALMAC, CALMAC website, (last visited May 11, 2011), available at: http://calmac.org/default.asp.  16 
effects, especially before 1998. A recent staff paper summarizes the positions 
of various parties."
24 
 
In lieu, NRDC recommends that the CEC adopt the following statement: 
  Uncertainty around attribution of savings among standards, programs, and 
price effects, has been the subject of debate in recent Demand Analysis 
Working Group meetings.  Parties have disagreed regarding historical 
program impacts and price effects. A recent staff paper summarizes the 
positions of various parties. 
VII.   Chapter 8: California’s Electricity Infrastructure  
1.  NRDC suggests that Staff improve the description of California’s once-through 
cooling (OTC) policy, as well as its correlated impacts.  
The section titled “OTC Mitigation” starting on page 113 should be re-titled 
“Implementation of Clean Water Act” or “Phase out of Once Through Cooling.” 
Mitigation alone is a legally insufficient measure and is not allowed under the State 
Water Board’s OTC policy. Furthermore, the description of the policy also uses the term 
“mitigation” inaccurately and does not clearly track the requirements of the policy or the 
interaction with the advisory role of the energy agencies. We recommend improving the 
description to make clear the limited circumstances, chiefly feasibility and grid 
reliability, under which either delay or track two compliance are contemplated.
25   
The description of once through cooling impacts contained in the last paragraph on 
page 113 is inadequate.  Instead, we suggest using the description contained in the 
California Energy Commission Staff Report, Issues and Environmental Impacts 
Associated with Once-Through Cooling at California’s Coastal Power Plants:  
“California’s coastal power plants are partly responsible for ocean degradation. 
Recent studies required by the California Energy Commission and other State 
agencies have shown that coastal power plants that use seawater for once-through 
cooling are contributing to declining fisheries and the degradation of estuaries, 
bay and coastal waters. These power plants indiscriminately ‘fish’ the water in 
these habitats by killing the eggs, larvae, and adults when water drawn from the 
natural environment flows through the plant (entrainment impacts) and by killing 
large adult fish and invertebrates that are trapped on intake screens (impingement 
impacts). These facilities also affect the coastal environment by discharging 
                                                 
24 Draft 2011 IEPR at 110.  
25 Furthermore, the discussion of air SCAQMD pollution offsets on page 113 is misleading and does not 
reflect the failure of the offset regime to bring about legally required improvements in air quality. 17 
heated water back into natural environments. Most impacts are to early life stages 
of fish and shellfish.”
26 
2.  NRDC strongly urges the CEC to require thorough mitigation efforts to protect 
marine life while conducting seismic surveys of the Diablo Canyon area. 
In the wake of the disastrous tsunami in northern Honshu, Japan, and the 
emergency at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station earlier this year, NRDC 
supported the recommendation of the California Energy Commission to conduct a 
seismic imaging study of the Diablo Canyon area.
27  We believe that such a study could 
be essential to reassessing the earthquake risk at the reactor site. At the same time, we 
recognize that high-intensity offshore seismic surveys can have significant impacts on 
marine mammals, fish, and other marine biota and therefore require thorough mitigation, 
at both the planning and operational stages, to minimize harm to the environment. Such 
mitigation will also be necessary to satisfy the permit requirements of the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5).  For more detail on NRDC’s proposed 
mitigation measures, see NRDC’s written scoping comments submitted to the California 
State Lands Commission on July 29, 2011, describing necessary mitigation measures in 
the proposed Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) for the Central Coastal California 
Seismic Imaging Project (“CCCSIP”). 
VIII. Chapter 11: Bringing Energy Innovation to California Through the Public 
Interest Energy Research Program 
1.  NRDC strongly supports Staff’s recommendations and agrees that PIER is 
essential to meeting California’s goals as a state and must continue. 
NRDC agrees with the CEC’s analysis of the PIER program and strongly supports 
its continuation. The PIER program is necessary for California to continue on its path to a 
clean energy economy and the NRDC recommends that the state continue to fund and 
support this program.  
                                                 
26 California Energy Commission Staff Report, Issues and Environmental Impacts Associated with Once-
Through Cooling at California’s Coastal Power Plants, June 2005, CEC-700-2005-013, available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-700-2005-013/CEC-700-2005-013.PDF 
27 Statement of Thomas B. Cochran, Ph.D., NRDC, on the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and Its Implications 
for U.S. Nuclear Power Reactors, Joint Senate Hearings of the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear 
Safety and the Committee on Environment and Public Works, at 10 (Apr. 12, 2011). 18 
IX. Chapter 13: Nuclear Issues and Status Report on Assembly Bill 1632 Report 
Recommendations 
1.  NRDC recommends that Staff reword the section entitled “Spent Fuel Pool 
Safety” to better indicate the uncertainty that spent fuel pools largely contributed 
to the contamination at Fukushima. 
Energy Commission Staff writes, “International researchers… found that the Unit 
4 spent fuel pool… played a significant part in the widespread release of radioactive 
materials to the environment,” citing a Scientific American article, which in turn cites a 
Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics study.
28 This study has a fair amount of modeling 
that raises a number of questions about the overall scale of the contamination; however, 
the data and reasoning are stretching in making any kind of definitive conclusion about 
the accident events based on their study. The researchers cannot explicitly link the 
observed and modeled data, which is the bulk of their report, to spent fuel pools. Their 
evidence is based on other observations relating to the timing of radiation levels and 
spraying the pools. It is possible that this reduction in levels was due to other actions at 
the site and so this conclusion is fairly speculative considering the rest of the report. 
Additionally, the level of uncertainty in these results makes it difficult to attribute the 
differences in cesium levels to the spent fuel pool, especially considering other reports 
that state that the pools were relatively unharmed. The INPO report included as 
Attachment A states: 
“Subsequent analyses and inspections determined that the spent fuel pool water 
levels never dropped below the top of fuel in any spent fuel pool and that no 
significant fuel damage had occurred. Current investigation results indicate that 
any potential fuel damage may have been caused by debris from the reactor 
building explosions.”
29 
 
NRDC recommends that Staff reword this section of Chapter 13 to reflect a 
healthy amount of skepticism on the spent fuel pool issue. As it is currently worded, Staff 
seems to suggest that the widespread conclusion is that the pools contributed in large part 
to the contamination; in fact, the majority of the evidence points to the contrary. The 
                                                 
28 Stohl et al., Xenon-133 and caesium-137 releases into the atmosphere from the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
nuclear power plant: determination of the source term, atmospheric dispersion, and deposition. Atmos. 
Chem. Phys. Discuss., 11, 28319–28394, 2011. www.atmos-chem-phys-discuss.net/11/28319/2011/ 
(doi:10.5194/acpd-11-28319-2011) 
29 INPO Special Report 11-005 (November 2011). Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. p.12.  
 19 
Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics study should be referenced in the context that it 
presents more questions about the accident. Citing the attached INPO report will help to 
present a more holistic set of perspectives on the issue.  
X.   Conclusion 
NRDC appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Draft 2011 IEPR and 
recommends that the Commission adopt the 2011 IEPR with the inclusion of the 
aforementioned recommendations.  
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1.0  Introduction  
  
This report provides a narrative overview and timeline for the earthquake, tsunami, and 
subsequent nuclear accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 11, 2011.  The purpose of this report is to 
provide an accurate, consolidated source of information regarding the sequence of events 
that occurred in the first days of the accident.  The information contained in this report 
may be used for determining future U.S. and international industry corrective actions.   
 
Although INPO describes certain events and actions taken, those descriptions are not 
intended to reflect any analysis or assessment of the decisions made by any individual or 
entity.  This report does not assess or analyze the effectiveness of plant workers or others 
involved in response to the event. 
 
This report reflects the best available information, most of which was obtained from 
direct and ongoing interaction with TEPCO.  It focuses on the first days of the event for 
units 1, 2, and 3 and includes some information on units 4, 5, and 6 as well as the spent 
fuel pools.  Because of the extensive damage at the site, some details of the event remain 
unknown or have not been confirmed.  All times are provided as Japan Standard Time 
(JST).   
 
This report includes the following sections: 
 
Executive Summary – high-level description of event milestones 
Overview of Event – short description of key event factors 
Event Progression – unit-specific narrative of event progression  
Radiological Effects – radiological information, including radiological releases 
Additional Information – station design information, drawings, and supporting data 
 
This report was created from information provided by TEPCO, the Japanese government, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and several Japanese nuclear and safety 
organizations.  Some of the data included logs from the TEPCO Emergency Response 
Center, unit-specific parameter values and chart recorder indications, and personal 
accounts of the accident and plant conditions.  In some cases, specific questions were 
addressed through INPO employees working in the INPO Emergency Response Center in 
Atlanta or in the TEPCO offices in Tokyo.  Specific sources used to gather information 
are provided in the reference section of this report.  
 
TEPCO personnel have reviewed the content of this report for accuracy, based on their 
current understanding of the event.  Furthermore, TEPCO assisted in developing the unit-
specific timelines, provided in Section 8.0, as well as the design basis information in 
sections 7.1 and 7.2. 
 
TEPCO openly shared information with INPO, responded to questions in a timely 
manner, and provided resources when available to support the generation of this report.  INPO 11-005 
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The utility is working to share the facts of this event with the industry and with the 
Japanese public.  Without TEPCO’s assistance, this report would not have been possible. 
 
This report is based on information available to INPO as of November 1, 2011.  INPO 
has verified as much information as possible, but it makes no warranties as to the 
accuracy or reliability of the information.  The information in this report has not been 
verified through independent or on-site observations.  The values provided, such as 
reactor parameters and seismic intensity, are preliminary and may be revised as more 
information becomes available.  The effects containment conditions may have had on 
these indications have not been validated.  Numerical values that include tenths of a unit 
are not intended to imply accuracy or precision, but rather are a result of the conversion 
from metric to U.S. units.  
 
This report has been designated as “open distribution” and is available to the general 
public.  The information contained herein was provided to INPO without the expectation 
of confidentiality, and the report does not contain INPO proprietary information.  INPO 
members and participants may reproduce this document for business use.  This report is 
copyrighted, and written permission is needed for organizations other than INPO 
members and participants to reproduce the information. 
 
Copies of this report have been provided to TEPCO, the World Association of Nuclear 
Operators (WANO), and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
 
1.1  Site Description 
 
Fukushima Daiichi was the first of three nuclear generating stations operated by TEPCO.  
The station is located on an 860-acre site in the Fukushima prefecture, approximately 160 
miles (260 km) from Tokyo, on the northeast coast of Japan.  It was one of the largest 
generating stations in the world, consisting of six boiling water reactors capable of 
generating 5,480 MWe total.   
 
The units are designed such that 
units 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 
share common facilities and 
structures, such as a shared control 
room and turbine building.  The 
station also has a shared spent fuel 
pool and dry cask storage facility.  
The shared spent fuel pool is 
located on the inland side (west) of 
Unit 4.  The dry cask storage 
facility is located between units 1 
and 5 along the coast.   
 
Refer to Section 7.0 for additional 
station and design-specific 
information on each unit. INPO 11-005 
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2.0  Executive Summary  
 
On March 11, 2011, at 1446 (JST), a severe earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter 
Scale occurred 112 miles (180 km) off the coast of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Station.  The earthquake was the largest Japan has ever experienced.  It caused all of the 
operating units (units 1, 2, and 3) to automatically scram on seismic reactor protection 
system trips.  The earthquake damaged breakers and distribution towers, causing a loss of 
all off-site electrical power sources to the site.  The emergency diesel generators 
automatically started and provided AC power to emergency systems.  Three minutes after 
the earthquake, the Japan Meteorological Association issued a major tsunami warning, 
indicating the potential for a tsunami at least 3 meters high.  Station workers were 
notified of the warning and evacuated to higher ground. 
 
Forty-one minutes after the earthquake, at 1527, the first of a series of seven tsunamis 
arrived at the site.  The maximum tsunami height impacting the site was estimated to be 
46 to 49 feet (14 to 15 meters).  This exceeded the design basis tsunami height of 18.7 
feet (5.7 meters) and was above the site grade levels of 32.8 feet (10 meters) at units 14.  
All AC power was lost to units 14 by 1541 when a tsunami overwhelmed the site and 
flooded some of the emergency diesel generators and switchgear rooms.  The seawater 
intake structure was severely damaged and was rendered nonfunctional.  All DC power 
was lost on units 1 and 2, while some DC power from batteries remained available on 
Unit 3.  Four of the five emergency diesel generators on units 5 and 6 were inoperable 
after the tsunami.  One air-cooled emergency diesel generator on Unit 6 continued to 
function and supplied electrical power to Unit 6, and later to Unit 5, to maintain cooling 
to the reactor and spent fuel pool.   
 
With no core cooling to remove decay heat, core damage may have begun on Unit 1 on 
the day of the event.  Steam-driven injection pumps were used to provide cooling water 
to the reactors on units 2 and 3, but these pumps eventually stopped working; and all 
cooling water to the reactors was lost until fire engines were used to restore water 
injection.  As a result of inadequate core cooling, fuel damage also occurred in units 2 
and 3.  Challenges in venting containments contributed to containment pressures 
exceeding design pressure, which may have caused containment damage and leakage. 
 
Hydrogen generated from the damaged fuel in the reactors accumulated in the reactor 
buildingseither during venting operations or from other leaksand ignited, producing 
explosions in the Unit 1 and Unit 3 reactor buildings and significantly complicating the 
response.  The hydrogen generated in Unit 3 may have migrated into the Unit 4 reactor 
building, resulting in a subsequent explosion and damage.  The loss of primary and 
secondary containment integrity resulted in ground-level releases of radioactive material.  
Following the explosion in Unit 4 and the abnormal indications on Unit 2 on the fourth 
day of the event, the site superintendent directed that all nonessential personnel 
temporarily evacuate, leaving approximately 70 people on site to manage the event. 
 
During releases, dose rates as high as 1,193 millirem per hour (mrem/hr) (11.93 mSv/hr) 
were measured at the site boundary, approximately 0.6 miles (1 km) from units 14.  The INPO 11-005 
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windows for the emergency response center had to be covered with lead shielding to 
reduce dose rates in the center.  Organized off-site radiation surveys began on March 16.  
Radiation levels off site at that time ranged from 0.1 mrem/hr (1 µSv/hr) to 20 mrem/hr 
(200 µSv/hr).  Thirty-seven miles (60 km) northwest of the station, the dose rate was 0.8 
mrem/hr (8 µSv/hr).  Water and soil samples indicated the presence of strontium, iodine, 
and cesium.  Food and water restrictions were implemented in some areas as a result of 
radioactivity.  People within the 12.4 miles (20 km) surrounding the station were 
evacuated, and those living up to 18.6 miles (30 km) away were directed to shelter inside 
their homes as the releases of radioactive gases and materials increased as the event 
progressed and more fuel damage occurred.  Potassium iodide tablets and powder were 
distributed to local governments beginning March 21.  Because the evacuations had 
already been completed, however, the potassium iodide was not issued to the population. 
 
Radiation surveys of the on-site areas surrounding units 13 showed dose rates as high as 
13 rem/hr (0.13 Sv/hr) in areas around units 2 and 3.  More detailed surveys performed 
over the following weeks discovered localized dose rates greater than 1,000 rem/hr (10 
Sv/hr) around equipment and debris outside units 1 and 3. 
 
Some personnel who responded to the event received high doses of radiation.  Two 
control room operators received the highest dosesa calculated internal and external 
dose of 67.8 rem (0.678 Sv) and 64.3 rem (0.643 Sv).  The majority of dose received by 
these workers was internal (85-87 percent).  Potassium iodide was provided to some 
station personnel on March 13.  As of the end of March, approximately 100 workers had 
received doses of greater than 10 rem (0.1 Sv).   
 
The Fukushima event was rated as a level 7 event on the International Nuclear and 
Radiological Event (INES) scale.  The Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan estimated 
approximately 17 million curies (6.3 E17 Bq) of iodine-131 equivalent radioactive 
material was released into the air and 0.127 million curies (4.7 E15 Bq) into the sea 
between March 11 and April 5.  The 1986 accident at Unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant was the only other nuclear accident to have a level 7 INES rating.  According 
to the IAEA, the Chernobyl accident resulted in approximately 378.4 million curies (14 
E18 Bq) of radioactive material being released into the environment.
1 
 
The combination of the earthquake and tsunami caused considerable damage to the 
Japanese coast.  According to the government of Japan’s report to the IAEA, almost 
500,000 residential buildings were damaged or destroyed.  There was considerable 
damage to roads, railways, and public and industrial utilities.  Approximately 4 million 
homes lost electricity.  The total area inundated by the tsunami was approximately 217 
square miles (561 square km).  As of October 7, 2011, the Japanese Red Cross reports 
that almost 16,000 people are confirmed dead, and almost 4,000 remain missing.  
Approximately 90 percent of the deaths were reported to be caused by drowning. 
                                                 
1 Chernobyl’s Legacy:  Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts.  The Chernobyl Forum 2003-2005 
Second Revision INPO 11-005 
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3.0  Overview of Event  
 
3.1  Status of Units Just Before the Earthquake 
   
Unit 1 was in operation at rated power output before the event, with all safety systems 
and both emergency diesel generators operable.  High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) 
and both isolation condensers were available and in standby.  Reactor water level and 
pressure were normal for power operations.  Unit 1 had been in operation since 
September 27, 2010. 
 
Unit 2 was in operation at rated power output before the event, with all safety systems 
and both emergency diesel generators operable.  High pressure coolant injection and 
reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) were available and in standby.  Reactor water level 
and pressure were normal for power operations.  Unit 2 had been in operation since 
September 23, 2010. 
 
Unit 3 was in operation at rated power output before the event, with all safety systems 
and both emergency diesel generators operable.  Both high pressure coolant injection and 
RCIC were available and in standby.  Reactor water level and pressure were normal for 
power operations.  The startup transformer was out of service for planned modification 
work.   Unit 3 had been in operation since November 18, 2010. 
 
Unit 4 was shut down and had been in an outage since November 30, 2010.  All the fuel 
was in the spent fuel pool to facilitate reactor pressure vessel shroud work.  The cavity 
gate was installed, isolating the spent fuel pool from the upper pools.  The 4A emergency 
diesel generator was out of service for planned maintenance, with the 4B emergency 
diesel generator operable and in standby. 
 
Unit 5 had been shut down and in an outage since January 3, 2011.  Fuel had been loaded 
into the reactor and the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) reassembled.  Reactor water level 
was high, reactor coolant system temperature was 192.2°F (89°C), and reactor pressure 
was 1,037 psig (7.15MPa gauge) to support RPV leak testing.  Decay heat removal was 
secured at 0744 in preparation for the leak testing.  Both emergency diesel generators 
were operable. 
 
Unit 6 had been shut down and in an outage since August 14, 2010.  Fuel had been 
loaded into the reactor and the RPV reassembled.  Reactor water level was normal, and 
reactor coolant system temperature was 78.8°F (26°C) with the reactor coolant system 
depressurized.  Residual heat removal (RHR) system B was being used as needed for 
decay heat removal.  All three emergency diesel generators were operable. 
 
3.2  Earthquake 
 
On March 11, 2011 at 1446, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred off the eastern coast of 
Japan.  The epicenter of the earthquake was 112 miles (180 km) from the Fukushima 
Daiichi site and the hypocenter was 15 miles (24 km) under the Pacific Ocean.  The INPO 11-005 
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Table 3.2-1  Observed and Design Basis Seismic Data 
 
A gal is a unit of acceleration (cm/sec2) expressing the strength of an earthquake's tremors.  Observed data is 
interim and may be revised following further analysis.  (See Section 7.1 for seismic data.) 
 
earthquake lasted approximately three minutes and resulted in the Japanese coastline 
subsiding an average of 2.6 feet (0.8 meters).  
 
The peak acceleration measured at Fukushima Daiichi was 0.561g (550 gal) in the 
horizontal direction and 0.308g (302 gal) in the vertical direction at Unit 2.  This 
exceeded the design basis acceleration of 0.447g (438 gal) in the horizontal direction.  
The design basis maximum acceleration was also exceeded in units 3 and 5.  According 
to the government of Japan, the probability for exceeding the design basis acceleration 
was in the range of 10
-4 to 10
-6 per reactor-year.  The design basis maximum acceleration 
in the vertical direction was not exceeded in any of the units.  
 
The ground motion exceeded the reactor protection system setpoints, causing automatic 
scrams.  The power lines connecting the site to the transmission grid were damaged 
during the earthquake, resulting in a loss of all off-site power.  The emergency diesel 
generators started and loaded as expected in response to the loss of off-site power to 
supply electrical power, with the exception of one emergency diesel generator on Unit 4, 
which was out of service for planned maintenance.  Feedwater and condensate pumps, 
which are powered by nonvital AC sources, were not available because of the loss of AC 
power. 
 
As the shaking from the earthquake subsided, the operators began their scram response.  
Reactor pressure, reactor water level, and containment pressure indications for units 1, 2, 
and 3 appeared as expected following a scram and did not indicate any potential breach 
of the reactor coolant system (RCS) from the earthquake.  However, no detailed 
walkdowns or further investigation has been performed. 
                                                 
2 “Seismic Ground Motion Due to Great East Japan Earthquake and Seismic Ground Motion Accounted for in 
Seismic Safety Assessments,” provided by TEPCO 
Observation Point 
(the lowest 
basement of reactor 
buildings) 
Observed Data (interim)
2 
  
Maximum Response Acceleration 
Against Basic Earthquake Ground 
Motion (gal) 
Scram Setpoint 
(gal)  Maximum Response Acceleration 
(gal) 
Horizontal 
(N-S) 
Horizontal 
(E-W) 
Vertical  Horizontal 
(N-S) 
Horizontal 
(E-W) 
Vertical  Horizontal 
(E-W) 
Vertical 
Fukushima 
Daiichi 
Unit 1  460  447  258 
 
487  489  412 
135  100 
Unit 2  348  550  302  441  438  420 
Unit 3  322  507  231  449  441  429 
Unit 4  281  319  200  447  445  422 
Unit 5  311  548  256  452  452  427 
Unit 6  298  444  244  445  448  415 INPO 11-005 
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Figure 3.3-1  General Elevations and Inundation Level 
 
TEPCO activated its Headquarters for Major Disaster Countermeasures (Corporate 
Emergency Response Center) in Tokyo to assess damage from the earthquake and to 
support recovery efforts.  The Station Emergency Response Center was activated on site 
to respond to the event. 
 
In the time between the earthquake and the first tsunami, multiple seismic eventssome 
with magnitudes between 6.4 and 7.9occurred within 100 km of the initiating event.   
 
3.3  Tsunami 
 
The earthquake generated a series of seven tsunamis that arrived at the site starting at 
1527, 41 minutes after the earthquake.  The first wave was approximately 13 feet (4 
meters) high.  The height of this wave did not exceed the site design basis tsunami of 
18.7 feet (5.7 meters) and was mitigated by the breakwater.  A second wave arrived at 
1535; however, the wave height is unknown, because the tide gauge failed (maximum 
indicated level of the gauge is 24.6 feet or 7.5 meters).  At least one of the waves that 
arrived at the station measured approximately 46 to 49 feet (14 to 15 meters) high based 
on water level indications on the buildings.   
 
The tsunami inundated the area surrounding units 14 to a depth of 13 to 16 feet above 
grade (4 to 5 meters), causing extensive damage to site buildings and flooding of the 
turbine and reactor buildings.  Intake structures at all six units were unavailable because 
the tsunamis and debris heavily damaged the pumps, strainers, and equipment, and the 
flooding caused electrical faults.  The damage resulted in a loss of the ultimate heat sink 
for all units.  The diesel generators operated for a short time; but by 1541, the 
combination of a loss of cooling water, flooding of electrical switchgear, and flooding of 
some of the diesel generator rooms (located in the basement of the turbine buildings and 
not designed to withstand flooding) caused a loss of all AC power on site for units 15.  
(Refer to Figure 7.4-7.) 
 
Figure 3.3-1 shows the general elevations (typical for units 14) and the approximate 
inundation level.  The grade level of units 14 is 32.8 feet (10 meters) and is 42.7 feet (13 
meters) at units 5 and 6 above mean sea level (commonly referred to as OP, for the level 
in the Onahama Port).  The intake structures were at an elevation of 13.1 feet (4 meters) 
for all units. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 ft (14m) 
33 ft (10m) 
13 ft (4m) 
   Main Control Room 
   Battery Room 
   Switchgear 
   EDG Room INPO 11-005 
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3.4  Loss of Power 
 
In the control rooms, as plant equipment and distribution panels flooded, lighting 
gradually faded and instruments began to fail.  Station batteries, which were designed to 
last for 8 hours, were lost when the flooding grounded or damaged DC distribution 
systems.  The loss of DC power resulted in a loss of all lighting in the units 1-2 control 
room within 51 minutes after the scram.  (Note:  Units 1 and 2 share a common control 
room, as do units 3 and 4.)  Normal lighting in the units 3-4 control room was lost, and 
only emergency lighting remained.  Control room operators began checking to see which 
indications were still available.   
 
Three air-cooled emergency diesel generators (EDGs) had previously been installed at 
the station as a modification (2B, 4B, and 6B EDGs).  These EDGs had independent fuel 
systems and were capable of providing power to vital AC systems following a complete 
loss of the seawater ultimate heat sink.  Furthermore, AC distribution system cross-ties 
had been installed between units, which allowed power to be transferred among units 1-2 
and 3-4 or between units 5-6 for both the 6.9-kV and 480-V distribution systems.  The 
air-cooled EDGs were located above grade, and some of them survived the tsunami.  The 
distribution systems for the Unit 2 and the Unit 4 air-cooled EDGs, which were located 
below grade, flooded and failed during the tsunami.  The Unit 6 air-cooled EDG and 
portions of the electrical distribution system survived the tsunami and were used to 
reestablish cold shutdown on units 5 and 6.  Figure 7.4-7 illustrates the damage to the 
electrical distribution system caused by the tsunami. 
 
When all AC power was lost, TEPCO personnel notified the government that an 
emergency condition existed.  TEPCO corporate offices and the Japanese government 
arranged for delivery of portable electric generators to the Daiichi site.  The generators 
were located; however, damaged roads and congested traffic prevented the generators 
from reaching the site quickly.  Helicopters were considered, but the generators were too 
large and heavy to carry.  Ultimately, TEPCO was able to secure some mobile generators 
from the Tohoku Electric Power Company.  These generators, along with some TEPCO 
generators, began to arrive at the site late in the evening of March 11 and continued to 
arrive into the next morning.   
 
The portable generators were limited in their effectiveness because they could not be 
connected to the station electrical distribution system as a result of the extensive damage 
the tsunami and flooding caused.  Workers checked motors and switchgear in an attempt 
to find usable equipment to support cooling the reactors.  The testing revealed that the 
Unit 2 standby liquid control (SLC) pumps were not flooded or damaged.   
 
Based on the inspection results, the first mobile generator was placed adjacent to Unit 2, 
and workers began to lay temporary cables from the generator to the associated 
distribution panel for the SLC pumps.  The temporary power cables were approximately 
4 inches (10 cm) in diameter and 656 feet (200 meters) long and weighed more than 
1 ton.  Forty employees began to run the cables through the debris and flooded areas.  
The force of the tsunami had blown manhole covers off, resulting in unmarked openings 
in the ground.  Aftershocks and subsequent tsunami warnings further slowed progress.  In INPO 11-005 
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spite of the challenges, the workers completed the task on Unit 2 and terminated the 
temporary cable to the associated power panel on March 12 at 1530.   
 
At 1536, an explosion occurred in the Unit 1 reactor building.  This explosion was most 
likely caused by the buildup of hydrogen that had been generated in the Unit 1 reactor 
core and leaked into the reactor building.  The explosion injured five workers, and debris 
from the explosion struck and damaged the cables and mobile generator that had been 
installed to provide power to the standby liquid control pumps.  The debris also damaged 
the hoses that had been staged to inject seawater into Unit 1 and Unit 2.  Fieldwork was 
suspended as workers were evacuated to the Emergency Response Center for 
accountability.  Some of the debris was also highly contaminated, resulting in elevated 
dose rates and contamination levels around the site.  As a result, workers were now 
required to wear additional protective clothing, and stay times in the field were limited.  
The explosion significantly altered the response to the event and contributed to 
complications in stabilizing the units.   
 
3.5  Core Cooling 
 
Following the tsunami, Unit 1 lost all AC and DC power, control room lighting, control 
board instrumentation, and all cooling and high-pressure makeup water to the reactor.  
Operators had been cycling the A isolation condenser as needed to control reactor 
pressure and had just removed the condenser from service when the flooding began.  
Neither HPCI nor the isolation condensers were in service when DC power was lost.  
Unit 1 had no injection or core cooling in service.  While indicated reactor water level did 
not lower below the top of active fuel until the morning of March 12, calculations based 
on conservative estimates later revealed that the core may have uncovered as early as 
three hours after the earthquake, and fuel damage might have commenced approximately 
1.5 hours later.   
 
TEPCO estimates that there was no injection into the Unit 1 reactor for 14 hours and 9 
minutes after the isolation condenser was secured, approximately one hour after the 
reactor shut down.  Conservative calculations indicate that most of the core may have 
been damaged, and some of the fuel may have relocated to the bottom head of the reactor 
vessel, although this has not been confirmed.  Core cooling was eventually established 
when reactor pressure lowered sufficiently and a fire engine was used to inject fresh 
water, followed by seawater. 
 
Units 2 and 3 were relatively stable, with RCIC in operation after the tsunami.  However, 
injection was eventually lost on these units, resulting in core damage.   
 
TEPCO estimates that there was no injection into the Unit 2 reactor for 6 hours and 29 
minutes following the loss of RCIC, approximately 70 hours after shutdown.  The core 
began to uncover at approximately 1630 on March 14, three days after the tsunami.  
Inadequate core cooling resulted in subsequent fuel damage.  Conservative calculations 
indicate that some of the fuel may have relocated to the bottom head of the reactor vessel, 
although this has not been confirmed.  Core cooling was eventually established when a 
fire engine was used to inject seawater. INPO 11-005 
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On Unit 3, following the loss of high pressure coolant injection at 0242 on March 13, 
approximately 36 hours after shutdown, TEPCO estimates that there was no injection into 
the reactor for 6 hours and 43 minutes.  The core began to uncover at approximately 0400 
the second day after the tsunami.  Inadequate core cooling resulted in subsequent fuel 
damage.  Conservative calculations indicate that some of the core may have relocated to 
the bottom head of the reactor vessel, although this has not been confirmed.  Core cooling 
was eventually established when a fire engine was used to inject seawater. 
 
Based on the given plant conditions, it is expected that boiling occurred in the reference 
legs of the reactor water level instruments, resulting in nonconservative water level 
indications.  After the event, TEPCO confirmed that adverse conditions in the drywell 
may have resulted in boiling of the reference legs, causing indicated water levels to be 
higher than actual levels for all three units.   
 
In each of the three units, it is postulated that there is extensive damage with limited and 
localized melting of the fuel and internals and limited vessel damage.  The lack of core 
cooling to compensate for decay heat resulted in excessive fuel temperatures and 
oxidation of the zirconium cladding.  The oxidation of zirconium in a steam environment 
will create significant additional heat from the exothermic reaction and large quantities of 
hydrogen.  This hydrogen contributed to the increases in containment pressure and to the 
subsequent hydrogen explosions on units 1, 3, and 4. 
 
3.6  Containment Pressure Control 
 
During a severe accident, containment pressure must be controlled to prevent damage to 
the containment and to help remove energy to facilitate injecting water into the reactor 
with low-pressure systems.  Without heat removal systems (no AC power and a loss of 
ultimate heat sink), containment pressure and temperature will increase as energy from 
the reactor is transferred to the containment via safety relief valves or systems such as 
RCIC and HPCI. 
 
The TEPCO severe accident procedures provide guidance for venting containment.  The 
guidance directs venting when containment pressure reaches the maximum operating 
pressure if core damage has not occurred.  If core damage has occurred, venting the 
containment will result in a radioactive release, so containment is not vented until 
pressure approaches twice the maximum operating pressure.  In this case, the Emergency 
Response Center personnel could not verify the integrity of the core, and the associated 
guidance was applied in the decision to vent Unit 1. 
 
The severe accident procedures specify that the chief of the Emergency Response Center 
(site superintendent) shall determine if containment venting should be performed.  The 
site superintendent may solicit input and advice from station management when making 
this decision.  Although government permission is not specifically required before 
containment is vented, government concurrence is desired. 
 INPO 11-005 
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In the case of Unit 1, the site superintendent informed the government of his intention to 
vent the containment.  Following this, he received concurrence from government 
agencies to vent containment following a press conference, which was planned for 0300 
on March 12.  The associated evacuations were reported as complete at 0903, and the 
operators were directed to vent containment at 0904.   
 
A review of the applicable procedures revealed that the accident management guidelines 
do not specifically require evacuations to be completed before venting.  The procedures 
do, however, require management to be knowledgeable about the status of evacuations 
and to coordinate venting containment with local authorities.  The procedure wording has 
typically been interpreted as encouraging the operators to verify evacuations are 
completed before venting. 
 
The first indication of increasing containment pressure was not available until 2350 on 
the night of the event, when workers connected the temporary generatorwhich was 
being used to provide some control room lightingto the containment pressure 
instrument.  The indication read 87 psi (600 kPa).  By this point, access to the reactor 
building had already been restricted because of high dose rates.  The lack of available 
containment pressure indications early in the event may have prevented the operators 
from recognizing the increasing pressure trend and taking action earlier in the event. 
 
Unit 1 containment was not vented successfully until approximately 1430 on March 12.  
Additional challenges occurred because of high dose rates and a lack of contingency 
procedures for operating the vent system without power, as well as the lack of prestaged 
equipment, such as an engine-driven air compressor.   
 
The decision to complete evacuations before venting containment, and the subsequent 
equipment and radiological challenges encountered as operators attempted to establish a 
vent path, delayed injection of water into the Unit 1 reactor.  At approximately 0230 on 
March 12, as Unit 1 depressurized, pressure in the reactor and in containment equalized 
at approximately 122 psia (0.84 MPa abs).  This pressure is above the discharge pressure 
of the station fire pumps and fire engines.  Once pressure had equalized, further 
reductions in reactor pressure were not possible until containment pressure had lowered.  
As a result, little to no injection was achieved until after the containment was vented 
successfully, which occurred at approximately 1430 on March 12.   
 
High containment pressures in Unit 1 contributed to the amount of time Unit 1 did not 
have adequate core cooling.  In units 1, 2, and 3, the extended duration of high 
temperature and pressure conditions inside containment may have damaged the drywell 
head seals, contributing to hydrogen leaks and the subsequent explosions.  Containment 
leakage also contributed to ground-level radiation releases from units 1, 2, and 3. 
 
See figures 7.4-4 and 7.4-5 for simplified drawings of the containment vent systems. 
   INPO 11-005 
12 
3.7  Spent Fuel Pools and Dry Cask Storage 
 
Fukushima Daiichi had spent fuel stored in pools at each unit, in a common spent fuel 
pool, and in on-site dry cask storage.  Spent fuel pool cooling flow was lost for all spent 
fuel pools following the loss of off-site power and was not immediately restored when the 
emergency diesel generators started.  Unconfirmed reports were that sloshing of the water 
in the spent fuel pools resulted in a loss of some water during the earthquake.  The 
explosion in the Unit 4 reactor building caused structural damage to the Unit 4 spent fuel 
pool, but it is not clear if the integrity of the pool liner was compromised. 
 
Subsequent analysis and inspections performed by TEPCO personnel determined that the 
spent fuel pool water levels did not drop below the top of fuel in any spent fuel pool and 
that no significant fuel damage had occurred.  Current investigation results indicate that 
any potential fuel damage was likely caused by debris from the reactor building 
explosions.   
 
The dry cask storage building was damaged by the tsunami, and some of the casks were 
wetted.  An inspection confirmed that the casks were not damaged by the event. 
 
3.8  Alternative Injection Sources 
 
Fukushima Daiichi had three fire engines available that had been added to improve fire-
fighting capabilities following the 2007 Niigata-Chuetsu-oki earthquake that had affected 
the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power station.  These fire engines could also be used as 
an alternative low-pressure water source for injecting into the reactors; however, one was 
damaged by the tsunami and a second could not reach units 14 because of earthquake 
damage to the road.  Only one fire engine was immediately available to support the 
emergency response on units 14.  This fire engine was blocked from accessing Unit 1 by 
a fuel oil tank that had been displaced into one road by the tsunami and by the inability of 
workers to open a deenergized security gate on the other road.  Workers broke through a 
gate between units 2 and 3, allowing the truck to access Unit 1.   
 
Although modifications had been made previously to allow fire engines to inject water 
into the core spray system, establishing injection was still difficult.  The fire engine did 
not have sufficient discharge pressure to overcome the elevation differences and reactor 
pressure.  To compensate for this, the truck loaded water at the fire protection tank, then 
drove to the Unit 1 reactor building to inject into the fire protection system.  This 
operation was slowed by debris and because the route took the fire engine under a 
building that had partially collapsed. 
 
After some trial and error, workers established continuous injection by routing a suction 
hose from a fire protection tank to the truck, then discharging to the fire protection 
system piping and into the reactor via an installed modification to the low pressure 
coolant injection system.  The fire protection tank, however, only had one hose 
connection.  As a result, injection into the reactor had to be stopped each time the tank 
needed to be refilled so another fire engine, now available, could attach a hose and fill the INPO 11-005 
13 
tank.  Seawater injection was eventually switched to a flooded pit, then to the harbor 
itself. 
 
3.9  Working Conditions 
 
In the days after the earthquake and tsunami, a group of TEPCO employees, members of 
the Japan Self-Defense Force, and other volunteers worked to stabilize the damaged 
reactors.  This group worked through extremely adverse conditions to complete their 
assigned tasks. 
 
The workers faced multiple challenges and hazards.  The tsunami had caused 
considerable damage.  Large areas of the site were flooded or littered with debris.  The 
force of the tsunami coming ashore had blown manhole covers off, leaving unguarded 
openings.  Without power available, much of the work was performed in complete 
darkness.  Passageways or rooms in some areas of the plant were dark and flooded.  
Elevated dose rates challenged worker ability to perform tasks in the plant and in the 
field.  For some of the higher dose jobs, such as the attempt to open the suppression 
chamber vent valve on Unit 1, operators volunteered to perform the taskregardless of 
the potential hazards. 
 
Operators worked to restore or maintain cooling to the reactors, sometimes using 
unconventional or unique methods.  Some of the tasks that were accomplished were not 
based on existing procedure guidance or formal training.  The workers were placed in 
conditions that were beyond the design basis for the station and had to rely on their 
fundamental knowledge and creativity to recover indications or operate systems.  While 
these efforts were not always successful on the first attempt, workers continued their 
efforts until the desired results were achieved. 
 
Ongoing aftershocks and tsunami warnings further challenged the workers.  As expected 
following a major earthquake, hundreds of aftershocks occurred in the days after the 
initial event.  Two of the aftershocks on March 11 were larger than magnitude 7.0. 
 
After the explosion in Unit 1, radiological conditions continued to degrade, and workers 
were subjected to elevated and continuously changing dose rates and contamination 
levels.  Under the threat of subsequent explosions in other units, they continued their 
efforts to stabilize the reactors.   
 
Because of the tsunami and earthquake damage to the surrounding communities, little 
outside assistance was initially available.  Some workers lost their homes and families to 
the earthquake and tsunami, yet continued to work.  Many workers slept at the 
stationusually on the floor.  Because of food shortages, workers were commonly only 
provided with a biscuit for breakfast and a bowl of noodles for dinner.  Some of these 
workers remain on site today, still working to keep the reactors cool and prevent the 
spread of contamination.   
 
Two operators were killed when they became trapped while performing inspections in the 
Unit 4 turbine building when the tsunami inundated the site and flooded the building.INPO 11-005 
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4.0  Unit-Specific Event Narrative 
 
4.1  Unit 1 Narrative 
 
On March 11 at 1446 (T=0), an earthquake caused a loss of off-site power and an 
automatic reactor scram.  All control rods inserted; and several actions occurred, 
including a loss of feedwater and condensate and main steam isolation valve closures, as 
expected because of the loss of off-site AC power.  The emergency diesel generators 
started and loaded in response to the loss of off-site power and supplied power to the 
safety systems.  While reactor water level initially dropped because of the collapsing 
steam voids, reactor water level was within the normal band and the operators did not 
need to initiate high pressure coolant injection (HPCI).   
 
Six minutes after the scram (1452), the isolation condensers (ICs) automatically initiated 
on increasing pressure in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), resulting in a decrease in 
reactor pressure as cooler water circulated through the reactor core from the ICs.   
 
At 1503 (T plus 17 minutes), operators recognized that Unit 1 was exceeding cooldown 
rate limitations and manually removed the isolation condensers from service by closing 
the cold leg return containment outboard isolation motor-operated valves (MO-3A and B) 
(see Figure 7.4-1).  These actions were consistent with procedure limitations of not 
exceeding a 100
oF/hr (55
oC/hr) cooldown rate.  Operators determined that only one IC 
was needed to control reactor pressure between 870 and 1,015 psig (6 to 7 MPa gauge).  
Operators cycled the A IC system by opening and closing the motor-operated valve (MO-
3A) to control reactor pressure.  Chart recorders indicate that the operators manually 
started and stopped the IC system three times between 1510 and 1534 as RPV pressure 
cycled and that the A IC was removed from service at approximately 1534, just minutes 
before the loss of all AC and DC power. 
 
At 1527 (T plus 41 minutes), the first tsunami arrived at the station.  The subsequent 
tsunamis flooded and damaged the intake structure; and by 1537 (T plus 51 minutes), the 
tsunami had begun to flood the turbine building basement.  The flooding wetted or 
submerged the emergency diesel generators and the AC and DC distribution systems, 
resulting in a gradual loss of all AC and DC power.  Between 1537 and 1550, the loss of  
power caused a loss of normal control room lighting, indications, and controls.  The 
indications for HPCI and the IC systems faded and went out.  TEPCO made an 
emergency declaration because of the loss of all AC power and notified the government 
and associated authorities. 
 
The isolation condenser was the only system available to cool the reactor; and without 
DC power, this system needed to be operated locally.  The IC also required a source of 
makeup water to the condenser to continue to function beyond 8 hours.  Without power, 
this makeup water would have to be provided using a diesel-driven fire pump.  However, 
the operators did not immediately place the IC in service.  As a result, Unit 1 had no 
injection or core cooling in service. 
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At 1636, another emergency was declared because of the inability to determine reactor 
water level and the status of injection into the core.  Batteries and cables were taken to 
the control room in an attempt to restore control board instruments, with work focused on 
restoring reactor water level indication.  With no core cooling and extensive damage to 
the site, workers began to investigate methods for venting containment without power 
and reviewing methods for injecting water into the reactor using the fire protection 
system or fire engines.  The diesel-driven fire pump was started and allowed to idle in 
standby, ready to provide injection into the reactor when needed.  In complete darkness, 
operators began to align the alternative water injection valves from the fire protection 
system to the core spray system by manually opening the valves in the reactor building.  
Injection could not be achieved, however, until after the RPV was depressurized below 
100 psig (0.69 MPa gauge). 
 
Instruments and indications periodically appeared to function but would soon lose power 
and fail again.  On one occasion, the valve position indications for the IC MO-2A and 
MO-3A motor-operated valves began working.  The operator noticed that the valves both 
indicated closed.  At 1818, the operator opened both valves using their main control room 
switches in an attempt to place the isolation condenser in service.  While some steam was 
initially seen coming from the condenser, the steam faded.  At 1825, the operator closed 
the MO-3A valve to remove the system from service.  The reason for this action has not 
been determined.  As a result, there was no cooling method aligned to remove decay heat 
from the reactor.   
 
Because the control room had no working indications, operators checked reactor pressure 
locally in the reactor building.  At 2007, reactor pressure indicated 1,000 psig (6.9 MPa 
gauge).  Reactor water level was still unknown. 
 
At 2049 (T plus 6.1 hours), workers restored some temporary control room lighting in the 
units 1-2 control room when a small portable generator was installed. 
 
At 2050 (T plus 6.1 hours), the Fukushima prefecture began to direct residents living 
within 1.2 miles (2km) of the station to evacuate. 
 
Water level indication was restored in the control room at 2119 (T plus 6.5 hours).  
Indicated reactor water level was approximately 8 inches (200 mm) above the top of 
active fuel (TAF).   
 
At 2123 (T plus 6.6 hours), the Prime Minister expanded the evacuation zone to 1.9 miles 
(3 km), with residents living within a 6.2 mile radius (10 km) directed to take shelter.   
 
Operators placed the A IC back in service at about 2130 (T plus 6.7 hours), when once 
again the indications began to work.  By this point, no cooling or injection had been 
provided to the reactor for almost 6 hours, and core damage was most likely occurring.  
While steam was observed coming from the condenser vent, it is not clear that the IC 
went into service as expected.  Inspections performed in September 2011 revealed that INPO 11-005 
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the A IC valves did open but the water level in the secondary side remained at 65 percent, 
indicating that the system may not have functioned as designed.   
 
Dose rates in the reactor building increased to such a level that, by 2151 (T plus 7.1 
hours), access to the building was restricted.  By 2300 (T plus 8.2 hours), dose rates as 
high as 120 mrem/hr (1.2 mSv/hr) were detected outside the north reactor building 
personnel air lock door.  Dose rates in the control room also increased. 
 
Just after midnight on March 12 (T plus 9.3 hours), the site superintendent directed the 
operators to prepare to vent the primary containment vessel.  In the control room, 
operators assembled piping and instrumentation drawings, the accident management 
procedures, valve drawings, and a white board.  Because there was no procedure to 
operate the vent valves without power, the operators began to develop a plan for venting, 
including how to operate the valves manually.  They determined that both the motor-
operated containment vent valve (MO-210) and the small suppression chamber air-
operated vent valve (AO-90) could be operated manually (see Figure 7.4-4).  At 2350 (T 
plus 9.1 hours), containment pressure indicated 87 psia (0.6MPa abs), exceeding the 
containment design pressure of 62.1 psig (0.428 MPa gauge). 
 
At 0130 (T plus 10.7 hours), TEPCO officials informed the Prime Minister, the Minister 
of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency of plans 
to vent containment.  All concurred with the venting of units 1 and 2 containments.  The 
government planned a 0300 press conference to announce the venting.  The TEPCO 
corporate Emergency Response Center instructed the station to vent the containments 
following the press conference.  The operators continued preparations to vent the 
containments.   
 
At 0148 (T plus 11 hours), the installed diesel-driven fire pump that had been running in 
standby to inject into the reactor stopped operating.  To restart the fire pump, workers 
carried diesel fuel to the pump and refilled the fuel tank, but attempts to start the engine 
depleted the batteries.  Workers then retrieved spare batteries that were stored in an office 
and attached them, but the engine still would not start.   
 
In parallel, efforts to use a station fire engine as an injection source to the reactor were 
ongoing.  The damage from the earthquake and tsunami made this task difficult.  The 
earthquake and tsunami also damaged fire hydrants and caused fire system leaks.  While 
workers were able to close valves and isolate the leaks, the damage made it impossible to 
use filtered water as a water source.  Fire protection tanks remained available for use as a 
water source.  
 
The station had three fire engines, but only one was available to support injecting water 
into the Unit 1 reactor.  One fire engine was damaged by the tsunami and was not 
functional.  The second was parked adjacent to units 5 and 6 but could not be driven to 
Unit 1 because of earthquake damage to the road and debris from the tsunami.  The 
remaining fire engine, which was located near units 3 and 4, was functional.  Workers 
had to clear obstacles and debris to move the fire engine to Unit 1.  A heavy fuel oil tank, INPO 11-005 
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which had been displaced by the tsunami, made one access road impassable.  A security 
gate that had lost power and would not open blocked another road that provided access to 
Unit 1.  Workers broke a lock on the gate between units 2 and 3, allowing the fire engine 
to arrive at Unit 1.   
 
Alternatives for injecting water via fire protection lines were reviewed, and additional 
fire engines and water transportation by the Japanese Self-Defense Force were also 
considered. 
 
By 0230 (T plus 11.7 hours), indicated containment pressure had increased to 122 psia 
(0.84MPa abs), which is approximately twice design pressure.  Indicated reactor pressure 
decreased to 116 psig (0.8 MPa gauge), and reactor water level indicated 19.7 inches 
(500 mm) above TAF by the lowest indication.  At this pressure, the containment had 
equalized with reactor pressure and was still greater than the discharge pressure of the 
diesel-driven fire pump lined up to inject water into the reactor.  There was no steam flow 
from the reactor to cool the fuel, and there was no source of injection into the reactor.   
 
TEPCO is not sure how the Unit 1 reactor depressurized.  Because reactor and 
containment pressure equalized, it appears the reactor depressurized because of either a 
stuck-open relief valve or a breach of the reactor coolant system or reactor pressure 
vessel.  The isolation condenser may have helped with the pressure reduction; however, 
had the isolation condenser caused the depressurization, reactor pressure likely would 
have continued to decrease until the shell-side boiled dry.  Then the reactor coolant 
system would have repressurized and would not have equalized with containment 
pressure. 
 
At approximately 0300, a press conference was held to announce the venting of the 
containments.  At the station, however, workers were not directed to perform the 
evolution, and indicated primary containment pressure remained well above the 62.1 psig 
(0.428 MPa gauge) design pressure.  Allowing the containment to be exposed to 
pressures above design pressure may have caused containment penetrations and seals to 
degrade and leak, but this has not been verified.  Indicated containment pressure began to 
decrease unexpectedly and stabilized near 113 psia (0.78 MPa abs) without venting. 
 
As the morning progressed, plant conditions continued to degrade.  In preparation for 
venting the containment, workers attempted to enter the reactor building to perform 
surveys.  When the reactor building air lock door was opened, the workers saw steam and 
closed the door.  No surveys were performed.  
 
The first indications of an off-site release were detected at 0450 (T plus 14.1 hours) when 
a dose rate of 0.1 mrem/hr (1µSv/hr) was measured at the site boundary.  The source of 
this release has not been confirmed, but the timing correlates with an unexplained slow 
reduction in containment pressure without venting.  By 0500 (T plus 14.2 hours), workers 
were directed to wear full face masks with charcoal filters and coveralls in both the 
control room and in the field.  Increasing dose rates in the Unit 1 control room caused 
operators to periodically move to the Unit 2 side of the room where dose rates were INPO 11-005 
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lower.  At 0514 (T plus 14.5 hours), workers noted an increase in radiation dose rates in 
the plant concurrent with the decrease in containment pressure.  Workers believed this 
may have indicated a leak from the containment.  This was reported to the government.  
Over the next 30 minutes, radiation levels at the site boundary increased.  At 0544 (T plus 
15 hours), the Prime Minister expanded the evacuation zone to 6.2 miles (10 km).  
 
As reactor pressure and containment pressure slowly decreased, a fire engine began 
injecting fresh water from a fire protection water storage tank into the reactor via the core 
spray system.  Although reactor pressure was not recorded, containment pressure was 
approximately 107 psia (0.74 MPa abs).  The low discharge pressure of the fire pump 
was only slightly higher than reactor pressure, so the injection flow rate was low.  
Complications in maintaining the injection lineup further reduced injection rates.  
Initially, the fire engine refilled with water at the fire protection water storage tank, then 
drove close to the reactor building and injected water through a fire protection line 
connected to a core spray line.  This was because the fire protection water storage tank 
was at a low elevation, and the workers were concerned about the discharge pressure of 
the fire engine being insufficient to overcome reactor pressure and inject into the core.  
Further complications, such as driving the fire engine under damaged buildings located 
between the tank and the unit, exacerbated these delays.  During these first few hours, the 
calculated fire engine injection rate was low, averaging less than 10 gpm (38 lpm). 
 
After some trial and error, workers established continuous water injection from the fire 
engine.  A hose was run from the suction of the fire engine to the fire protection water 
storage tank, allowing the fire engine to discharge water directly into the fire protection 
line system and into the reactor. 
 
An additional fire engine arrived on site and was used to repeatedly transport fresh water 
from the fire protection tank at Unit 3 to the fire protection tank at Unit 1.  The Unit 1 fire 
protection tank had only one hose connection; so to refill the tank, the fire engine that 
was injecting water into the reactor had to be disconnected from the tank.  As a result, 
water injection into the reactor was stopped each time the second fire engine needed to 
replenish the Unit 1 fire protection tank. 
 
At 0650 (T plus 16.1 hours), the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry ordered 
TEPCO to vent the Unit 1 containment.  TEPCO personnel, however, had just learned 
that some residents inside the evacuation zone were not sure which direction to evacuate, 
so they had not left yet.  The Prime Minister arrived at the station at 0711.  After some 
discussion, TEPCO confirmed its plans to vent containment at 0900 after evacuations 
were completed; and at 0804, the Prime Minister left the station.  By this time, indicated 
reactor water level had dropped below the top of active fuel by the lowest indicated 
reading.   
 
TEPCO informed the local governments that venting would start at approximately 0900.  
Venting was being coordinated with the local governments in an attempt to ensure 
evacuations were completed before venting commenced.  Station procedures for venting 
containment did not specifically state that evacuations be completed before venting.  The INPO 11-005 
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procedures stated that venting containment should be coordinated with local governments 
and that the station should be knowledgeable about the status of evacuations.  These 
statements had been interpreted as providing guidance to verify evacuations were 
completed before venting. 
 
The control room operators formed three teams to perform the venting, with two 
operators on each team (one to perform actions and the other to assist by holding 
flashlights and monitoring dose rates, as well as for other safety concerns, such as 
ongoing aftershocks).  Because there were no means of communicating with the field 
teams, they were dispatched one at a time, with the next team leaving only after the 
preceding team returned.   
 
In preparation for manual venting of the containment, a radiological evaluation of 
working conditions in the torus room was provided to the Emergency Response Center.  
Based on radiation levels of 30 rem/hr (300 mSv/hr), workers were limited to 17 minutes 
stay time to remain below the emergency response radiation exposure limit of 10 rem 
(100 mSv).  Workers were required to wear a self-contained breathing apparatus with a 
20-minute air supply and were given potassium iodide tablets. 
 
At 0903 (T plus 18.2 hours), evacuations south of the plant were confirmed as being 
completed, and the first team was dispatched to open the motor-operated containment 
vent valve (MO-210) (see Figure 7.4-4).  The team opened the valve the desired amount.  
The operators received approximately 2.5 rem (25 mSv) each while performing the task.  
The team returned to the control room; and by 0930, the second team had been 
dispatched to open the air-operated suppression chamber vent valve in the torus room 
(AO-90).  To open this valve, the team would have to enter the torus room at one location 
and travel to the other side of the room to manipulate the valve.  The team was 
unsuccessful, as dose rates in the torus room quickly exceeded their limits; and the 
operators turned back.  One of the operators received 10.6 rem (106 mSv), exceeding his 
emergency dose limit of 10 rem (100 mSv).   
 
The control room operators decided not to dispatch the third team because of the doses 
received.  They notified the Emergency Response Center (ERC) of the inability to open 
the air-operated vent valve (AO-90).  As a result, TEPCO personnel had to devise a new 
method to open the air-operated valve.  The ERC began working on methods to open the 
large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve (AO-72).  This would require DC 
power and a temporary air source.  ERC personnel instructed the control room to attempt 
to operate the small air-operated suppression chamber vent valve remotely, assuming 
there would be sufficient residual air pressure in the system to operate the valve. 
 
Workers continued their efforts to vent containment, while other groups worked to install 
mobile generators and stage fire hoses to allow seawater injection into the reactor.  
Workers continued to inject fresh water using a fire engine.  
 
At 1017 (T plus 19.5 hours), workers had installed temporary batteries to provide DC 
power to the small air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-90).  Operators INPO 11-005 
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attempted to open the valve from the control room, relying on residual air pressure in the 
instrumentation air system.  Operators made three attempts to open the small air-operated 
valve (at 1017, 1023, and 1024).   
 
At 1040 (T plus 19.9 hours), radiation levels increased at the main gate and the 
monitoring post.  Workers initially believed the radiation levels indicated the small air-
operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-90) had opened.  However, by 1115 the 
radiation levels were decreasing and indicated containment pressure remained high, 
indicating that the venting was not fully effective.  While this has not been confirmed, the 
trend in radiation levels indicates that the small air-operated vent valve may have opened 
intermittently, and this may have resulted in some of the downstream system pressurizing 
and gases leaking from the system.  However, it is postulated that the valve did not 
remain open long enough to allow the pressure to blow the rupture disk and vent the 
containment through the ventilation stack.  
 
The ERC was informed that a small air compressor was available in a subcontractor’s 
office.  Workers retrieved drawings and took pictures of the connection point and planned 
how to install the compressor to enable remote operation of the large air-operated 
suppression chamber vent valve (AO-72) from the control room.  The temporary air 
compressor was located and transferred to the reactor building equipment bay.  By 1400 
(T plus 23.2 hours), the compressor was installed and started.  At 1430almost 24 hours 
after the event had begunthe rupture disk opened and containment venting commenced.   
 
Containment pressure began to decrease, and the injection flow rate of water into the 
reactor subsequently increased.  Calculations, based on the total volume of water injected 
into the reactor, demonstrate that the injection rate was approximately 50 gpm (189.3 
lpm).  By 1453, the Unit 1 fire protection tank was running out of water, so the site 
superintendent directed the injection of seawater into the reactor.  Water transfers from 
other sources continued, while workers staged hoses and prepared to inject seawater into 
the reactor.  Work to install a temporary generator, which would provide power to the 
Unit 2 standby liquid control and control rod drive pumps, was nearing completion.  This 
power could be cross-tied to the Unit 1 systems, providing injection sources in Unit 1 as 
well.   
 
At the same time, hydrogen generated from the high-temperature interaction of zirconium 
and steam was being released from the reactor into the containment.  Some of these gases 
found their way into the reactor building through leaks, most probably in the primary 
containment vessel penetrations because of the excessive pressure.  Other potential leak 
paths included possible damage to the hardened vent or backflow through the unit 
standby gas treatment system into the reactor building; however, the exact leak path has 
not been determined.  As the gases accumulated in the reactor building, an explosive 
concentration of hydrogen developed, resulting in an explosion at 1536 on March 12.  
The explosion breached the reactor building and allowed radioactive materials to be 
released to the environment; it also damaged temporary power cables, generators, fire 
engines, and the fire hoses that had been staged to inject seawater.  The five workers who 
were injured by the blast were carried to safety.  The remaining workers evacuated to the INPO 11-005 
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ERC for accountability.  Additionally, the debris spread by the explosion was highly 
radioactive, further complicating the event response.  The explosion also damaged the 
door to the control room, which had been opened to allow workers to install temporary 
power cables.  The open door allowed airborne radioactive material to enter the control 
room.  All injection into the core was lost. 
 
Less than an hour after the explosion, radiation dose rates at a station monitoring post 
along the site boundary had reached 101.5 mrem/hr (1,015 µSv/hr).  By 1825, the Prime 
Minister had expanded the evacuation zone to 12.4 miles (20 km).   
 
The operators lined up a fire engine to inject seawater into the reactor through the core 
spray system and commenced injecting seawater at 1904 on March 12.  Boron was then 
added to the water source to address criticality concerns.   
 
This situation continued over the next several days as site personnel attempted to restore 
electrical power to the unit.  Off-site power was restored to Unit 1 on March 20, nine 
days after the event.   
 
4.2  Unit 2 Narrative 
 
On March 11, 2011 at 1446 (T=0), an earthquake caused a loss of off-site power and an 
automatic reactor scram.  All control rods inserted and several actions occurred, including 
a loss of feedwater and condensate and main steam isolation valve closures, as expected 
because of the loss of off-site AC power.  The emergency diesel generators started and 
loaded in response to the loss of off-site power and supplied power to the safety systems.  
Reactor water level initially dropped because of the collapsing steam voids, as expected; 
and operators initiated reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) to maintain reactor water 
level after the scram.  One minute later, RCIC automatically shut down because of a high 
reactor water level.  The operators waited approximately 10 minutes for level to lower 
and then restarted RCIC.  Torus cooling and spray were started to cool the suppression 
chamber pool, removing the heat introduced by the RCIC turbine exhaust.   
 
At 1527 (T plus 41 minutes), the first of a series of seven tsunamis generated by the 
earthquake arrived at the station.  One minute later, RCIC again shut down because of a 
high reactor water level.  Operators waited for reactor water level to lower, then restarted 
RCIC. 
 
The subsequent tsunamis flooded and damaged the intake structure; and by 1541 (T plus 
55 minutes), the tsunami had begun to cause flooding in the turbine building basement.  
The flooding wetted or submerged the Unit 2A emergency diesel generator and the AC 
and DC distribution systems, resulting in a gradual loss of all AC and most DC power.  
The 2B emergency diesel generator (EDG), which is air-cooled and located away from 
the ocean in the common spent fuel pool building, did not flood and continued to operate.  
The electrical switchgear for the 2B EDG, however, is located below grade in the 
building, was wetted by the tsunami, and subsequently failed.  Lighting and indications 
were lost as AC and DC power systems failed, including all indications for HPCI and INPO 11-005 
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RCIC.  Control room lighting, including emergency lighting, failed completely, leaving 
the control room dark.  TEPCO management made an emergency declaration because of 
the loss of all AC power and notified the government and associated authorities. 
 
The operators were not sure if RCIC was still operating because the indicating lights had 
gone out.  High pressure coolant injection, which requires DC power to operate, became 
unavailable when flooding inundated the DC distribution system.  At 1636, another 
emergency was declared because of the inability to determine reactor water level and the 
status of injection into the core.  With the possibility of no core cooling and extensive 
damage to the site, workers began to investigate methods for venting containment 
without power and reviewing methods for injecting water into the reactor using the fire 
protection system or fire engines.   
 
Batteries and cables were taken to the control room.  After confirming the wiring using 
drawings, workers planned to connect batteries directly to instrument panels in the 
control room.  A top priority was to ascertain the status of water injection into the reactor 
pressure vessel.  Restoration work focused on connecting batteries to the reactor water 
level indicator, which uses DC power. 
 
Workers confirmed the submergence and damage of power panels (high-voltage 
switchgear) by measuring the insulation resistance.  They also confirmed two power 
centers were not damaged and could be energized.  They identified the possibility of 
high-pressure water injection using the control rod drive system and standby liquid 
control systems if portable generators could restore power. 
 
At 1712 (T plus 2.4 hours), the site superintendent directed workers to investigate 
methods for injecting water into the reactor using the fire protection system.  Emergency 
Response Center personnel discussed using alternative water injection, which was 
implemented as an accident management measure.  This included the use of fire 
protection tanks and fire engines, which had been deployed after the Niigata-Chuetsu-oki 
earthquake in 2007.  The operators established an alternative water injection flow path 
via the residual heat removal system by manually opening valves in the turbine and 
reactor building to establish an injection path after the reactor pressure decreased to 100 
psig (0.69 MPa gauge).  This pressure is sufficiently low to allow the fire pump to inject. 
 
At 2049 (T plus 6.1 hours), workers restored some temporary control room lighting in the 
units 1-2 control room when a small portable generator was installed.  Critical 
indications, such as reactor water level and the status of RCIC, remained out of service. 
 
Without functional indications, operators reported that reactor water level may lower 
below the top of active fuel (TAF).  TEPCO informed the government that the estimated 
time for Unit 2 reactor water level to lower to TAF was 2140.  Immediately following 
this report, the Prime Minister expanded the evacuation zone to a 1.9 mile (3 km) radius 
of the station and directed inhabitants within a 1.9 to 6.2 mile (3 to 10 km) radius to take 
shelter. 
 INPO 11-005 
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At 2150 (T plus 7.1 hours), workers restored multiple indications, including reactor water 
level indication, in the control room.  Indicated reactor water level was 134 inches (3,400 
mm) above TAF.  Both the restoration of indication and the indicated reactor water level 
were reported to the government.   
 
Workers next restored one channel of reactor pressure indication and containment 
pressure indication.  Unit 2 reactor pressure indicated 914 psig (6.3 MPa gauge) and 
containment pressure indicated 20 psia (0.14 MPa abs) at 2325 (T plus 8.7 hours). 
 
Dose rates in the control room (shared with Unit 1) started increasing, most likely as a 
result of ongoing core damage and releases from Unit 1.  Operators continued to work on 
restoring indications while lining up a fire engine to supply another injection source.   
 
Just before midnight, the first of several power supply vehicles (mobile generators) began 
to arrive on site.  The generators were limited in their effectiveness because they could 
not be connected to the station electrical distribution system as a result of the extensive 
physical damage caused by the tsunami and flooding.  The first mobile generator was 
placed adjacent to Unit 2, and workers began to lay temporary cables from the generator 
to the associated distribution panel for the standby liquid control pumps.   
 
Operators reviewed drawings to determine if they could open the valves required for 
venting.  Based on their reviews of piping and instrumentation diagrams, accident 
management procedures, and the venting procedure, operators developed a method for 
venting containment.  They prepared a venting plan and began to review the locations of 
the vent valves. 
 
To confirm the operation of RCIC, operators were sent to locally inspect the system.  
Wearing breathing protection and boots, workers attempted to verify the condition of 
RCIC, but field conditions made this very difficult.  Work that would normally take 
approximately 10 minutes required more than one hour to complete.  The RCIC room 
was dark, and the water level in the room came nearly to the top of the worker's boots, so 
they turned back without getting close enough to check system operation.  While the 
workers could not get close to the system, they could hear faint metallic sounds, which 
they interpreted as indicating the system was operating.  Because of the lack of 
communication methods, the workers had to return to the control room to report their 
findings.   
 
At about 0200 on March 12, workers made another attempt to verify RCIC operation.  On 
this attempt, the workers discovered that the water level in the RCIC room had increased, 
and they could not enter the room.  They checked reactor pressure and RCIC pump 
discharge pressure on an instrument rack in the reactor building.  The RCIC pump 
discharge pressure was high, so the workers concluded RCIC was operating.  The 
workers returned to the control room to report that RCIC was in operation on Unit 2.  
With this information, opening the Unit 1 containment vent valves was made a priority.  
Operators proceeded with the lineup to vent Unit 1 and, at the same time, monitored 
parameters on Unit 2. INPO 11-005 
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By 0500 (T plus 14.2 hours), workers were directed to wear full face masks with charcoal 
filters and coveralls in both the control room and in the field.   Increasing dose rates in 
the Unit 1 control room caused operators to periodically move to the Unit 2 side of the 
room.  By this point, the level in the condensate storage tank was likely to be low and the 
suppression chamber level high, so the RCIC water supply switched from the condensate 
storage tank to the suppression chamber. 
 
At 1530 (T plus 24.7 hours), the temporary cable connection between Unit 2 and the 
power supply vehicle was completed.  Operators were only moments away from 
energizing the Unit 2 standby liquid control system when, at 1536, an explosion occurred 
in the Unit 1 reactor building.  Debris struck and damaged the cable and the power supply 
vehicle, and the generator stopped.  A review of satellite pictures revealed that the 
explosion also caused a blowout panel in the Unit 2 reactor building to open, which 
resulted in a loss of secondary containment integrity.  Fieldwork was suspended and 
workers evacuated to the Emergency Response Center (ERC).  The next day, workers 
attempted to start the power supply vehicle; however, the current surge relay actuated and 
the generator failed. 
 
At 1730 (T plus 26.7 hours), the site superintendent ordered preparations to proceed for 
venting the Unit 2 containment.  Injection with RCIC continued and indicated 
containment pressure remained relatively stable at 29–44 psia (200-300 kPa abs).  
Concurrent preparations started for lining up to vent both the units 2 and 3 containments.  
Considering the complications on Unit 1, operators planned to manually open the vent 
valves while the dose in the field was low, aligning the suppression chamber vent to the 
rupture disk.   
 
The motor-operated containment vent valve (MO-271) was opened at 0810 on March 13 
(T plus 41.4 hours).  At the time, containment pressure indicated approximately 50.8 psia 
(0.35 MPa abs).  At 0855, indicated containment pressure reached 52.9 psia (0.365 MPa 
abs), below the design pressure of 55.1 psig (0.38 MPa gauge), then began to lower.  The 
venting lineup was not yet complete.  At 1015 (T plus 43.5 hours), the site superintendent 
directed operators to vent the Unit 2 containment (see Figure 7.4-5).  Workers used the 
small generator in the control room, which had been installed to restore some lighting, to 
energize the solenoid for the large air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-
205).  At 1100 (T plus 44.2 hours), the vent lineup was completed but indicated 
containment pressure was lower than the 62 psig (427 kPa gauge) pressure necessary to 
open the rupture disk and allow venting, and the rupture disk remained intact.  The site 
superintendent then ordered workers to prepare for seawater injection into the reactor.   
 
Reactor water level continued to be maintained by RCIC, but conditions were degrading 
and operators monitored reactor water level for indications of a RCIC failure.  At the 
direction of the site superintendent, workers began staging hoses and equipment to 
support injecting into the Unit 2 reactor using fire engines when needed.  Plans were 
made to depressurize the reactor quickly when needed, allowing operators to switch core 
cooling to seawater via the fire protection system rapidly. INPO 11-005 
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On March 14 at 1101 (T plus 68.3 hours), a hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 3 
reactor building.  The explosion damaged the temporary power supply used to open the 
Unit 2 suppression chamber vent valve (AO-205), causing the valve to fail closed.  
Indicated containment pressure was stable around 66.7 psia (460 kPa abs), just below the 
rupture disk pressure.  Debris damaged the fire engine and hoses that had been staged to 
inject seawater into the reactor.  All field work was stopped and workers evacuated to the 
ERC for accountability.   
 
In the ERC, workers became concerned about the ability to depressurize the reactor to 
inject water with fire engines.  The suppression chamber was saturated, indicating 301
oF 
(149.3
oC) and 70.5 psia (486 kPa abs).  With the suppression chamber saturated, the 
safety relief valves (SRVs) may not provide a quick reduction in reactor pressure needed 
to switch core cooling to the fire protection system.  Based on this concern, TEPCO 
decided to vent Unit 2 containment first to remove energy, then open a safety relief valve 
(SRV) to reduce reactor pressure and switch from RCIC to seawater injection. 
 
Work to prepare fire engines and hoses recommenced at 1305 (T plus 70.3 hours).  
Because of scattered radioactive debris, workers shifted the seawater source to the 
shallow draft quay (harbor) instead of the main condenser backwash valve pit of Unit 3.  
In the high radiation environment surrounded by scattered rubble, workers prepared a 
new water injection line using available fire engines and hoses. 
 
At 1318 (T plus 70.5 hours), reactor water level began to trend downward.  By 1325, 
operators concluded that RCIC had failed and core injection was lost.  Attempts to restart 
RCIC were unsuccessful.  At the time of the trip, indicated reactor water level was 
approximately 95 inches (2,400 mm) above the top of active fuel (TAF) and containment 
pressure was 67 psia (465 kPa abs).  Calculations revealed that reactor water level would 
reach the top of active fuel at approximately 1630.  Workers continued to focus on 
venting containment, but ongoing aftershocks and evacuations delayed the work. 
 
Because of delays in opening the suppression chamber vent valve (AO-205), TEPCO 
changed the priority from venting containment to depressurizing the reactor.  At 
approximately 1600 (T plus 73.2 hours), an evacuation order was lifted, which allowed 
field work to recommence; and the site superintendent directed that the efforts to vent 
containment be performed in parallel with reactor depressurization.  Indicated reactor 
water level had now decreased to 12 inches (300 mm) above TAF.  By 1620, workers 
realized that a temporary air compressor was not providing sufficient air pressure and that 
the large air-operated suppression chamber vent valve was not opening.   
 
At 1630, indicated reactor water level had decreased below the top of active fuel, and 
operators began work to open an SRV and align seawater injection into the reactor.  High 
radiation levels on site, caused by the radioactive debris from the units 1 and 3 reactor 
building hydrogen explosions, precluded continuous manning of the fire engines.  
Workers started a fire engine and lined up injection so water would flow when reactor 
pressure was low enough.  Periodic tours were conducted to check fire engine operation.   INPO 11-005 
26 
 
Because of a lack of power, temporary batteries were necessary to open the SRV.  
Batteries were gathered from cars, carried to the control room, and connected.  However, 
the voltage was insufficient, so additional batteries were scavenged and added.  Operators 
attempted to operate several SRVs without success.  With no injection, reactor water 
level decreased.  The lack of core cooling likely resulted in core damage and the 
generation of hydrogen from the high-temperature interaction of steam and zirconium 
inside the reactor.   
 
Efforts to depressurize the reactor continued to about 1800 (T plus 75.2 hours), when 
enough batteries had been installed and sufficient power existed to open the SRV.  The 
high suppression chamber temperature resulted in reactor pressure lowering more slowly 
than desired.  Reactor pressure indicated 1,015 psig (6.998 MPa gauge) at 1634 and 881 
psig (6.075 MPa gauge) at 1803 and lowering; but the open SRV resulted in additional 
inventory loss from the reactor, and indicated reactor water level continued to lower.  At 
1822 (T plus 75.6 hours), indicated reactor  water level decreased to 146 inches (3,700 
mm) below TAFoffscale low, indicating the core may have been completely 
uncovered.  The open SRV resulted in an energy transfer into containment, and hydrogen 
and radioactive gases escaped from the reactor and accumulated inside containment.  
However, indicated containment pressure remained relatively constant.  It is postulated 
that some of these gases entered the reactor building from leaks in the containment.  The 
open blowout panel in the reactor building prevented the hydrogen from reaching an 
explosive level; however, it allowed the subsequent escape of radioactive materials to the 
environment.   
 
Workers had still not been able to establish a containment vent path.  TEPCO personnel 
now suspected that the solenoid on the air supply valve had failed, preventing the large 
air-operated suppression chamber vent valve from being opened.  Workers attempted to 
open the small air-operated suppression chamber vent valve to vent the containment.  
Reactor pressure continued to lower slowly; and by 1903 (T plus 76.3 hours), reactor 
pressure had reached 91 psig (0.63 MPa gauge), below the discharge pressure of the fire 
engine.  The injection of seawater should have commenced; but at 1920, a worker touring 
the area discovered the fire engine had run out of fuel.  Workers added fuel and restarted 
the engine at 1954, establishing seawater injection into the core.  A second fire engine 
was started and aligned to inject at 1957, but reactor water level remained below the 
indicating range. 
 
At 2100 (T plus 78.2 hours), operators opened the small suppression chamber air-
operated vent valve (AO-206), establishing the venting lineup (other than the rupture 
disk).  Indicated containment pressure remained slightly lower than the 62 psig (427 kPa 
gauge) working pressure of the rupture disk, so venting did not occur. The vent valves 
remained open, and operators monitored containment pressure. 
 
Between 2037 and 2118, reactor pressure began to increase and exceeded the discharge 
pressure of the fire engine.  At 2120, operators opened a second SRV to increase the rate 
of reactor depressurization.  Forty minutes later (2200), indicated reactor water level INPO 11-005 
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recovered to 63 inches (1,600 mm) below TAF.  However, containment pressure was 
now increasing.  Near the site boundary, dose rates increased to as high as 76 mrem/hr 
(760 µSv/hr). 
 
At 2240, another unexpected increase in reactor pressure occurred.  Reactor pressure 
indications increased from 62 psig (0.428MPa gauge) at 2240 to 264.4 psig (1.823MPa 
gauge) at 2250.  At the same times, indicated reactor water level lowered from 27.6 
inches (700 mm) below TAF to 63 inches (1,600 mm) below TAF.  The cause of the 
increase in reactor pressure has not been identified.  With reactor pressure above the 
shutoff head for the fire engines, reactor water level again began to decrease, exposing 
more of the fuel.  At approximately 2330, indicated reactor pressure again began to trend 
down, but reactor water level indication remained off-scale low.  As the reactor 
depressurized, containment pressure increased, indicating a peak value of 108.8 psia 
(0.75 MPa abs) at 2344. 
 
Operators began to recognize some abnormalities in their indications.  Containment 
pressure was well above the rupture disk pressurebut the rupture disk had not failed.  
Additionally, indicated drywell pressure was trending upward and had increased above 
102 psia (0.7 MPa abs), whereas indicated suppression chamber pressure was stable at 
about 43.5 to 58 psia (300-400 kPa abs), below the rupture disk pressure.  The non-
unified pressures indicated a problem.  As indicated suppression chamber pressure was 
lower than the working pressure of the rupture disk and indicated drywell pressure 
increased above the design pressure, the operators decided to open the small air-operated 
drywell vent valve (AO-208) to vent directly from the drywell to reduce pressure. 
 
Two minutes after midnight on March 15, the operators opened the small air-operated 
drywell vent valve (AO-208).  The vent line lineup was complete, except for the rupture 
disk that remained closed.  Containment pressure remained stable at approximately 109 
psia (750 kPa abs).  The operators rechecked their lineup and found that the small air-
operated drywell vent valve had already failed closed.  They continued to work toward 
establishing a containment vent path for Unit 2; but at about 0600 (T plus 87.2 hours), a 
loud noise was heard in the area around the torus and suppression chamber pressure 
indication failed low.  At approximately the same time, a hydrogen explosion occurred in 
the Unit 4 reactor building.  The loud noise in Unit 2 was widely reported as another 
explosion, which was accompanied by torus pressure lowering to atmospheric 
pressurebut this was later determined to be incorrect.  A review of the seismic 
instrumentation revealed that, if something did fail in Unit 2, the failure did not generate 
the same shock wave or force as an explosion.  Additionally, the suppression chamber 
pressure reading 0.0 psia (0.0 MPa abs) is an indication of a failed instrument, not an 
indication of atmospheric pressure.  Indicated drywell pressure remained stable at 
approximately 106 psia (0.73 MPa abs) and reactor water level indicated 110 inches 
(2,800 mm) below TAF.  The Unit 2 containment was not vented, and the cause for the 
containment pressure changes has not been determined. 
 
Following the explosion in the Unit 4 reactor building, dose rates at the main gate 
increased to 58.4 mrem/hr (583.7 µSv/hr).  All nonessential personnel (approximately INPO 11-005 
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650 people) were evacuated to Fukushima Daini (approximately 4.3 miles, (7 km) away), 
leaving 70 people at the station.  Shift operators periodically went to the control room to 
log containment pressure and other critical parameters, but no values were recorded from 
0720 until 1125.  When containment pressure was checked at 1125, it indicated 22.5 psia 
(0.155 MPa abs).  With no reports of steam being discharged from the Unit 2 vent stack 
and no changes to the venting lineup, TEPCO suspects the loud noise, instrument failure, 
and subsequent containment depressurization to be indicative of a potential breach of the 
containment. 
 
As the day continued, the operators lined up a fire engine to inject seawater into the 
reactor through the core spray system and commenced injecting seawater at 1954 on 
March 14.  Injection was occasionally challenged as reactor pressure varied.  Boron was 
added to the water source to address criticality concerns.   
 
This situation continued over the next several days as site personnel attempted to restore 
electrical power to the unit.  Off-site power was restored to Unit 2 on March 20, nine 
days after the event.   
 
4.3  Unit 3 Narrative 
 
On March 11, 2011 at 1446 (T=0), an earthquake caused a loss of off-site power and an 
automatic reactor scram.  All control rods inserted and several actions occurred, including 
a loss of feedwater and condensate and main steam isolation valve closures, as expected 
because of the loss of off-site AC power.  The emergency diesel generators started and 
loaded in response to the loss of off-site power and supplied power to the safety systems.  
After waiting for the shaking from the earthquake to stop, the operators manually tripped 
the main turbine because of high vibrations and subsequently broke main condenser 
vacuum to help stop the main turbine.   
 
After the scram, reactor water level initially dropped as expected because of the 
collapsing steam voids.  At 1505, operators initiated RCIC to maintain reactor pressure 
and water level after the scram.  Twenty minutes later, RCIC automatically shut down 
because of a high reactor water level.  With reactor water level high in the control band, 
the operators monitored reactor water level and waited for the level to lower before 
restarting RCIC.   
 
At 1527 (T plus 41 minutes), the first of a series of seven tsunamis, generated by the 
earthquake, arrived at the station.  The second tsunami, which arrived at 1535, flooded 
and damaged the intake structure.  By 1538 (T plus 52 minutes), the tsunami had begun 
to cause flooding in the turbine building basement.  The flooding wetted or submerged 
the Unit 3A and 3B emergency diesel generators and the electrical distribution systems, 
resulting in a gradual loss of all AC and most DC power.  Lighting and indications were 
lost as AC and DC power systems failed.  Normal control room lighting failed 
completely, but some DC power remained for emergency lighting and indications.  
TEPCO management made an emergency declaration because of the loss of all AC power 
and notified the government and associated authorities.  Two field operators were noted INPO 11-005 
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as missing from the units 3 and 4 operating crew.  The operators were later found to have 
drowned after being trapped in the Unit 4 turbine building basement when the tsunami 
flooded the building. 
 
While the tsunami caused the loss of some DC power systems, including some of the 
control board instrumentation and controls, the operators had indication of reactor 
pressure and reactor water level.  Both HPCI and RCIC remained available for injection.  
Operators used safety relief valves as needed to control reactor pressure. 
 
At 1603 (T plus 1.3 hours), indicated reactor water level had lowered and RCIC was 
restarted to restore reactor water level.  With RCIC in service, reactor water level was 
maintained approximately 157 inches (4,000 mm) above TAF by narrow range 
indication.  At 2158, a small portable generator was used to restore lighting in the units  
3-4 control room.  These conditions were maintained through the evening. 
 
The next day (March 12) at 1136, RCIC shut down unexpectedly and could not be 
restarted.  At this time, no water was being injected into the reactor.  Operators requested 
that a fire engine be dispatched to prepare for injecting water into Unit 3, but all fire 
engines were being used to mitigate the ongoing accident in Unit 1.  Requests for off-site 
fire engines were initially unsuccessful because the roads were impassable.  Primary 
containment pressure indication slowly increased, peaking at 57 psia (0.39 MPa abs), 
below the design pressure of 55 psig (0.38 MPa gauge). 
  
At 1235 (T plus 21.8 hours ), an hour after RCIC tripped, HPCI automatically started on 
a low-low reactor water level signal and began to restore reactor water level.  Operators 
throttled open full-flow test valves to return some of the HPCI flow to the suppression 
chamber, possibly in an attempt to prevent a high-level trip.  By 1635, indicated reactor 
water level had recovered to 15.7 inches (400 mm) by wide range indication, or 
approximately 180 inches (4,570 mm) above TAF.  The HPCI system was drawing a 
considerable amount of steam off the reactor, and reactor pressure had begun to decrease 
significantly.  At 1700 (T plus 26.2 hours), reactor pressure indicated 421 psig (2.9 MPa 
gauge) and lowering.   
 
The site superintendent ordered preparations to proceed for venting the containment.  
Knowing that venting would be required eventually, operators commenced preparations 
for lining up to vent the Unit 2 and Unit 3 containments.  Operators planned to manually 
open the vent valves while the dose rates in the reactor building were currently low. 
 
As the evening continued, station batteries depleted, and DC-powered instruments began 
to degrade and fail.  At 2027, the accident management indications for drywell pressure, 
suppression chamber pressure, and suppression chamber water level failed.  Nine minutes 
later, at 2036, reactor water level indication was lost.  The last indicated reactor water 
level before the failure was 53 inches (1,350 mm) by wide range instrument (217 inches 
or 5,520 mm above TAF) , but only 16 inches (400 mm) above TAF by fuel zone 
instruments. 
 INPO 11-005 
30 
After 2100 (T plus 30.2 hours), operators started a review of the vent procedures to 
identify the sequence and location of vent valves, which were written on a whiteboard.  
Emergency response workers reviewed the vent procedure for Unit 1.  Based on the 
review and the accident management procedure for Unit 3, they developed a plan to 
manually vent Unit 3 and provided the plan to the control room operators. 
 
At 0242 on March 13 (T plus 35.9 hours), the HPCI system tripped.  At the time of the 
trip, DC power was failing and reactor pressure was low, indicating approximately 84 
psig (0.58 MPa gauge).  Operators attempted to restart HPCI but were unsuccessful 
because the batteries were exhausted.  Operators were unable to restart RCIC locally.  
They next attempted water injection by diesel-driven fire pump, but reactor pressure was 
too high.  With HPCI isolated and with no safety relief valves (SRVs) available because 
of the loss of DC, reactor pressure quickly increased well above the discharge pressure of 
the fire pump, preventing water injection. 
 
Injection into the reactor was lost, and at approximately 0415 on March 13 the reactor 
core started to uncover.  As the core uncovered, core damage commenced, and the high-
temperature interaction of steam and zirconium began, generating large amounts of 
hydrogen in the reactor.   
 
The operators understood they needed to depressurize the reactor but had no method of 
opening an SRV.  All of the available batteries had already been used, so workers were 
sent to scavenge batteries from cars and bring them to the control room in an attempt to 
open an SRV.  
 
At 0450 (T plus 38.1 hours), workers attempted to open the large air-operated 
suppression chamber containment vent valve (AO-205).  To open the valve, workers used 
the small generator to provide power to the valve solenoid.  An operator checked the 
valve indication locally in the torus room, but the valve indicated closed.  The torus room 
was very hot because of the previous use of RCIC, HPCI, and SRVs; and the room was 
completely dark, which made a difficult working environment.  By 0500, reactor pressure 
had exceeded 1,070 psig (7.38 MPa gauge), reactor water level indicated 79 inches 
(2,000 mm) below TAF and lowering, and containment pressure indicated 52.2 psia (0.36 
MPa abs).   
 
At 0515 (T plus 38.5 hours), the site superintendent instructed operators to complete the 
lineup for venting the containment (see Figure 7.4-5).  The operators energized the 
solenoid for the large air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-205), but the 
vent valve remained closed.  Operators determined that there was insufficient air pressure 
to operate that valve.  The operators replaced the temporary air bottle, and the valve 
opened.  The motor-operated vent valve, however, had not yet been opened, so the vent 
lineup was not complete.   
 
With no ability to inject into the reactor, and containment pressure indicating 66.7 psia 
(0.46 MPa abs) and increasing, operators aligned a fire engine to the containment spray 
system in an attempt to reduce containment pressure.  Containment pressure, however, INPO 11-005 
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continued to increase.  While not confirmed, the high containment temperature and 
pressure may have caused the drywell head seal and containment penetrations to degrade 
and begin to leak.  By 0735 (T plus 40.8 hours), indicated reactor water level had lowered 
to the bottom of the fuel zone indication, indicating the core may have been completely 
uncovered. 
 
At 0835 (T plus 41.8 hours), operators opened the motor-operated containment vent 
valve.  At 0841, they opened the large air-operated suppression chamber vent valve, 
completing the vent lineup except for the rupture disk.  A short time later, steam was 
observed discharging from the vent stack and dose rates at the site boundary increased to 
88.2 mrem/hr (882 µSv/h).  The containment vent rupture disk had opened, and pressure 
began to decrease.  The maximum indicated containment pressure was 92.4 psia 
(0.637 MPa abs) at 0910. 
 
At approximately the same time, workers had scavenged enough batteries to power the 
SRVs, and the operators opened an SRV to depressurize the reactor.  By 0925, reactor 
pressure had decreased sufficiently to start borated fresh water injection.  Reactor water 
level recovered and increased above the top of active fuel. 
 
By 1030 (T plus 43.7 hours), knowing that the site was low on fresh water, the site 
superintendent ordered workers to be ready to commence injection using seawater.  
Workers staged equipment in preparation for a quick transition to seawater injection.  
They looked for seawater sources, including accumulated water in the basement of the 
Unit 4 turbine building.  Workers broke through the truck bay doors and attempted to 
move a fire engine into place, but this plan was unsuccessful.  They also considered 
taking water from the discharge channel of Unit 4 or the training center pool, but this also 
did not work.  Workers elected to use a Unit 3 circulating water reversing valve pit, 
which had been flooded by the tsunami, as the water source for the fire engines.   
 
A short time later, at 1117, the air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-205) 
was found closed.  The air cylinder being used to provide air was depleted because of 
leakage.  The workers attempted to lock open the valve locally, but they were not 
successful because of the adverse conditions in the torus room.  The room was dark and 
hot, and the torus was shaking because of the open SRV.  Workers eventually replaced 
the air bottle, and the air-operated valve was reopened.  Similar problems challenged the 
containment vent lineup over the next few days.  An engine-driven air compressor was 
later installed to resolve these issues. 
 
The fresh water supply was depleted at 1220 (T plus 45.6 hours), and injection into the 
reactor stopped.  Workers had prepared to make a swift change to seawater injection, but 
an aftershock and subsequent evacuation order occurred while the work was being carried 
out, so the swap was delayed.  By 1300, indicated reactor pressure had decreased to 28 
psig (0.19 MPa gauge), and reactor water level indicated approximately 79 inches (2,000 
mm) below TAF by the lowest indication.   
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Seawater injection was established at 1312.  However, indicated reactor water level 
remained below the top of active fuel.  The dose rates measured at the air lock to Unit 3 
increased to 30 rem/hr (300 mSv/hr).  By 1530, indicated reactor water level was 
74.8 inches (1,900 mm) below TAF.  Dose rates in the Unit 3 side of the control room 
reached 1.2 rem/hr (12 mSv/hr), and operators moved to the Unit 4 side of the room in an 
attempt to minimize their exposure.   
 
At 0110 on March 14 (T plus 58.4 hours), injection was stopped when the water level in 
the reversing valve pit became low.  Workers began refilling the pit using other fire 
engines.  Reactor water level indicated 88.6 inches (2,250 mm) below TAF.   
 
At 0200 (T plus 59.2 hours), operators noticed that containment pressure was trending 
upward, indicating at 38.4 psia (0.265 MPa abs) and increasing.  Because of ongoing 
problems with the large air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-205), workers 
decided to open the small air-operated suppression chamber vent valve (AO-206).  
Containment pressure continued to increase.  The workers could not maintain the valve 
open because of a loss of air pressure and a loss of DC power to the solenoid.   
 
To restore injection into the reactor, workers moved the fire engine around, allowing the 
suction hose to drop deeper into the valve pit.  At 0320 (T plus 60.6 hours), seawater 
injection into the reactor was restored.  The injection rate was not sufficient, and 
indicated reactor water level continued to lower.  By 0430, reactor water level was below 
the indicating range of the fuel zone instrument, indicating the core may have been 
completely uncovered.   
 
Additional fire engines, which had been requested previously, began to arrive around 
sunrise.  The fire engines were delayed because the drivers needed to be changed to 
station workers off site because of the contamination and radiation levels at the site.  
Workers began using two fire engines that had arrived from off site to pump seawater 
from the shallow-draft quay (harbor) into the reversing valve pit.  At 1053 (T plus 68.1 
hours), seven 5-ton Self-Defense Force water supply vehicles arrived and began to refill 
the reversing valve pit.  However, continued problems with the containment vent lineup 
had resulted in indicated containment pressure increasing and stabilizing at 
approximately 75.4 psia (0.52 MPa abs). 
 
A large hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 3 reactor building at 1101 on March 14.  
The explosion destroyed the secondary containment and injured 11 workers.  The large 
amount of flying debris from the explosion damaged multiple portable generators and the 
temporary power supply cables.  Damage to the fire engines and hoses from the debris 
resulted in a loss of seawater injection.   Debris on the ground near the unit was 
extremely radioactive, preventing further use of the main condenser backwash valve pit 
as a source of water.  With the exception of the control room operators, all work stopped 
and workers evacuated to the Emergency Response Center for accountability. 
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An undamaged fire engine was moved to the shallow-draft quay, and at 1630 a new 
injection lineup was completed.  Fire engines and hoses were rearranged to inject 
seawater directly from the quay into both units 2 and 3 reactors.   
 
This situation continued over the next several days as site personnel attempted to restore 
electrical power to the unit.  Off-site power was restored to Unit 3 on March 22, 11 days 
after the event.   
 
4.4  Unit 4 Narrative 
 
Unit 4 was shut down and had been in a refueling outage since November 30, 2010.  All 
of the fuel had been removed from the reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool to 
facilitate shroud work.  The reactor was disassembled with the head off at the time of the 
earthquake.  The cavity gates were installed, isolating the spent fuel pool from the upper 
pools.  Spent fuel pool temperature was approximately 80.6
oF (27
oC). 
 
Following the earthquake and tsunami, the operators in the units 3-4 control room 
focused the majority of their efforts on stabilizing Unit 3.  Because of the low decay heat 
load in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool, operators may not have been immediately concerned 
with taking action to fill or cool the spent fuel pool.   
 
On March 15, however, a hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 4 reactor building.  
This was unexpected, as workers did not believe there was enough decay heat in the pool 
to result in overheating and the subsequent high-temperature interaction of zirconium and 
water to produce hydrogen gas.  After the explosion, however, some people suspected 
that the spent fuel was overheating, and they became concerned about subsequent 
hydrogen explosions caused by the fuel in the spent fuel pools on other units.  Some 
resources may have been diverted from attempts to stabilize the reactors, as extensive 
actionssuch as helicopter water drops and the use of water cannonswere taken in an 
attempt to refill the pools.  Subsequent analysis and inspections determined that the water 
level in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool never dropped below the top of fuel and that no 
significant fuel damage had occurred.   
 
There are various theories regarding the cause of the hydrogen explosion in Unit 4.  
Hydrogen water chemistry was used at Fukushima Daiichi, and hydrogen was also used 
to cool the main generators.  Both of these sources of hydrogen were reviewed, and it 
appears that neither source caused the Unit 4 explosion.   
 
The most widely accepted theory is associated with the backflow of gases from Unit 3 
during venting.  The containment vent exhaust piping from Unit 3 is connected to the 
Unit 4 exhaust piping.  The dampers on the Unit 4 standby gas treatment system (SGTS) 
are air-operated and fail open on a loss of power or air (except the cross-connect between 
SGTS filter trains).  Additionally, the system does not have a backflow damper installed 
in the piping that connects to Unit 3.  With no power or air, and no fans in service to 
direct the gases from Unit 3 up the exhaust stack, the exhaust gases from Unit 3 would be 
directly aligned to the Unit 4 SGTS filters.  This piping arrangement may have allowed INPO 11-005 
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gases from the Unit 3 containment to be vented to the Unit 4 reactor building via reverse 
flow through the Unit 4 standby gas treatment system.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.4-1  Unit 4 Standby Gas Treatment System Hydrogen Flow Path 
 
To confirm this theory, on August 25 TEPCO personnel performed radiation surveys on 
the Unit 4 SGTS filters.  The survey results, shown in Figure 4.4-2, revealed higher 
radiation levels at the locations closer to Unit 3.  These survey results support the 
conclusion that there was backflow from Unit 3 to Unit 4.  Further inspections are needed 
to confirm this theory; but based on this information, it is postulated that the hydrogen 
explosion in the Unit 4 reactor building was caused by hydrogen from Unit 3.  INPO 11-005 
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Figure 4.4-2  Unit 4 Standby Gas Treatment System Filter Survey Results 
 
4.5  Spent Fuel Pools and Dry Cask Storage 
 
Unit  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Number of fuel assemblies 
     
  
   
   In the reactor  400  548  548  0  548  764 
   Spent fuel assemblies 
in the spent fuel pool  292  587  514  1,331  946  876 
  
New fuel assemblies 
in the spent fuel pool 
100  28  52  204  48  64 
Water volume (ft
3)  36,021  50,323  50,323  50,323  50,323  52,866 
Table 4.5-1  Spent Fuel Pool Data 
 
Background 
 
As shown, the spent fuel pools (SFPs) for units 14 contained different amounts of spent 
fuel at the time of the event, generating different heat loads.  The Unit 4 SFP had the 
greatest heat load because the entire core had been offloaded into the SFP to support 
ongoing outage work. 
 
Approximately 60 percent of the spent fuel on site is stored in a separate building in a 
common spent fuel pool.  This pool contained 6,375 fuel assemblies (about 80 percent of 
pool capacity), but the heat load was very low because the assemblies were stored in their 
respective units’ SFPs for 19 months or longer before being set in the common pool.  
Calculations determined that cooling can be lost to this pool for 30 days before it INPO 11-005 
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becomes a concern.  The common spent fuel pool uses fans and air for cooling, so 
cooling is maintained if the seawater ultimate heat sink is lost; however, AC power is 
required to power the fan motors and circulating pumps. 
 
Dry cask storage is also used for spent fuel.  At the time of the event, the station had nine 
casks containing 408 spent fuel assemblies. 
 
There are no mixed-oxide fuel assemblies in any of the spent fuel pools or in the dry cask 
storage facility.   
 
Event Progression 
 
Spent fuel pool cooling flow was lost for all pools because of the loss of off-site power 
and was not restored after the emergency diesel generators started.  The existing water 
inventory in the spent fuel pools provided sufficient cooling to remove decay heat, as 
long as the fuel remained covered.  Unconfirmed reports were that sloshing of the water 
in the SFPs during the earthquake resulted in a loss of some inventory; however, this has 
not been verified.  After the tsunami impacted the site, operators were able to use the 6B 
emergency diesel generator (EDG) to provide power to cooling systems for the Unit 6 
spent fuel pool.  After installing temporary cables, the 6B EDG provided power to Unit 5 
spent fuel pool cooling. 
 
Hydrogen explosions in the units 1, 3, and 4 reactor buildings, coupled with the loss of 
the blowout panel in Unit 2, resulted in the SFPs of all units being exposed to 
atmosphere.  The explosions may have also caused additional inventory to be lost from 
the pools.  After the explosion on Unit 4, a concern arose that the SFP may have boiled 
dry and resulted in fuel damage and hydrogen generation.  In response to this concern, 
station personnel took numerous actions to ensure the spent fuel had sufficient cooling.   
 
Fire engines from the surrounding area, including water cannons from the Japan Self-
Defense Force, were brought to the site to spray water into the SFPs to keep the fuel 
assemblies covered.  The water cannons could only reach the floor surrounding the SFP, 
so little water got into the pool.  On March 17, helicopters attempted to drop large loads 
of water into the SFPs.  Because of high radiation levels, the helicopters needed to 
maintain a high altitude; and that, coupled with the prevailing winds, resulted in this 
effort not being successful.  
 
Concrete pumping trucks were flown to Japan for use in pumping water into the SFPs.  
These trucks, which have long, articulated booms normally used for transferring concrete, 
were lined up to pump water into the spent fuel pools on March 18.  This operation was 
successful; however, the trucks did not start refilling the SFPs until several days after the 
event began.  The delay in refilling the SFPs may have contributed to increased radiation 
levels in the area around the spent fuel pools because less shielding was provided with 
the reduced water level.  The exact impact, however, was not known because radiation 
levels were not monitored as the pools were refilled. 
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Subsequent analyses and inspections determined that the spent fuel pool water levels 
never dropped below the top of fuel in any spent fuel pool and that no significant fuel 
damage had occurred.  Current investigation results indicate that any potential fuel 
damage may have been caused by debris from the reactor building explosions.   
 
An inspection of the dry cask storage facility revealed that, while the building was 
damaged by the tsunami, the dry storage casks do not appear to be damaged.  The casks 
were wetted by the tsunami, but they were not moved from their storage locations by the 
force of the waves or debris.  The fuel stored inside the dry casks has not yet been 
inspected.INPO 11-005 
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5.0  Radiological Overview 
 
Capabilities for monitoring radiological conditions effectively both on site and off site 
were severely hampered by the effects of the earthquakes and tsunamis.  The earthquake 
did not damage on-site monitoring systems, but few remained following the tsunamis.  
For example, most electronic personnel dosimeters, computer systems for activating and 
recording dose from these devices, installed contamination monitors, and many portable 
survey instruments were lost to the flooding.  Installed radiation monitors essential for 
monitoring core, containment, and spent fuel pool conditions were lost when the tsunamis 
wetted the electrical distribution equipment.  In addition, radiological effluent, 
environmental, and meteorological monitors were lost. 
 
During the event, Fukushima Prefecture officials directed several evacuations.  Evacuees 
were screened for contamination upon reporting to shelters.  The screening criterion for 
evacuees reporting to shelters was originally 100,000 counts per minute (cpm).  The 
screening criterion was revised on March 20 to 0.1 mrem/hr at 4 inches (10 cm) to align 
with IAEA standards.  Between March and June, 195,354 people were screened, with 102 
persons being decontaminated below the limits.   
 
Following the event, Japanese government officials estimated the amount of radioactivity 
discharged into the air between March 11 and April 5 was equivalent to 1.7 E7 curies (6.3 
E17 Bq). 
 
On April 2, very high concentrations of radioactivity were identified in the harbor of the 
station.  The source was water accumulating in the turbine building, flowing through a 
trench, and leaking into the harbor.  The magnitude of this release was estimated at 1.3 
E5 curies (4.81 E15 Bq).  This source was stopped after a couple of days.  The ocean 
around the plant was sampled daily following this discovery, and the maximum 
concentration in late July was approximately 1 E3 pCi/l (3.7 E1 Bq/l) of cesium-137.   
 
5.1  On-Site Capabilities 
 
The loss of personnel monitoring capabilities resulted in the need for initial emergency 
responders to share dosimeters, with only one worker on a team wearing dosimetry for 
many missions.  The limited number of electronic dosimeters made measuring worker 
dose difficult because individual passive dosimeters, such as thermoluminescent 
dosimeters, are normally not worn at the station.   
 
With no process radiation monitoring indications available, operators were not aware of 
changes in radiological conditions until personnel in the field noted them.  For example, 
when returning the Unit 1 isolation condenser to service at 2130 on March 11, dose rates 
in the reactor building increased more than expected.  This is an indication that fuel 
damage may have already begun and likely created the first radiological release to the 
environment.  However, operators were not aware of this condition until workers in the 
plant reported increases in their dose and elevated dose rates were measured outside the 
reactor building personnel air lock.  Later on March 12, operators were unsure if attempts INPO 11-005 
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to vent Unit 1 were successful because the radiological monitor on the plant vent stack 
was inoperable.   
 
The loss of installed radiological monitoring equipment and meteorological 
instrumentation also contributed to TEPCO and off-site agencies relying on postulated 
core damage scenarios to perform off-site dose projections.   
 
5.2  Site Boundary and Off-Site Capabilities 
 
Radiological monitors installed off site and at the site boundary (approximately 0.62 
miles (1 km) from the plant) were also lost from either the widespread loss of power that 
resulted from the earthquake or from the tsunamis.  Twenty-three of 24 off-site 
monitoring posts, the off-site central monitoring facility, and all 8 site boundary 
monitoring posts were out of service.  Additionally, local government personnel who 
were responsible for collecting off-site radiological data either could not be located 
following the earthquake and tsunami or were supporting other disaster duties.  This 
resulted in no organized off-site radiological monitoring until March 16, when Ministry 
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology personnel, the ministry 
responsible for environmental radiation monitoring, assumed this responsibility. 
 
To compensate for the loss of installed monitors at the site boundary, station personnel 
had a vehicle equipped with radiological and meteorological instruments.  Monitoring 
began at the site boundary on the inland side of the plant at 1700 on March 11.  This 
monitoring was normally limited to a single location.  Although valuable data was 
obtained, air samples were not taken; and, as the event progressed, the data was often not 
collected in close proximity to the plume.   
 
5.3  On-Site Dose Rates and Protective Measures 
 
After off-site evacuations had been reported as complete at 0903 on March 12, operators 
entered the Unit 1 reactor building in an attempt to vent containment.  The reactor 
building had elevated dose rates and a steam-filled environment.  The operators wore 
fire-fighting turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus and were provided with 
electronic dosimeters set to alarm at 10,000 mrem (100 mSv) and potassium iodide for 
thyroid protection.  The first team opened a valve on the second floor of the reactor 
building, but elevated dose rates in the torus room required the second team to turn back 
before completing its mission.  One of the operators received a dose of 10,630 mrem 
(106.30 mSv) while in the torus room.  This was reported to the authorities as an 
overexposure because it was above the 10,000 mrem emergency exposure limit. 
 
The explosion on Unit 1 at 1536 on March 12 spread highly radioactive debris around the 
site.  The door to the units 1-2 control room, which had been opened to allow workers to 
run temporary power cables, was damaged by the explosion, allowing radioactive 
material into the control room.  The elevated dose rates and high levels of surface and 
airborne radioactivity around the site hampered efforts to stabilize units 2 and 3 and 
resulted in substantial dose to site workers.  Operators in the units 3-4 control room were INPO 11-005 
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directed to wear charcoal respirators after the Unit 1 explosion.  However, to 
continuously staff their posts, they needed to remove their respiratory protection on 
occasion, such as to eat.  In addition, a few of the operators wore conventional eyeglasses 
(spectacles kits were not a requirement), which prevented their respirators from sealing 
properly.  As a result, two operators in the units 3-4 control room received doses in 
excess of the initial 10,000 mrem (100 mSv) and later 25,000 mrem (250 mSv) 
emergency dose limit.  One received 67,808 mrem (678.08 mSv), of which 59,000 mrem 
(590 mSv) was internal.  The other received 64,307 mrem (643.07 mSv), with a total 
internal dose of 54,000 mrem (540 mSv).   
 
On March 13 at 1300, pressure in the Unit 3 drywell and torus began to decrease rapidly, 
indicating a release from the containment.  On-site dose rates as high as 30,000 mrem/hr 
(300 mSv/hr) were measured outside the Unit 3 personnel air lock.  Operators in the units 
3-4 control room had to move to the Unit 4 side because dose rates on the Unit 3 side 
reached 1,200 mrem/hr (12 mSv/hr).  The TEPCO medical chief directed site personnel 
under 40 years of age to take potassium iodide, while older workers were given the 
option.  
 
On March 14, at 0700, Unit 3 containment was vented.  Indication on a Unit 3 drywell 
radiation monitor had been recovered briefly just before the venting, and a dose rate of 
16,700 rem/hr (167 Sv/hr) was recorded.  The Unit 3 explosion severely impacted work 
within the plant.  Debris on the ground had dose rates exceeding 1,000 rem/hr (10 Sv/hr), 
and workers establishing water injection for Unit 2 could no longer continuously monitor 
fire engines because of the elevated dose rates.   
 
On March 15, elevated dose rates around the site led TEPCO officials to evacuate 
nonessential personnel at the site to Fukushima Daini.  Seventy workers remained on site 
and 650 evacuated to Fukushima Daini.  
 
The high surface and airborne contamination levels around the site also resulted in the 
Emergency Response Center becoming contaminated early in the accident.  The buildup 
of contamination was not recognized until radiological surveys in the building were first 
performed on March 24.  As a result, controls were not in place to prevent uptakes, and 
some workers received substantial internal doses.  For example, a female worker in the 
building exceeded the 500 mrem (5 mSv) quarterly dose limit when she was determined 
to have received 1,350  mrem (13.50 mSv) of internal dose. 
 
On March 22 and 23, surveys of the airborne radioactivity and dose rates around the site 
began to be collected and documented.  The dose rates are documented on Figure 5.3-1.  
Localized dose rates as high as 1,000 rem/hr (10 Sv/hr) were later discovered. 
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Figure 5.3-1  Site Dose Rates 
 
Dose rates inside the reactor and turbine buildings were taken in April and May.  Dose 
rates 3.3 feet (1 m) above water that had accumulated in the turbine buildings ranged 
from 0.3 rem/hr (0.003 Sv/hr) in Unit 4 to 100 rem/hr (1 Sv/hr) in Unit 2.  The general 
area dose rates in the reactor buildings ranged from slightly below 1 rem/hr (0.01 Sv/hr) 
to approximately 43 rem/hr (0.43 Sv/hr) in Unit 2.  A localized area around a steam leak 
on Unit 1 had dose rates as high as 400 rem/hr (4 Sv/hr).  Air samples collected in the 
reactor buildings measured iodine-131 concentrations equivalent to as high as 3 rem/hr 
(0.03 Sv/hr) of thyroid dose if breathed by an unprotected worker.  Although high 
concentrations of strontium isotopes, a strong beta emitter, have been discovered off site, 
measurements of beta dose rates have not been documented in available plant surveys.  
As a result of the high beta contamination levels, two workers received beta burns when 
they stepped in turbine building water. 
 
5.4  Site Boundary and Off-Site Dose Rates and Protective Measures 
 
Evacuations in the area surrounding the plant were first ordered at 2050 on March 11 for 
the people living within 1.2 miles (2 km) of the site.  The evacuation was extended to a 
1.9 mile (3 km) radius at 2123, and those within 6.2 mile (10 km) were directed to shelter 
within their homes. 
 
The first increase in dose rates at the site boundary was detected at 0404 on March 12.  
Dose rates near the main gate increased from the normal background of 0.007 mrem/hr 
(0.07  Sv/hr) to 0.1 mrem/hr (1.0  Sv/hr).  This data, along with a decrease in drywell 
pressure, prompted Unit 1 control room personnel to conclude that a release had 
occurred.  At 0544, the Prime Minister extended the evacuation radius to 6.2 miles (10 
km), and a TEPCO press release at 0600 reported elevated dose rates around the site. 
 
At 1020 on March 12, while Unit 1 operators were attempting to open the containment 
vent valve, dose rates at the site boundary briefly reached as high as 38.5 mrem/hr (0.385 
mSv/hr).  Dose rates later spiked as high as 101.5 mrem/hr (1.015 mSv/hr) at the site 
boundary, and steam was seen leaving the plant stack after operators vented Unit 1 torus INPO 11-005 
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using a temporary air supply at 1410.  Dose rates at the site boundary remained elevated 
and had no discernable increase after the explosion that occurred on Unit 1 at 1536.  The 
evacuation radius was extended to 12.4 miles (20 km) at 1825.  Over the next day, dose 
rates remained elevated well above normal background with periodic increases, which 
indicated that radiological releases continued to occur. 
 
On March 13 at 1300, pressure in the Unit 3 drywell and torus began to decrease rapidly, 
indicating a release from the containment.  Dose rates at the site boundary increased to 
155.7 mrem/hr (1.557 mSv/hr).  
 
There were no appreciable changes in site boundary dose rates on March 14 following 
venting of the Unit 3 containment because the wind direction was blowing the plume 
toward the ocean.  However, the release was likely very large given that a Unit 3 drywell 
radiation monitor recovered briefly just before the venting indicated a dose rate of 16,700 
rem/hr (167 Sv/hr).  The wind continued to blow toward the ocean, and site boundary 
dose rates did not increase when a hydrogen explosion occurred on Unit 3 at 1101.  Dose 
rates at the site boundary did increase to as high as 313 mrem/hr (3.13 mSv/hr) later in 
the evening, and elevated dose rates were measured 62 miles (100 km) south of the plant. 
 
On March 15 at 0820, site boundary dose rates began to increase rapidly to 821 mrem/hr 
(8.21 mSv/hr).  This increase occurred approximately two hours after the pressure in the 
Unit 2 drywell began to decrease.  This release is likely responsible for much of the 
elevated dose rates later discovered off site because of deposition that occurred from the 
rainfall in many areas during this release.  Government officials directed that inhabitants 
between 12.4 miles (20 km) and 18.6 miles (30 km) of the site remain sheltered.  The 
highest dose rates recorded at the site boundary were measured on March 16, when dose 
rates reached 1,085 mrem/hr (10.85 mSv/hr).   
 
Routine dose rate surveys began to be collected in the area outside the 12.4 mile (20 km) 
radius of the plant on March 16.  The highest dose rate of 17 mrem/hr (0.17 mSv) was 
measured 19 miles (30.5 km) northwest of the station.  The first air samples from the site 
boundary, on March 22 and 23, had iodine-131 concentrations that were equivalent to 
approximately 80 mrem (0.8 mSv) of thyroid dose each hour if inhaled by an unprotected 
individual.  The concentration remained between 25 and 200 percent of this value until 
April 18, 2011.  Surveys inside 12.4 miles (20 km) began on March 30.  The map shown 
in Figure 5.4-1, which was created based on survey results, is representative of these 
initial surveys. 
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Figure 5.4-1  Initial Off-Site Survey Results 
 
Government officials issued the first directive for the public to take potassium iodide and 
restrictions on consumption of food and water on March 21.  The directive for the 
mandatory issuance of potassium iodide included the inhabitants of several villages and 
towns within the affected area.  Enough potassium iodide for 900,000 people was 
distributed within a 31-mile (50 km) radius of the plant.  Because the evacuations had 
already been completed, however, the potassium iodide was not issued to the population. 
 
Food restrictions included the distribution of such items as spinach and raw milk from 
Fukushima and a few nearby prefectures.  While food restrictions have continued to be 
added and lifted since the event, all water restrictions that had gone into effect were lifted 
by April 1, 2011, except in one small village where they remained until May 10, 2011 for 
infants. INPO 11-005 
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7.0  Additional Information 
 
7.1  Earthquake Design Basis 
 
The seismic design criteria for Japanese nuclear power plants is established by the 
Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) of Japan, as documented in NSC Regulatory Guides 
for Power-generating Light Water Reactors.  The seismic design criteria at Fukushima 
Daiichi include geological survey information and calculate the design values based on 
ground motion from known and hypothetical sources.  The seismic design basis for 
Fukushima Daiichi was derived from the 1938 Shioyazaki offshore earthquake, which 
occurred in the vicinity of the site and was considered as a specified interplate earthquake 
that had the most significant impact on the site.  The hypothetical source is based on the 
relative uncertainty associated with geological conditions and the inability to fully 
evaluate all probable earthquakes that could occur near the site.  The probability of 
exceeding the design basis seismic ground motion was calculated to be 10
-4 to 10
-6.   
 
The March 11 earthquake occurred over the area where multiple smaller individual 
earthquakes had previously occurred.  The interaction over a large area contributed to the 
earthquake being the largest Japan has ever experienced and the fourth largest recorded 
earthquake in the world.  The design basis seismic analysis had not considered the 
possibility of ground motion across several areas.  The March 11 earthquake exceeded 
the maximum acceleration value for units 2, 3, and 5 in the east-west direction, as 
measured from the reactor building base slab seismometers. 
 
The earthquake damaged breakers in the units 1 and 2 switchyard, causing a loss of off-
site power to both units.  A protective relay actuated, causing breakers in the Shin 
Fukushima Power Substation to open, resulting in a loss of off-site power to units 3 and 4 
(the Unit 3 startup transformer was out of service for planned modification work before 
the earthquake).  Units 5 and 6 lost power when a transmission line tower that carried 
both 66-kV lines (tower Number 27) collapsed.  As a result, the earthquake caused a loss 
of all off-site power to units 1 through 6.  
 
While no formal seismic walkdowns have been performed, a review of plant indications 
and operator logs does not indicate any seismic damage that affected the operator 
response to the earthquake.  Before the tsunami, all emergency diesel generators that 
were operable started and loaded as expected, and each emergency core cooling system 
the operators used appeared to function as designed.  Reactor pressure, reactor water 
level, and containment pressure indications for units 1, 2, and 3 appeared as expected 
following a scram and did not indicate any potential breach of the reactor coolant system 
from the earthquake.   
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Preliminary Seismic Data – Fukushima Daiichi reactor building slab seismic instrument
3 
 
Figure 7.1-1   Preliminary Seismic Data 
Graphs indicate the observed values as compared to the design basis seismic criteria.   
  Ss-1:  Design basis for inland crustal earthquakes and interplate earthquakes 
  Ss-2:  Design basis for oceanic intraplate earthquakes 
  Ss-3:  Design basis for hypothetical (unspecified) sources 
                                                 
3 “Seismic Ground Motion Due to Great East Japan Earthquake and Seismic Ground Motion Accounted for in Seismic Safety Assessments,” provided by TEPCO INPO 11-005 
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7.2  Tsunami Design Basis 
 
In the 1960s, when TEPCO applied for the construction permit at Fukushima Daiichi, it 
was common practice to adopt historical tsunami records as the design basis tsunami 
height.  Numerical simulation of tsunamis based on tsunami generation methods 
(earthquakes) did not begin until the mid-1970s.  The original design basis tsunami for 
Fukushima Daiichi was based on the Chilean tsunami of 1960, which resulted in a 
historic high water level of 10.2 ft (3.122 m) at the Onahama port, just north of the plant.  
Based on this, 10.2 ft (3.122 m) was the design basis for Fukushima Daiichi when the 
construction permit was issued.   
  
The tsunami design basis for Fukushima Daiichi considered only the inundation and 
static water pressures, and not the impact force of the wave or the impact of debris 
associated with the wave.  The design included a breakwater, which ranged in height 
from 18 ft (5.5 m) to as high as 32.8 ft (10 m), as shown in Section 1.1.   
 
Following the publishing of Tsunami Assessment Methods for Nuclear Power Plants in 
Japan by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE) in 2002, TEPCO voluntarily 
reassessed its tsunami design basis.  Using these new deterministic evaluation techniques, 
however, TEPCO determined the design basis tsunami would result in a maximum water 
level of 18.7 ft (5.7 m).  Because these changes were done voluntarily and not at the 
direction of the regulator, the licensing basis did not change.  According to the 
evaluation, the elevation of the Unit 6 seawater pump motor for the emergency diesel 
generator was raised 7.9 in (20 cm), and the seawater pump motor for high pressure core 
spray was raised 8.7 in (22 cm).  These changes ensured all vital seawater motors were 
installed higher than the new inundation level of 18.7 ft (5.7m).  The new analysis did not 
consider or require the station design to mitigate hydrodynamic impact forces.  The 
breakwater was not modified when the new tsunami height was implemented because it 
was not intended to provide tsunami protection, but rather to minimize wave action in the 
harbor. 
 
The 2002 analysis considered tsunamis generated from eight different near-field sources 
off the coast of Japan.  The March 11 earthquake was a rupture across several of these 
areas, resulting in a larger-than-expected tsunami.  Tsunamis caused by ruptures across 
several areas had not been considered as credible in the analysis.  The tsunami was the 
largest in the history of Japan.   
 
In 2006, TEPCO performed a study on the development of probabilistic tsunami hazard 
analysis, which used the Fukushima coast as an example.  The study estimated the 
probability of the Fukushima coast experiencing a tsunami greater than 19.7 ft (6 m) to be 
less than 1.0 E-2 in the next 50 years. 
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7.3  Station Specifications 
Table 7.3-1:  Fukushima Daiichi Unit Information (U.S. units)converted from source document provided in Table 7.3-2 
   
 
Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3  Unit 4  Unit 5  Unit 6 
Main 
Specifications 
Electric Output (MW)  460  784  784  784  784  1,100 
Start of Construction  Sep-67  May-69  Oct-70  Sep-72  Dec-71  May-73 
Start of Commercial Operation  Mar-71  Jul-74  Mar-76  Oct-78  Apr-78  Oct-79 
Reactor Type  BWR3  BWR4  BWR4  BWR4  BWR4  BWR5 
Containment Type  Mark I  Mark II 
Main Contractor  GE  GE/Toshiba  Toshiba  Hitachi  Toshiba  GE/Toshiba 
Nuclear Reactor 
Heat Output (MW)  1,380  2,381  3,293 
Number of Fuel Assemblies   400  548  764 
Full Length of Fuel Assemblies (in)  171  176  176 
Number of Control Rods  97  137  185 
Reactor 
Pressure Vessel 
(RPV) 
Inner Diameter (in)  189  220  252 
Height (in)  787  866  906 
Total Weight (short ton)  485  551  827 
Design Pressure (psi)  1194.8  1249.9 
Design Temperature (F)  572  576 
Primary 
Containment 
Vessel (PCV) 
Height (ft.)  105.0  108.3  111.5  157.5 
Diameter of Cylindrical Portion (ft.)  32.8  36.1  32.8 (top) 
Diameter of Spherical Portion (ft.)  59.1  65.6  82.0 (bottom) 
Suppression Pool Water Amount (kgal)  462.3  787.2  845.4 
Design Pressure (psig)  62.4  55.1  40.6 
Design Temperature (F)  284  280  340 (DW) 221 (SC) 
Steam Turbine 
Number of Revolutions (rpm)  1,500 
Steam Temperature (F)  540 
Steam Pressure (psig)  950 
Fuel 
Type  uranium dioxide (Unit 3 contains MOX) 
Uranium (ton)  69  94  132 
AC Distribution 
Emergency Diesel Generators (* indicates air-cooled EDG)  2  1/1*  2  1/1*  2  2/1* 
Electrical Grid  4 - 275-kV lines  2 - 500-kV lines INPO 11-005 
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Table 7.3-2:  Fukushima Daiichi Unit Information (metric units)
4 
                                                 
4 Overview of facility of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/index-e.html 
 
Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3  Unit 4  Unit 5  Unit 6 
Main 
Specifications 
Electric Output (MW)  460  784  784  784  784  1,100 
Start of Construction  Sep-67  May-69  Oct-70  Sep-72  Dec-71  May-73 
Start of Commercial Operation  Mar-71  Jul-74  Mar-76  Oct-78  Apr-78  Oct-79 
Reactor Type  BWR3  BWR4  BWR4  BWR4  BWR4  BWR5 
Containment Type  Mark I  Mark II 
Main Contractor  GE  GE/Toshiba  Toshiba  Hitachi  Toshiba  GE/Toshiba 
Nuclear Reactor 
Heat Output (MW)  1,380  2,381  3,293 
Number of Fuel Assemblies   400  548  764 
Full Length of Fuel Assemblies (m)  4.35  4.47  4.47 
Number of Control Rods  97  137  185 
Reactor 
Pressure Vessel 
(RPV) 
Inner Diameter (m)  4.8  5.6  6.4 
Height (m)  20  22  23 
Total Weight (metric ton)  440  500  750 
Design Pressure (MPa)  8.24  8.62 
Design Temperature (℃)  300  302 
Primary 
Containment 
Vessel (PCV) 
Height (m)  32  33  34  48 
Diameter of Cylindrical Portion (m)  10  11  10 (top) 
Diameter of Spherical Portion (m)  18  20  25 (bottom) 
Suppression Pool Water Amount (ton)  1,750  2,980  3,200 
Design Pressure (MPa gauge)  0.43  0.38  0.28 
Design Temperature (℃)  140  138  171 (DW) 105 (SC) 
Steam Turbine 
Number of Revolutions (rpm)  1,500 
Steam Temperature (℃)  282 
Steam Pressure (kg/cm2g)  66.8 
Fuel 
Type  uranium dioxide (Unit 3 contains MOX) 
Uranium (ton)  69  94  132 
AC Distribution 
Emergency Diesel Generators (* indicates air-cooled EDG)  2  1/1*  2  1/1*  2  2/1* 
Electrical Grid  4 - 275-kV lines  2 - 500-kV lines INPO 11-005 
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Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3 
Core Spray 
(CS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Flow (gpm per system)  2422  4491  5024 
Number of pumps per system  2  1  1 
Pump discharge pressure (psig)  284  501  501 
Containment 
Cooling (CCS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Flow (gpm per system)  3104  13032  11447 
Number of pumps per system  2  2  2 
Number of heat exchangers per system  1  1  1 
High Pressure 
Coolant 
Injection 
(HPCI) 
Number of systems  1  1  1 
Flow (gpm per system)  3003  4249  4249 
Number of pumps per system  1  1  1 
Low Pressure 
Coolant 
Injection (LPCI) 
Number of systems 
  
2  2 
Flow (gpm per system)  7705  8013 
Number of pumps per system  2  2 
Residual Heat 
Removal (RHR) 
Pump 
  
     
Number of pumps  4  4 
Flow (gpm)  7705  8013 
Total pump head (ft)  420  420 
Seawater pump       
Number of seawater pumps  4  4 
Flow (gpm)  4306  4306 
Total pump head (ft)  761  761 
Heat exchanger       
Number of units  2  2 
Heat transfer capacity (kcal/hr)  7760000  7760000 
Shutdown 
Cooling (SHC) 
Pump    
     
Number of pumps  2 
Flow (gpm)  2050 
Pump head (ft)  150 
Heat exchanger    
Number of heat exchangers  2 
Heat exchanging capacity (kW)  4400 
Table 7.3-3:  Fukushima Daiichi System Information (U.S. units)converted from source 
document provided in Table 7.3-4 
   INPO 11-005 
51 
 
Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3 
Reactor Core 
Isolation 
Cooling (RCIC) 
Steam turbine 
  
     
Number of steam turbines  1  1 
Reactor pressure (psig)  1045-150  1045-150 
Output (HP)  500-80  500-80 
Speed (rpm)  5000-2000  5000-2000 
Pump       
Number of pumps  1  1 
Flow (gpm)  418  427 
Total pump head (ft)  2788-525  2788-525 
Speed (rpm)  Variable  Variable 
Isolation 
Condenser (IC) 
Number of systems  2 
      Tank water retention capacity (gal/tank)  28002 
Steam flow (short ton/hr per tank)  116 
Standby Gas 
Treatment 
(SGTS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Number of fans per system  1  1  1 
Exhaust capacity (cfm per unit)  1101  1589  1589 
Iodine filtration efficiency (%)  >97  >99.9  >99.9 
Safety Valves 
Number of valves  3  3  3 
Total capacity (short ton/hr)  992  992  992 
Blowout pressure (psig) 
1235.4 
1251.1  
(2 valves) 
(1 valve) 
1241.1  1241.1 
Blowoff area  Drywell  Drywell  Drywell    
Main Steam 
Safety Relief 
Valves 
Number of valves  4  8  8 
Total capacity (short ton/hr)  1202  3197  3197 
   Pressure  Valves  Pressure  Valves  Pressure  Valves 
Relief valve function (psig) 
1056.1  1  1080.3  1  1080.3  1 
1066.1  2  1090.2  3  1090.2  3 
1076.0  1  1100.2  4  1100.2  4 
Safety valve function (psig) 
1110.2  2  1110.2  2 
   1120.1  2  1120.1  3 
   1130.1  3 
Blowoff area  Suppression Chamber  Suppression Chamber  Suppression Chamber 
Table 7.3-3 (continued)   
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Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3 
Core Spray (CS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Flow (T/hr per system)  550  1020  1141 
Number of pumps per system  2  1  1 
Pump discharge pressure (kg/cm2g)  20  35.2  35.2 
Containment 
Cooling (CCS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Flow (T/hr per system)  705  2960  2600 
Number of pumps per system  2  2  2 
Number of heat exchangers per system  1  1  1 
High Pressure 
Coolant Injection 
(HPCI) 
Number of systems  1  1  1 
Flow (T/hr per system)  682  965  965 
Number of pumps per system  1  1  1 
Low Pressure 
Coolant Injection 
(LPCI) 
Number of systems 
  
2  2 
Flow (T/hr per system)  1750  1820 
Number of pumps per system  2  2 
Residual Heat 
Removal (RHR) 
Pump 
  
     
Number of pumps  4  4 
Flow (T/hr)  1750  1820 
Total pump head (m)  128  128 
Seawater pump       
Number of seawater pumps  4  4 
Flow (m3/hr)  978  978 
Total pump head (m)  232  232 
Heat exchanger       
Number of units  2  2 
Heat transfer capacity (kcal/hr)  7760000  7760000 
Shutdown 
Cooling (SHC) 
Pump    
     
Number of pumps  2 
Flow (m3/hr)  465.5 
Pump head (m)  45.7 
Heat exchanger    
Number of heat exchangers  2 
Heat exchanging capacity (kcal/h)  3800000 
Table 7.3-4:  Fukushima Daiichi System Information (metric units)
5 
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Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3 
Reactor Core 
Isolation Cooling 
(RCIC) 
Steam turbine 
  
     
Number of steam turbines  1  1 
Reactor pressure (kg/cm2g)  79-10.6  79-10.6 
Output (HP)  500-80  500-80 
Speed (rpm)  5000-2000  5000-2000 
Pump       
Number of pumps  1  1 
Flow (t/h)  95  97 
Total pump head (m)  850-160  850-160 
Speed (rpm)  Variable  Variable 
Isolation 
Condenser (IC) 
Number of systems  2 
      Tank water retention capacity (m3/tank)  106 
Steam flow (metric ton/hr per tank)  100.6 
Standby Gas 
Treatment 
(SGTS) 
Number of systems  2  2  2 
Number of fans per system  1  1  1 
Exhaust capacity (m3/hr per unit)  1870  2700  2700 
Iodine filtration efficiency (%)  >97  >99.9  >99.9 
Safety Valves 
Number of valves  3  3  3 
Total capacity (metric ton/hr)  900  900  900 
Blowout pressure (kg/cm2g) 
86.8  
87.9  
(2 
valves) 
(1 
valve) 
87.2  87.2 
Blowoff area  Drywell  Drywell  Drywell 
Main Steam 
Safety Relief 
Valves 
Number of valves  4  8  8 
Total capacity (metric ton/hr)  1090  2900  2900 
   Pressure  Valves  Pressure  Valves  Pressure  Valves 
Relief valve function (kg/cm2g) 
74.2  1  75.9  1  75.9  1 
74.9  2  76.6  3  76.6  3 
75.6  1  77.3  4  77.3  4 
Safety valve function (kg/cm2g) 
78  2  78  2 
   78.7  2  78.7  3 
   79.4  3 
Blowoff area  Suppression Chamber  Suppression Chamber  Suppression Chamber 
Table 7.3-4 (continued) 
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7.4  Fukushima Daiichi Simplified System Drawings/Descriptions 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4-1 Isolation Condensers on Unit 1
6 
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Figure 7.4-2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) – Typical Arrangement, Units 13
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Figure 7.4-3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) – Typical Arrangement, Units 2 and 3
8 
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Primary Containment Vessel Vent System Description 
 
Between 1999 and 2001, TEPCO modified the design of the containment vent system by 
adding new vent pipes extending from the suppression chamber and drywell to the stacks.  
These vent pipes were added to provide a method of venting containment during severe 
accidents.  The modified ventilation piping bypassed the standby gas treatment system 
(SGTS) to allow operators a method of venting containment even when the pressure is 
high.  The piping connection with the ventilation stack is provided with a rupture disk.  
(See figures 7.4-4 and 7.4-5.) 
 
Figure 7.4-4 Overview of Unit 1 Containment Vent System
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Figure 7.4-5 Overview of Units 2 and 3 Containment Vent System
10 
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Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 through 4 before the event 
Figure 7.4-6 Simplified Electrical System
11 
Systems highlighted in green were in service (energized).  The 4A EDG and Unit 3 startup transformer were out of service for planned 
maintenance at the time of the event. 
                                                 
11 “Fukushima Nuclear Accident Interim Report,” September 13, 2011, Tokyo Electric Power Company 
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Fukushima Daiichi 
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Figure 7.4-7 Fukushima Daiichi Electrical Distribution Damage
12 
                                                 
12 “Overview of Accident at TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations,” July 22, 2011 - Tokyo Electric Power 
Company Co. 
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Figure 7.4-8:  Generic cross-section of a BWR4 with a Mark I containment (similar to 
Fukushima Daiichi) 
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7.5  Organizational Structure and Staffing 
 
Fukushima Daiichi uses one shared control room for each two units on site (three control 
rooms; five shift crews per control room).  One operating crew is responsible for each 
control room and the two associated units.  The crew rotation is a standard five-crew, 12-
hour shift rotation with 10 days of training after every fifth rotation.  The chain of 
command is configured in the following manner (units 1-2 shown). 
 
 
   
Operations Department General 
Manager (Units 5-6) 
Unit Superintendent (Units 5-6) 
Site Superintendent 
Operations Department General 
Manager (Units 1-4) 
Unit Superintendent (Units 1-4) 
Shift Supervisor 
Assistant Shift Supervisor 
Unit 1 Senior 
Operator 
Unit 2 Senior 
Operator 
Unit 1 Main Shift Operator 
 
Assistant Senior 
Operator 
Unit 2 Main Shift Operator 
 
Auxiliary Operator  Auxiliary Operator  Auxiliary Operator  Auxiliary Operator INPO 11-005 
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Approximate equivalent positions for U.S. nuclear units (not exact equivalent): 
 
  Japan        U.S. 
shift supervisor    shift manager 
assistant shift supervisor  control room supervisor 
unit senior operator  at-the-controls operator (similar to senior reactor 
operator level in Japan) 
unit main shift operator  balance-of-plant reactor operator (reports to unit 
senior operator) 
assistant senior operator  field supervisor 
auxiliary operator    nonlicensed operator 
 
During severe accident conditions, the site supervisor is in charge of site Emergency 
Response Center supervision.  The shift supervisors will report directly to the site 
superintendent during these conditions. 
 
Operations Staffing at the Time of the Event 
 
The operating crews consisted of the following: 
 
  Units 1 and 2 had 11 operators and 1 trainee.  
  Units 3 and 4 had 8 operators and 1 trainee.  (Unit 4 minimum shift staffing was 
reduced because of the refueling outage.) 
  The normal operating shift organization for each of the two unit crews includes 
one shift supervisor, one assistant shift supervisor, two senior operators, one 
assistant senior operator, two main shift operators, and four auxiliary operators. 
  One crew in training reported to the station to assist in the response. 
 
Station Staffing at the Time of the Event 
 
  Immediately after the tsunami, approximately 400 people (about 130 operators 
and 270 maintenance personnel) were available for the recovery process. 
  About 70 TEPCO employees (maintenance workers) and about 40 people from 
affiliated companies were engaged in the initial field work to recover units 1 
through 3.  Most of the work was recovery of instrumentation and power supplies. 
 
7.6  Operator Training 
 
Initial operator training programs for reactor operators and above are provided by BWR 
Training Center Corporation (BTC), which is located close to Fukushima Daiichi.  
TEPCO is one of the shareholders of the company.  The site superintendent certifies 
initial qualifications for senior operators, main shift operators, and auxiliary operators on 
site.  By law, shift supervisors are required to be licensed.  The licensing process includes INPO 11-005 
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an evaluation of their knowledge and skills.  The Japan Nuclear Technology Institute 
(JANTI) performs this evaluation and issues the license. 
 
Continuing training programs are developed and implemented at the station.  Operators 
receive approximately 80 hours of continuing training per year.  A training curriculum 
review committee selects the training subject material for continuing training.  The 
training topics are typically based on operator fundamentals, performance improvement, 
operating experience, and changes in job performance requirements.  Training is 
performed in the classroom and simulator, as well as in on-the-job training settings.  
Some training is performed for specific positions, such as the shift supervisor (SS), senior 
operator (SO), and main shift operator (MSO).  Continuing training topics include the 
following: 
 
  Topic               Population        Location     Time (hours) 
Team Operation (Reactor Startup, AOP/EOP)  ALL    SIM    30 
Plant Systems, AOP/EOP        MSO/SO  Class/SIM  24 
AOP/EOP/SOP          SS    Class/SIM  3  
Fundamentals           ALL    Class    9  
Technical Specifications        ALL    Class    9  
Human Performance, Expectations      ALL    Class    3 
 
During continuing training, all operators are required to maintain and enhance their 
performance to support safe and reliable operation.  To ensure this goal is met, operator 
knowledge and skills are evaluated through written examinations, simulator evaluations, 
and task-performance evaluations.  The examination standard includes requirements for 
higher-order learning objectives, such as demonstrating the ability to diagnose plant 
conditions and prioritize response actions. 
 
Fukushima Daiichi has one full-scope simulator, which models Unit 3 (BWR-4 with a 
Mark I containment); and a limited-scope simulator, which models Unit 1 (BWR-3 with a 
Mark I containment).  Operators in TEPCO also use two full-scope simulators at the 
BTC, which models units 3 and 4 (BWR-4 with a Mark I containment). 
 
The diagram shown below illustrates the typical progression and training requirements 
for operators.  The times shown indicate the approximate time spent in each position. INPO 11-005 
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Figure 7.6-1 Operator Progression and Training Requirements 
 
7.7  Regulatory Structure 
 
Governmental responsibility for the safe operation of Japan's nuclear power plants is 
divided between multiple government agencies.  These agencies, and their 
responsibilities, are as follows: 
 
  The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has jurisdiction over 
commercial nuclear power reactor facilities in Japan.  The Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency (NISA), which operates under the authority of METI, is 
responsible for the safety of nuclear energy.  NISA’s mission is to ensure the 
safety of the people’s livelihoods through the regulation of the energy industry 
and related industries.   
 
  In October 2003, the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) was 
established.  JNES inspects nuclear facilities and provides technical support safety 
reviews and assessments. 
 
  The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) has 
various responsibilities, including environmental radiation monitoring.  MEXT is 
divided into two basic groups:  the research and development bureau and the 
science and technology policy bureau.  The research and development bureau is 
responsible for the promotion of nuclear energy, and the science and technology INPO 11-005 
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policy bureau is responsible for nuclear safety regulation.  MEXT is also 
responsible for dose limits for occupational exposure and helps local governments 
perform environmental surveys following an accident.   
 
  The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) is an independent agency that operates 
under the cabinet office.  The NSC is an administrative organization that provides 
supervision and audits the safety regulation by the MEXT and METI, thus 
providing independent verification over the administration of nuclear regulations 
in Japan.  The NSC has a range of missions, including planning, deliberation, and 
making decisions on regulations and policies related to nuclear safety as well as 
prevention of radiation hazards, based on expert knowledge on nuclear 
technologies and radiological protection.  The NSC has the authority to make 
recommendations to the regulatory bodies via the Prime Minister.  The NSC also 
promotes communications with the public for enhancing the credibility of nuclear 
safety. 
 
NISA occupies an off-site center, which must be located within 10 km of the station.  
Each nuclear station is required to have its own center, even when stations are in close 
proximity.  These centers are equipped to monitor plant and meteorological conditions.   
 
The JNES analyzes the data and makes recommendations on sheltering or evacuation.  
JNES makes the recommendation to NISA, which takes that recommendation and passes 
it along to the various government organizations. 
 
Emergency Plan 
 
Emergency preparedness and implementation in Japan involve many organizations, 
including on site, off site, national government, local government(s), regulators, and 
contractors.  Processes, organizations, and activities include responses to reportable 
events and nonreportable emergencies, as defined below.  A drawing is provided to 
demonstrate some of these relationships. 
 
One large-scale national emergency response drill is conducted each year to exercise the 
associated organizations and ensure the emergency plan is capable of fulfilling its 
intended function. INPO 11-005 
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Figure 7.7-1:  Nuclear Emergency Response Organization Relationships
13 
 
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act 
 
The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (commonly 
referred to as the Nuclear Disaster Law) was established in 1999 in response to the 
September 30, 1999 inadvertent criticality accident at the Tokai uranium processing 
plant.  The accident resulted in overexposure of three plant workers and additional 
unplanned exposures to 66 plant workers, local inhabitants, and emergency support 
personnel.   
 
The Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act provides guidance for responding to a nuclear 
emergency.  The act is intended to provide a closely coordinated response among the 
relevant organizations.  It includes the following guidance: 
                                                 
13 Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, June 2011 
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1)  Licensee notification to the Minister of METI is required following declaration of 
a “special event” as stipulated in Article 10 of the Nuclear Emergency 
Preparedness Act. 
 
2)  Upon receiving notification, the Minister shall initiate required actions and 
support local governments to prevent further escalation of a disaster. 
 
3)  If the Minister recognizes that a “special event” has degraded and conditions 
exceed predetermined thresholds associated with a nuclear emergency situation, 
the Minister shall immediately notify the Prime Minister. 
 
4)  The Prime Minister is responsible for declaring a “nuclear emergency situation” 
and directing local governments to take protective measures, such as evacuation, 
sheltering, and the administering of potassium iodide. 
 
5)  The Prime Minister shall establish and head the Nuclear Emergency Response 
Headquarters (NERHQ) in Tokyo and establish the local NERHQ at the 
associated off-site location. 
 
6)  The NSC shall convene an organization composed of commissioners and 
advisors, known as the Technical Advisory Organization in an Emergency, which 
will provide technical advice to the Prime Minister. 
 
7)  Local governments shall establish their own emergency response headquarters. 
 
8)  The Joint Council for Nuclear Emergency Response shall be established to share 
information between national and local governments and related organizations. 
TEPCO also has a corporate emergency response manual.  This manual defines three 
alert conditions for when a disaster occurs or is likely to occur.  The station emergency 
response organization is temporarily activated when these alert conditions are declared.  
The three levels of alert are as follows: 
 
  Alert level 1 is declared when a disaster is predicted or has occurred. 
  Alert level 2 is declared when a large-scale disaster is predicted or has occurred. 
  Alert level 3 is declared when a large-scale disaster has occurred that may require 
a lengthy recovery. 
 
The emergency response organization works out of a station Emergency Response 
Center.  This is a new building that was added following the Niigata-Chuetsu-oki 
earthquake in 2007.  The building was seismically designed, is at an elevated location, 
and has backup generators to provide power, so it withstood both the earthquake and the 
tsunami.  This is the work location for the site superintendent when fulfilling the role of 
emergency director.   
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Following an emergency declaration, the corporate office will activate the corporate 
emergency response center in Tokyo.  The corporate emergency response center is 
staffed to advise and instruct the station as needed and to support with media relations.  
The media release briefing room is located just outside the TEPCO Head Office Nuclear 
Emergency Headquarters.   
 
Station Emergency Response Organization Training 
 
According to TEPCO, the station emergency response organization conducts several 
integrated exercises each year.  The number of scenarios is sufficient to ensure that every 
member of the emergency response organization participates in at least one drill per year.   
 
Lower-level or specific drills, such as emergency medical treatment, evacuations, and 
communications exercises, are also performed throughout the year.  The operators will 
also participate in at least one emergency response organization emergency preparedness 
drill each year in the simulator.   
 INPO 11-005 
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7.8  Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviations   
Units of Measure 
AMG  accident management guidelines 
 
abs  absolute 
AOP  abnormal operating procedure 
 
AC  Alternating Current 
BWR  boiling water reactor  
 
Bq  Becquerel 
EDG  emergency diesel generator 
 
C  Celsius 
EOP  emergency operating procedure 
 
cm  centimeters 
ERC  Emergency Response Center 
 
cpm  counts per minute 
HPCI  high pressure coolant injection 
 
DC  Direct Current 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Association 
 
F  Fahrenheit 
IC  isolation condenser 
 
ft  feet 
INES  International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 
 
gal   galileo (seismic intensity) 
INPO  Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 
 
gal   gallon (volume) 
JANTI  Japan Nuclear Technology Institute  
 
gpm  gallons per minute 
JNES  Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization  
 
km  kilometers 
JST  Japan Standard Time 
 
kPa  kilopascals 
M/C  metal clad switchgear 
 
kV  kilovolts 
METI  Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry  
 
lpm  liters per minute 
MEXT  Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
 
MPa  Megapascals  
MSO  main shift operator    MWe  megawatts electric 
NERHQ  Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters 
 
m  meters 
NISA  Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency 
 
uSv  microsievert 
NPP  nuclear power plant 
 
mm  millimeters 
NSC  Nuclear Safety Commission  
 
mrem  millirem 
P/C  power center 
 
mSv  millisievert 
PCV  primary containment vessel 
 
psi  pounds per square inch 
RCIC  reactor core isolation cooling 
 
psia  pounds per square inch absolute 
RHR  residual heat removal 
 
psig  pounds per square inch gauge 
RPV  reactor pressure vessel 
     
SFP  spent fuel pool 
     
SGTS  standby gas treatment system 
     
SIM  simulator 
     
SLC  standby liquid control 
     
SO  senior operator       
SOP  standard operating procedure 
     
SRO  senior reactor operator 
     
SRV  safety relief valve 
     
SS  shift supervisor       
TAF  top of active fuel 
     
TEPCO  Tokyo Electric Power Company 
     
UHS  ultimate heat sink       Unit 1 Validated Event Timeline   INPO 11-005 
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8.0  Event Progression and Timeline 
 
8.1  Unit 1  
 
Date  Time  Unit 1 Actions 
11-Mar  1446  Ground motion exceeds the setpoint of seismic sensor C. 
11-Mar  1446  Ground motion exceeds the setpoint of seismic sensor B. 
11-Mar  1446  Automatic reactor scram signal on seismic trip 
11-Mar  1447  Plant computer indicates all control rods have fully inserted. 
11-Mar  1447  Inboard and outboard main steam isolation valves close because of loss of off-site power. 
11-Mar  1447  Automatic turbine trip on high vibration 
11-Mar  1447  6.9-kV bus 1D power loss 
11-Mar  1447  6.9-kV bus 1C power loss 
11-Mar  1447  EDG 1B starts and loads, energizing the 6.9-kV bus 1D; 6.9-kV bus 1D power loss clears. 
11-Mar  1447  EDG 1A starts and loads, energizing the 6.9-kV bus 1C; 6.9-kV bus 1C power loss clears. 
11-Mar  1447  Reactor water level initially dropped because of the collapsing steam voids.  Reactor water level was within the 
normal band and the operators did not need to initiate high pressure coolant injection. 
11-Mar  1452  The reactor mode switch was in shutdown. 
11-Mar  1452 
Both isolation condensers (ICs) started automatically.  Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure begins to decrease as 
cooler water is recirculated through the reactor core from the IC.  Reactor water level was in the normal level range, 
and high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) was not required to control level.    
11-Mar  1502  The reactor was confirmed subcritical. 
11-Mar  1503  The operators manually removed the isolation condensers from service.  
11-Mar  1503 
Workers removed the IC from service by closing the cold leg return drywell outboard isolation motor-operated valves 
(MO-3A and B).  These actions were taken because cooldown rate was exceeding the 100
oF/hr (55
oC/hr) limit 
specified in technical specifications. 
11-Mar  1506  The Headquarters for Major Disaster Countermeasures was established in the TEPCO office in Tokyo to assess 
damages from the earthquake and recover from the electric outage in TEPCO's service area.  
11-Mar  1507  Torus cooling and spray were reported in service (1507-1510). 
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Date  Time  Unit 1 Actions 
11-Mar  1510 
Operators determined that only one train of IC was needed to control reactor pressure in the 870 and 1,015 psi (6 to 
7 MPa).  The A IC system was operated by the opening and closing of the motor-operated valve (MO-3A) to control 
reactor pressure. 
11-Mar  1527  The first wave of a series of tsunamis, generated by the earthquake, arrived at the station.  
11-Mar  1535  The second tsunami hit the station.   
11-Mar  1537  Loss of all AC power occurs.  Instrumentation and emergency systems gradually fail between 1537 and 1550. 
11-Mar  --  The loss of DC distribution systems results in the loss of control room indications and alarms. 
11-Mar  --  The control room lighting was lost and only emergency lighting remained.  
11-Mar  --  The control panel indications for HPCI were barely lit but slowly faded to black.  The operators determined HPCI was 
not operable because indicators on the control panel had gone out.  
11-Mar  --  Valve status of IC was lost on the control panel.   
11-Mar  1542 
TEPCO entered its emergency plan because of the loss of all AC power, in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 1 of 
the Nuclear Disaster Law.  Government offices were notified.  The corporate Emergency Response Center was 
established. 
11-Mar  --  Flooding caused a loss of the instrumentation power system, resulting in a major loss of control room indications, 
including the reactor water level indication 
11-Mar  1636 
Operators could not determine reactor water level or the status of injection into the reactor.  An emergency was 
declared because of the loss of emergency core cooling system injection sources, in accordance with Article 15, 
paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law.  The appropriate government agencies were notified at 1645.  
11-Mar  -- 
Temporary batteries and cables were gathered and carried to the units 1 and 2 control room.  After confirming the 
wiring layout using drawings, batteries were connected to instrument panels.  The top priority was to verify the 
status of water injection into the RPV, so efforts were focused on connecting batteries to the DC-powered reactor 
water level indicator.  
11-Mar  -- 
The Emergency Response Center (ERC) began reviewing the accident management procedures and checking the vent 
procedures to determine how to open the containment vent valves without power.  Workers in the ERC went 
through the administration building and retrieved drawings and manuals needed to develop the procedure. 
11-Mar  1645  Operators were able to determine reactor water level.  The emergency associated with the inability to determine 
reactor water level was cancelled, and the appropriate government agencies were notified at 1655. 
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Date  Time  Unit 1 Actions 
11-Mar  1707 
The operators again lost the ability to verify reactor water level or the status of water injection.  The emergency plan 
was reentered in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law.  The appropriate government 
agencies were notified at 1712.   
11-Mar  1712  The site superintendent directed workers to investigate methods of injecting water into the reactor using the fire 
protection system or fire trucks.  
11-Mar  --  Operators reviewed methods for alternative water injection using the accident management (AMG) procedures and 
confirmed the injection path using the installed fire pump into the RPV via the core spray system. 
11-Mar  1730  The installed diesel-driven fire pump was started and allowed to idle in standby.   
11-Mar  --  Operators lined up the alternative water injection valves from the fire protection system to the core spray system by 
manually opening the valves in the reactor building.  The work was performed in complete darkness. 
11-Mar  --  Injection could not be achieved until after the RPV was depressurized below 100 psi (0.69 MPa).  
11-Mar  1818  Somehow, DC power partially returned, which allowed the control board indication lights for the IC M0-3A and M0-
2A to energize.  The valves indicated closed.    
11-Mar  1818  Operators placed the isolation condenser in service by opening the MO-3A and MO-2A.  Steam was observed coming 
from the condenser. 
11-Mar  1825  The isolation condenser was removed from service by the closing of the MO-3A valve. 
11-Mar  2007  Because there were no working indications in the control room, operators checked reactor pressure locally in the 
reactor building.  Reactor pressure was 1,000 psi (6.9 MPa).  
11-Mar  2049  A small portable electric generator was installed, which restored some temporary lighting in the units 1-2 control 
room. 
11-Mar  2050  Authorities of the Fukushima prefecture ordered evacuation of the population within a 1.2 mile (2 km) radius of 
Fukushima Daiichi.   
11-Mar  2119  Water level indication was restored in the control room.  Reactor water level was approximately 8 inches (200 mm) 
above the top of active fuel (TAF).  
11-Mar  2123  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the population within a 1.9 mile (3 km) radius of the station and 
sheltering for the population within a 1.9 to 6.2 mile (3 km to 10 km) radius of the station. 
11-Mar  2130  Operators placed the isolation condenser in service by opening valve MO-3A.  The generation of steam was 
confirmed at the condenser. 
11-Mar  2151  Access to the reactor building was restricted because of high dose rates. 
11-Mar  2200  Reactor water level indicates 21.7 inches (550 mm) above the top of active fuel. 
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Date  Time  Unit 1 Actions 
11-Mar  2300 
A radiation survey identified dose rates of 120 mrem/hr (1,200 µSv/hr) in front of the reactor building north door on 
the first floor of the turbine building and 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) in front of the door to the south.  The government 
authorities were notified at 2340. 
11-Mar  2350  A restoration team from the ERC connected the temporary generator, used to provide some control room lighting, to 
the drywell pressure instrument.  The indication read 87 psi (600kPa). 
12-Mar  --  Late in the evening on March 11 and into the early morning of March 12, power supply vehicles from Tohoku Electric 
Power Company and TEPCO arrived at the site. 
12-Mar  0006  The site superintendent directed preparations to vent the primary containment vessel (PCV) because drywell 
pressure was likely to exceed 87 psi (0.6 MPa). 
12-Mar  -- 
In the control room, operators assembled piping and instrumentation drawings, the accident management 
procedures, valve drawings, and a white board.  The operators began to develop a procedure for venting, including 
how to manually operate the valves, and the associated sequence. 
12-Mar  0030  The government confirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) of the station.   
12-Mar  0049  An emergency declaration was made for an abnormal increase in drywell pressure because drywell pressure was 
likely to exceed 87 psi (0.6 MPa).  The appropriate government agencies were notified at 0055. 
12-Mar  0130 
At approximately 0130, TEPCO officials informed the Prime Minister, Minister of METI, and NISA of their proposal to 
vent the containment.  The Prime Minister, Minister of METI, and the NISA concurred.  The TEPCO corporate ERC told 
the station that at 0300, the Minister of METI and other associations would announce the venting; and that after the 
announcement, the station should vent. 
12-Mar  0145  The government reconfirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) of the station.   
12-Mar  0148 
At some point, the installed diesel-driven fire pump that was standing by to pump water into the reactor 
malfunctioned.  In an attempt to restart the fire pump, diesel fuel was carried to the pump and the fuel tank was 
refilled, and batteries stored in an office were carried to the room and installed; but the pump would not 
start.  Workers began considering using fire trucks to supply water to the plant fire protection system. 
12-Mar  -- 
Damage to fire hydrants and leaks from the fire system made it impossible to use filtered water as a water source for 
the fire engines to supply the RPV.  Isolation valves were closed to stop the leaks and maintain water level in the 
filtered water tanks.  The fire protection tank was confirmed available for use as a water source.  
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12-Mar  -- 
The station had three fire engines, but only one was available to support injecting water into the Unit 1 RPV.  One fire 
engine was damaged by the tsunami.  The second fire engine was at parked adjacent to units 5 and 6 but could not 
be driven to Unit 1 because earthquake damage to the road and debris from the tsunami had restricted access 
between units 1 through 4 and units 5 and 6. 
12-Mar  -- 
To use the available fire engine, workers had to clear obstacles and debris to move the fire engine close to Unit 1.  A 
heavy fuel oil tank, which had been displaced by the tsunami, blocked the road in front of the old administration 
building, making the road impassable.  The security gate had lost power and would not open, preventing access from 
that road.  The emergency response team broke a lock on the gate between units 2 and 3, allowing the fire engine to 
arrive at Unit 1.   
12-Mar  --  Alternatives for injecting water via a fire protection line were reviewed.  Additional fire engines and water 
transportation by the Self-Defense Force were also considered. 
12-Mar  0224 
In preparation for manually venting the containment, a radiological evaluation of working conditions in the torus 
room was provided to the ERC.  With radiation levels at 30 rem/hr (300 mSv/hr), workers were limited 17 minutes of 
time in order to remain below the emergency response radiation limit of 10 rem (0.1 Sv).  Workers were required to 
wear a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) with a 20-minute air supply and would be given potassium iodide 
tablets.  
12-Mar  0230  Containment pressure had increased to 122 psia (0.84 MPa abs).  The government was informed at 0247. 
12-Mar  0245  Reactor pressure decreased to 116 psi (0.8 MPa). 
12-Mar  0255  Unit 2 field workers returned to the control room and reported that RCIC was in operation on Unit 2.  Based on this 
report, venting the Unit 1 containment was given a higher priority. 
12-Mar  0306  A press conference was held to announce plans to vent the Unit 1 PCV.  
12-Mar  0345  Workers attempted to enter the reactor building airlock door to perform surveys.  As soon as the door was opened, 
workers saw steam and closed the door.  No surveys were performed. 
12-Mar  -- 
Operators in the control room repeatedly reviewed and confirmed actions needed to vent containment.  They 
reviewed how to operate the valves, the sequence of operation, the physical location of the valves, and so forth.  
Operators collected the equipment needed to perform the evolution, including fire-fighting turnout gear, SCBAs, 
dosimeters, survey meters, and flashlights. 
12-Mar  0401  Exposure estimates associated with venting were provided to the government and associated authorities. 
12-Mar  0419  PCV pressure unexpectedly decreased and stabilized near 113 psi (0.78 MPa) without venting. 
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12-Mar  0423 
Increasing radiation levels were observed in the area around the main gate.  Dose rates increased from 0.0069 
mrem/hr (0.069 µSv/hr) at 0400 to 0.059 mrem/hr (0.59 µSv/hr) at 0423.  This was reported to the government and 
other agencies at 0455. 
12-Mar  0430  The ERC informed the control room that field operations were prohibited because of tsunami warnings. 
12-Mar  0450  A dose rate of 0.1 mrem/hr (1 µSv/hr) is measured at the site boundary. 
12-Mar  0450  Workers were directed to wear full face masks with charcoal filters and coveralls when in the field.   
12-Mar  0500  Operators in the control room were directed to wear full face masks with charcoal filters and coveralls.  Dose rates 
in the control room increased to the point that operators moved to the Unit 2 side of the room. 
12-Mar  0514  Radiation dose rates increased in the plant concurrent with a decrease in drywell pressure.  Workers determined 
these parameters indicated a drywell leak.  This was reported to the government. 
12-Mar  0544  Radiation levels at the site boundary increased, and the Prime Minister expanded the evacuation zone around 
Fukushima Daiichi to 6.2 miles (10 km).  
12-Mar  0546  A fire engine began injecting fresh water from the fire protection water storage tank into the reactor via the core 
spray system. 
12-Mar  -- 
Initially, the fire engine was filled at the fire protection water storage tank, then driven close to the reactor building 
to allow water to be injected through the fire protection line that was connected to the core spray line.  The fire 
protection water storage tank was at a low elevation, and the discharge pressure of the fire engine pump was 
believed to be insufficient to overcome reactor pressure and inject into the core.  Further complications, such as 
having to drive under a half-collapsed building between the tank and the unit, further delayed injection. 
12-Mar  -- 
After some trial and error, continuous water injection was commenced by connecting the fire engine to the tank, 
without the fire engine having to be at the low elevation of the tank.  A hose was run from the suction of the fire 
engine to the fire protection water storage tank, and this allowed the fire engine to discharge water to the fire 
protection line into the RPV. 
12-Mar  -- 
An additional fire engine arrived on site and was used to transport fresh water from the fire protection tank at Unit 
3 to the fire protection tank at Unit 1 repeatedly.  The Unit 1 fire protection tank had only one hose connection, so 
water injection into the RPV had to be stopped each time the second fire engine needed to replenish the water in 
the tank.  
12-Mar  0552  A total of 264 gallons (1,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0630  A total of 528 gallons (2,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0633  TEPCO confirmed that some residents of Ookuma-machi, which is inside the evacuation zone, had not evacuated 
yet.   The residents had not left because they were not sure in which direction to evacuate. 
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12-Mar  0650  The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry ordered venting of units 1 and 2 containment in accordance with the 
Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. 
12-Mar  0711  The Prime Minister arrived at the station. 
12-Mar  0755  A total of 793 gallons (3,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0755  The lowest indicated reactor water level decreased to the top of active fuel (TAF) (indicating level was higher than 
actual level). 
12-Mar  0803  The site superintendent directed venting to start at 0900. 
12-Mar  0804  The Prime Minister left the station. 
12-Mar  0815  A total of 1,057 gallons (4,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0827  A TEPCO employee who had been dispatched to check the status of evacuations reported that the evacuation of 
Ookuma-machi was not yet completed. 
12-Mar  0830  A total of 1,321 gallons (5,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0837  The Fukushima Prefectural government was informed that venting would start at approximately 0900.  Venting was 
being coordinated to ensure the evacuation was completed prior to venting commencing. 
12-Mar  0903  Evacuations south of the plant (Ookuma-machii) were confirmed as completed.    
12-Mar  -- 
The control room operators formed three teams to perform the venting, with two operators on each team (one to 
perform actions and the other to assist by holding flashlights and monitoring dose rates and for other safety 
concerns, such as ongoing aftershocks).  Because there was no means of communicating with the field teams, the 
decision was made to dispatch one team at a time, with the next team leaving only after the preceding team 
returned.   
12-Mar  0904  The first team of operators was dispatched to open the motor-operated containment vent valve. 
12-Mar  0905  Venting of Unit 1 containment was announced to the press.   
12-Mar  0915  A total of 1,585 gallons (6,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
12-Mar  0915  At approximately 0915, operators opened the motor-operated containment vent valve approximately 25 percent, as 
directed by the procedure.  The two operators involved each received a dose of 2.5 rem (25 mSv).   
12-Mar  0924  The second team of operators left the control room to open the torus vent valve. 
12-Mar  0930 
The second team of operators was unsuccessful in the attempt to manually open the suppression chamber air-
operated vent valve.  The operators entered the torus room but had to turn back because they expected they would 
exceed their 10 rem (100 mSv) dose limit. 
12-Mar  0940  A total of 5,548 gallons (21,000 liters) of fresh water was injected via the fire protection system. 
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12-Mar  -- 
The control room operators decided not to dispatch the third team to the field because of the doses received and 
notified the ERC of the inability to open the air-operated vent valve.  The ERC then began working on methods to 
open the suppression chamber air-operated vent valve.  This would require DC power and a temporary air source.  
The ERC also instructed the control room to attempt to operate the small air-operated valve remotely, hoping there 
would be sufficient residual air pressure in the system to operate the valve. 
12-Mar  0953  TEPCO provided an evaluation of the potential exposure from attempting the venting operation to the government 
and associated authorities. 
12-Mar  1017 
Operators attempted to open the suppression chamber air-operated vent valve remotely with residual air pressure in 
the instrumentation air system and temporary DC supplied by batteries.  The control room operators attempted to 
open the small air-operated valve three times (1017, 1023, and 1024).  
12-Mar  1040  Radiation levels increased at the main gate and monitoring posts.  Workers assumed that this was probably from 
venting the Unit 1 PCV.  
12-Mar  1115  Radiation levels were decreasing, which indicated that the venting was not fully effective.  PCV pressure stabilized at 
approximately 109 psia (0.75 MPa abs). 
12-Mar  -- 
The ERC team was informed that a small air compressor was in a subcontractor’s office.  Workers retrieved drawings 
and took pictures of the connection point and planned how to install the compressor to enable remote operation of 
the air-operated valve in the vent system from the control room. 
12-Mar  1139  The government was notified that one of the operators who had entered the torus room to attempt to vent the PCV 
had received 10.6 rem (106 mSv) radiation dose. 
12-Mar  1205  Reactor water level decreased to 59 inches (1,500 mm) below TAF.   
12-Mar  1400 
A temporary air compressor was located and transferred to the equipment bay, and needed fittings were 
located.  The compressor was installed in the equipment bay to provide workers with some protection from 
increasing dose rates.  At approximately 1400, the compressor was installed and started. 
12-Mar  1430 
Operators opened the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve.   The venting evolution and release of 
radioactive materials was confirmed based on an indicated decrease in containment pressure.  It was reported to the 
government at 1518. 
12-Mar  1450  Venting resulted in containment pressure lowering to 84 psia (0.58 MPa). 
12-Mar  1453  Fire engines had injected a total of 80 tons of fresh water into the reactor. 
12-Mar  1454  The site superintendent directed the injection of seawater into the reactor. 
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12-Mar  --  The Unit 1 fire protection tank was running out of water.  Water transfers from other tanks continued, and work to 
pump seawater into the reactors commenced. 
12-Mar  -- 
Workers began using a main condenser backwash valve pit, which flooded during the tsunami, as a water source to 
supply the fire pumps.  The pit was closer to the units and at a higher elevation than the sea, making injection easier.  
Three fire engines were connected in series to increase the discharge pressure. 
12-Mar  1518 
The government was informed that the standby liquid control system was being recovered to allow borated water to 
be injected into the reactor as soon as the system was operable.  Seawater injection into the reactor through the fire 
protection piping was also planned to start as soon as the lineup was competed and power was available.  
12-Mar 
apx 
1530 
Work to provide temporary power from a mobile generator to the Unit 2 standby liquid control system was 
completed. 
12-Mar  1536  A hydrogen explosion occurred in the reactor building (secondary containment). 
12-Mar  1536 
The explosion caused extensive damage to the reactor building and injured five workers.  Debris ejected by the 
explosion damaged the temporary power cables, along with one of the large portable generators.   The temporary 
power supply for the standby liquid control system and the hoses that had been staged for seawater injection were 
damaged beyond use.  Although the fire engines were damaged, they were still usable.  The injured workers were 
carried to safety.  Station workers, including the personnel working on the standby liquid control system and laying 
temporary power cables, had to evacuate for an accountability.  The area surrounding Unit 1 was strewn with highly 
radioactive debris, so cleanup required support from radiation protection personnel.   
12-Mar  1627 
Radiation dose rates at the monitoring post reached 101.5 mrem/hr (1,015 µSv/hr), which exceeded the 50 mrem/hr 
(500 µSv/hr) limit specified in Article 15, clause 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency 
Preparedness (abnormal increase in radiation dose at the site boundary).  This was reported to the authorities. 
12-Mar  1720  Workers began inspecting the condition of fire trucks, buildings, and other facilities following the explosion.  
12-Mar  1825  The Prime Minister ordered the population within 12.4 mile (20 km) radius of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Station to evacuate. 
12-Mar  1830 
Field inspections revealed the area around the units was littered with debris, and the equipment that had been 
staged to provide power to the standby liquid control system and hoses staged to inject seawater had been damaged 
and were no longer usable. 
12-Mar  1904  The injection of nonborated seawater into the reactor commenced using the fire engines. 
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12-Mar  2045  Operators commenced injecting water into the reactor through the core spray lines with borated seawater using fire 
engines. 
12-Mar  2045  Workers began adding boron to the seawater being injected into Unit 1. 
14-Mar  0110  All injection to the reactor was stopped because of a low level in the main condenser backwash valve pit.     
19-Mar  --  A cable from a nearby transmission line was connected to the station.   
20-Mar  1546  A 480-volt emergency low-voltage switchboard (power center 2C) was energized using power supplied by a 
temporary line from the Tohoku nuclear station power line.  
23-Mar  --  Reactor injection was changed to the feedwater system because of indications that the core spray injection nozzles 
were clogging from salt accumulation. 
24-Mar  1130  Lighting was restored to the units 1-2 control room . 
25-Mar  1537  Reactor injection was changed from seawater to fresh water. 
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11-Mar  1446  Earthquake causes seismic motion in excess of the reactor protection system scram setpoints.  A level 3 state of 
emergency was automatically declared for the earthquake. 
11-Mar  1447  Automatic reactor scram signal on seismic trip 
11-Mar  1447  The main turbine automatically tripped. 
11-Mar  1447  Emergency diesel generators started and loaded. 
11-Mar  1450  Operators start reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) to control reactor water level and pressure.   
11-Mar  1451  RCIC automatically tripped due to high reactor water level. 
11-Mar  1501  Operators confirmed the reactor was subcritical. 
11-Mar  1502  Operators manually started RCIC. 
11-Mar  1506  The Headquarters for Major Disaster Countermeasures was established in the TEPCO office in Tokyo to assess damages 
from the earthquake and recover from the electric outage in TEPCO's service area.  
11-Mar  1507  Torus cooling was placed in service.   
11-Mar  1525  Torus spray was placed in service.   
11-Mar  1527  The first wave of a series of tsunamis, generated by the earthquake, arrived at the station.  
11-Mar  1528  RCIC automatically tripped on high reactor water level. 
11-Mar  1535  The second tsunami hit the station.   
11-Mar  1539  Operators manually restarted RCIC. 
11-Mar  1541  A loss of all AC power occurs.  
11-Mar  --  Lighting and indications were lost as AC and DC power systems failed.  Control room lighting, including emergency 
lighting, failed, leaving the control room completely dark.   
11-Mar  1542  TEPCO entered its emergency plan because of the loss of all AC power, in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 1 of the 
Nuclear Disaster Law.  Government offices were notified.   The corporate Emergency Response Center was established. 
11-Mar  -- 
Flooding caused a loss of the instrumentation power system, resulting in a major loss of control board instrumentation, 
including reactor water level.  The operating status of RCIC was unknown because of the control board instrumentation 
loss.  
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11-Mar  -- 
Inspections revealed that switchyard breaker damage would prevent off-site power from being restored soon.  Diesel 
generators were not operable and restoration was difficult because either the engines or the associated switchgear were 
submerged.  It was concluded that power restoration using power supply vehicles was necessary. 
11-Mar  -- 
Although high- and low-voltage power supply vehicles headed to Fukushima Daiichi, they were not able to drive to the 
site quickly because of traffic and damaged roads.  TEPCO considered transporting the power supply vehicles using 
helicopters, but the power supply vehicles weighed too much.  TEPCO requested that the Tohoku Electric Power Company 
dispatch power supply vehicles to Fukushima Daiichi. 
11-Mar  -- 
Visual inspections and insulation resistance tests were performed on metal clad switchgear (M/C) and power centers 
(P/Cs) to determine the extent of the damage from the tsunami.  All of the Unit 1 and Unit 3 M/C and P/Cs were 
inoperable.  At Unit 2, all of the M/C and some of the P/Cs at were inoperable.  Later, it was confirmed four of seven P/Cs 
were operable. 
11-Mar  -- 
TEPCO decided to connect a power supply vehicle to the primary side of a Unit 2 power transformer (6.9-kV/480V) to 
provide 480 volts to energize the control rod drive and standby liquid control pumps.  Considering the distance to the P/C 
of Unit 2 and the ability to run cables, the power supply vehicle was driven to the side of the Unit 2 turbine building.  
11-Mar  1636 
TEPCO again entered the emergency plan in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law because 
operators concluded they could not determine reactor water level and the status of injection into the reactor.  The 
government was notified at 1645. 
11-Mar  -- 
Temporary batteries and cables were gathered and carried to the units 1-2 control room.  After confirming the wiring 
layout using drawings, batteries were connected to instrument panels.  The top priority was to verify the status of water 
injection into the RPV, so efforts were focused on connecting batteries to the DC-powered reactor water level indicator.  
11-Mar  1712  The site superintendent directed workers to investigate methods of injecting water into the reactor using the fire 
protection system or fire trucks.  
11-Mar  --  Operators reviewed methods for alternative water injection using the accident management (AMG) procedures and 
confirmed the injection path using the installed fire pump into the RPV via the core spray system. 
11-Mar  -- 
Operators established an alternative water injection flow path via the residual heat removal system by manually opening 
valves in the turbine and reactor building to establish an injection path after the reactor pressure decreased to 100 psi 
(0.69 MPa).  This was done before the reactor was depressurized so the valves would be in the proper position should 
dose rates increase and access become difficult. 
11-Mar  2049  A small portable electric generator was installed, which restored some temporary lighting in the units 1-2 control room. 
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11-Mar  2050  The Fukushima Prefecture ordered evacuation of the population within 1.2 mile (2 km) radius of the station. 
11-Mar  2102 
Operators did not have reactor water level indication in the control room and were unable to verify the injection of water 
into the reactor using RCIC.  The operators notified the government of the potential for water level to lower to the top of 
active fuel (TAF). 
11-Mar  2113  The government was notified that reactor water level was estimated to reach TAF at 2140. 
11-Mar  2123  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of inhabitants within a 1.9 mile (3 km) radius of the station and sheltering for 
those within a 1.9 to 6.2 mile (3 to 10 km) radius. 
11-Mar  2150  Water level indication was restored in the control room; level indicated 134 inches (3,400 mm) above TAF. 
11-Mar  --  Late in the evening of March 11 and into the early morning of March 12, power supply vehicles from Tohoku Electric 
Power Company and TEPCO arrived at the site. 
11-Mar  --  TEPCO's power supply vehicles were given priority for connecting cables. 
11-Mar  2325  Drywell pressure indication was restored, and indicated pressure was 20 psia (0.141 MPa). 
12-Mar  -- 
Operators reviewed valve drawings to determine if they could open the valves required for venting manually, or whether 
they would need to attach some type of actuator to force the valve open.  Based on their reviews of the piping and 
instrumentation diagrams, accident management procedures, and the vent operating procedure, the operators 
developed a method for venting Unit 2.  The motor-operated valve could be opened manually, but the suppression 
chamber air-operated vent valve could not.  The operators prepared a venting procedure and reviewed the locations of 
the vent valves. 
12-Mar  0030  The government confirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) was completed.  
12-Mar  -- 
Wearing breathing protection and boots, workers attempted to verify the condition of RCIC, but field conditions made 
this very difficult.  Work that would normally take approximately 10 minutes required more than one hour to complete.  
At around 0100, operators went to the RCIC room. The room was dark, and the water level in the room came nearly to 
the top of the workers’ boots , so they turned back without getting close enough to check system operation.  However, 
they could hear faint metallic sounds, indicating the system was operating.  Because of the lack of communications 
methods, the workers had to return to the control room to report their findings.  
12-Mar  0130  At approximately 0130, TEPCO officials informed the Prime Minister, Minister of METI, and NISA of their proposal to vent 
the containment.  Concurrence was received from the agencies. 
12-Mar  0145  The government confirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) was completed.  
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12-Mar  0200 
At around 0200, workers made another attempt to verify RCIC operation.  This time, water flooding in the RCIC room had 
increased, and workers could not enter the room.  On this attempt, workers checked reactor pressure and RCIC pump 
discharge pressure on an instrument rack in the reactor building.  RCIC pump discharge pressure was high, so workers 
concluded RCIC was operating.   
12-Mar  0255 
Field workers returned to the control room to report that RCIC was in operation on Unit 2.  The control room operators 
forwarded this information to the Emergency Response Center.  Based on this report, venting of the Unit 1 containment 
was given a higher priority.  The operators proceeded with the lineup to vent Unit 1 and, at the same time, monitored 
parameters on Unit 2. 
12-Mar  0306  A press conference was held to announce plans to vent the PCV.  
12-Mar  0333  An evaluation of the potential off-site exposure from venting was provided to the government.  
12-Mar  0423 
Increasing radiation levels were observed in the area around the main gate.  Dose rates increased from 0.0069 mrem/hr 
(0.069 µSv/hr) at 0400 to 0.059 mrem/hr (0.59 µSv/hr) at 0423.  The government and associated authorities were notified 
at 0455. 
12-Mar 
apx. 
 0500 
Operators in the control room were directed to wear full face masks with charcoal filters and coveralls.  Dose rates in the 
control room increased to the point that Unit 1 operators moved to the Unit 2 side of the control room.  
12-Mar  0544  The Prime Minister ordered evacuation of the population out to 6.2 miles (10 km) from the station. 
12-Mar  0650  The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry ordered venting of units 1 and 2 containment in accordance with the Act on 
Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.  
12-Mar  0711  The Prime Minister arrived at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. 
12-Mar  0804  The Prime Minister departed Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. 
12-Mar  -- 
The cable was more than 4 inches (10 cm) in diameter; about 656 feet (200 meters) long, and weighed more than 1 ton.  
Laying this kind of cable usually takes days using machinery, but 40 TEPCO personnel laid the cable in four to five hours by 
hand.  It was very difficult work because of extremely bad working conditions, such as darkness, flooding from the 
tsunami, debris, and lost manhole covers.  It was challenging to locate cable penetrations in the dark, and some doors 
needed to be destroyed to route the cable.  Earthquake aftershocks and recurring tsunami warnings caused work to be 
interrupted periodically. 
12-Mar  --  Work to connect the cable to the power center was performed by several engineers, and the job took several hours. 
12-Mar  --  The lack of power challenged communications, causing workers to have to walk to communicate, which was very time-
consuming. 
   Unit 2 Validated Event Timeline      INPO 11-005 
85 
Date  Time  Unit 2 Actions 
12-Mar  1530  The primary side of the power cabinet was connected to the temporary cable, completing the lineup for temporary power 
to standby liquid control. 
12-Mar  1536 
An explosion occurred inside the Unit 1 reactor building, resulting in a large amount of flying debris.  The temporary 
cables, generators, and hoses that had been staged for injecting seawater were damaged.  Workers had to evacuate to 
the Emergency Response Center. 
12-Mar  1627 
The radiation dose rate at the monitoring post reached 101.5 mrem/hr (1.015 mSv/hr), which exceeded the 50 mrem/hr 
(500 µSv/hr) limit specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in 
radiation dose at the site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities. 
12-Mar  1730  The site superintendent ordered preparations to begin for venting the containment. 
12-Mar  -- 
RCIC injection continued, and drywell pressure was stable at 29–44 psia (200-300 kPa abs.).  Knowing that venting would 
be required eventually, operators commenced preparations for lining up to vent the Unit 2 and Unit 3 containments.  
Operators planned to manually open the vent valves (other than the rupture disk) because the dose in the field was 
currently low. 
12-Mar  1825  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the population within a 12.4 mile (20 km) radius of Fukushima Daiichi. 
13-Mar  0810 
The shift supervisor, wearing a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and protective equipment, opened the motor-
operated containment vent valve 25 percent in accordance with the procedure.  Containment pressure was 50.8 psia 
(0.35 MPa abs). 
13-Mar  0856 
The dose rate measured 88.2 mrem/hr (882 µSv/h) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0901. 
13-Mar  1015  The site superintendent ordered operators to vent the containment. 
13-Mar  1035  Drywell pressure indicated 1.45 psia (0.010 MPa  abs). 
13-Mar  1100 
Using the small generator installed for the temporary lighting in the control room as a power source, operators opened 
the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve.  The vent lineup was completed, but the rupture disk remained 
intact because drywell pressure remained below the 62 psig (427 kPa gauge) rupture pressure of the disk.   
13-Mar  1120  A press release was made to announce venting the Unit 2 containment.  
13-Mar  1205  The site superintendent ordered preparations for injecting seawater into the reactor.  
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13-Mar  1415 
The dose rate measured 90.5 mrem/hr (905 µSv/h) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 1423. 
13-Mar  1518  The projected off-site dose associated with venting was reported to the authorities. 
14-Mar  0220 
The dose rate measured 75.1 mrem/hr (751 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the site 
boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0424. 
14-Mar  0240 
The dose rate measured 65 mrem/hr (650 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0537. 
14-Mar  0400 
The dose rate measured 82 mrem/hr (820 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0800. 
14-Mar  0912 
The dose rate measured 51.9 mrem/hr (518.7 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) 
limit specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at 
the site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0934. 
14-Mar  1101  The Unit 3 reactor building exploded.   
14-Mar  --  The explosion damaged the fire engine and hoses that had been staged to inject seawater into the reactor.   
14-Mar  --  The explosion knocked the power supply loose from the solenoid for the control air valve to the suppression chamber 
large air-operated vent valve, and the valve closed.  The venting lineup had to be performed again. 
14-Mar  --  After the explosion, all workers except the shift workers in the control room were evacuated to the Emergency Response 
Center.  The status of the work in the field had to be confirmed and resumption of work was delayed. 
14-Mar  1130  Containment pressure was stable around 65.3 psia (450 kPa abs) to 66.7 psia (460 kPa abs), stable below the pressure 
needed to open the rupture disk. 
14-Mar  -- 
Shortly after 1200, a site survey confirmed scattered contaminated rubble and equipment damage caused by the Unit 3 
explosion.  A decision was made to change the water supply and draw a suction directly from the shallow draft quay 
(harbor) instead of the main condenser backwash valve pit of Unit 3, which was now covered with contaminated debris.  
In the high radiation environment surrounded by scattered rubble, personnel prepared a new water injection line by 
using available fire engines and hose pipes. 
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14-Mar  1230 
Operators were concerned about the ability to depressurize the reactor with the suppression chamber saturated.  
Suppression chamber temperature was 301
oF (149.3
oC) and pressure was 70.5 psia (486 kPa abs).  Operators decided to 
vent containment first,  then open a safety relief valve (SRV) and start water injection. 
14-Mar  1305  Workers realigned fire hoses and fire engines in preparation for injecting seawater into the reactor. 
14-Mar  1318  Reactor water level was 94.5 inches (2400 mm) above TAF and trending downward.  The government and other 
authorities were notified of the ongoing preparations to inject seawater. 
14-Mar  1325 
Based on a lowering trend in reactor water level, operators concluded that RCIC may have failed.  TEPCO determined this 
constituted a loss of reactor cooling in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law.  The  
government and associated authorities were notified at 1338.  At the time of the trip, indicated reactor water level was 
approximately 94.5 inches (2,400 mm) above the top of active fuel and drywell pressure was 67 psi (465 kPa).     
14-Mar  1443  A fire engine was connected to the fire protection system. 
14-Mar  --  Between 1500 and 1600, frequent aftershocks made work difficult as workers repeatedly had to take refuge. 
14-Mar  1528  The government and associated authorities were notified that reactor water level was estimated to reach TAF at 1630.   
14-Mar  1600 
Because of delays in opening the suppression chamber vent valve, the priority for reactor depressurization was changed. 
The site superintendent directed that the work to open the suppression chamber vent valve be performed in parallel with 
reactor depressurization. 
14-Mar  -- 
Because of a lack of power, temporary batteries were necessary to open the SRV.  Batteries were gathered from cars,  
carried to the control room, and connected.  However, the voltage was not adequate, so additional batteries were 
scavenged and added.  Operators attempted to operate several SRVs.  Efforts to depressurize the reactor continued until 
around 1800, when depressurization began.  The high suppression chamber temperature and pressure resulted in the 
reactor depressurizing more slowly than desired.   
14-Mar  1600  After receiving permission to recommence work after the explosion, operators continue attempts to open the large 
suppression chamber air-operated vent valve. 
14-Mar  1600  Reactor water level decreased to 12 inches (300 mm) above TAF. 
14-Mar  1620  The large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve could not be opened because of insufficient air pressure from the 
air compressor. 
14-Mar  1620  Indicated reactor water level reached TAF. 
14-Mar  1630  The fire engine was started in preparation for injecting seawater to the reactor. 
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14-Mar  1634  The government and associated authorities were notified that in addition to the start of reactor depressurization, 
seawater injection would commence using the fire protection system.  Reactor pressure was 1,015 psi (6.998 MPa). 
14-Mar  1717  Reactor water level decreased to TAF.  This was reported to the authorities at 1725. 
14-Mar  1800  Reactor pressure was 1,035 psig (7.133 MPa gauge). 
14-Mar 
apx.  
1800  At approximately 1800, operators opened an SRV and began depressurizing the reactor. 
14-Mar  1803  Reactor pressure was 881 psig (6.075 MPa gauge). 
14-Mar  1822  Reactor water level lowered to 146 inches (3,700 mm) below TAF, the bottom of the indicating range, indicating the core 
was completely uncovered.  This was reported to the authorities at 1932. 
14-Mar  -- 
Despite attempts to vent containment, pressure remained stable.  Operators began work to open the small suppression 
chamber air-operated vent valve in addition to the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve to reopen the vent 
path.  However, the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve would not open.  Workers believed the solenoid 
on the control air valve had malfunctioned. 
14-Mar  1903  Reactor pressure stabilizes at approximately 91.4 psig (0.63 MPa gauge). 
14-Mar     The radiation on site was high, forcing workers to make rounds to check the operating status of the fire engines. 
14-Mar  1920  While touring to check the status of the fire engines, workers discovered that an engine had run out of fuel and no 
seawater was being injected into the reactor. 
14-Mar  1954  After a fire engine was refueled and started, seawater injection commenced into the reactor via the fire protection 
system. 
14-Mar  1957  A second fire engine was started to augment seawater injection into the reactor. 
14-Mar 
apx.  
2100 
Operators opened the small suppression chamber air-operated vent valve.  This established the venting lineup except the 
rupture disk.  Containment pressure was lower than the working pressure of the rupture disk at 62 psig (427 kPa gauge), 
so venting did not occur.  The vent valves remained open and operators continued to monitor containment pressure.  
Indicated containment pressure was 60.8 psia (0.419 MPa abs). 
14-Mar  2120  A second SRV was opened, and reactor water level trended up.  This was reported to the government and associated 
authorities at 2134. 
14-Mar  2130  Reactor water level was 118 inches (3,000 mm) below TAF.  
14-Mar  2135 
The dose rate measured by a monitoring car was 76 mrem/hr (760 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 2235. 
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14-Mar  2200  Reactor water level recovered to 63 inches (1,600 mm) below TAF, trending up.   
14-Mar  2250 
Containment pressure increased to 78 psia (0.54 MPa abs), which exceeded the maximum  design pressure of 62 psig (427 
kPa gauge).  This represented an abnormal increase in containment pressure as specified in Article15, paragraph 1 of the 
Nuclear Disaster Law.  This was reported to the authorities at 2339. 
14-Mar  2250 
Reactor pressure increased unexpectedly, accompanied by a drop in reactor water level.  Reactor pressure increased from 
62 psig (0.428 MPa gauge) at 2240 to 264.4 psig (1.823 MPa gauge) at 2250.  At the same times, reactor water level 
lowered from 27.6 inches (700 mm) below TAF to 63 inches (1,600 mm) below TAF. 
14-Mar  2325  Containment pressure increased above 101.5 psia (0.7 MPa abs).   
14-Mar  2330  Reactor pressure again began to drop.  The highest reactor pressure was 456.9 psig (3.15 MPa gauge). 
14-Mar  -- 
Drywell pressure was trending up and reached 101.5 psia (0.7 MPa abs); but in contrast, suppression chamber pressure 
remained stable around 43.5 to 58 psia (300 to 400 kPa abs).  The pressure was not equalizing between the containment 
and the suppression chamber. 
14-Mar  --  Pressure in the suppression chamber was lower than rupture disk pressure and drywell pressure was increasing, so 
operators decided to open the small drywell air-operated vent valve. 
15-Mar  0002 
Operators opened the small drywell air-operated vent valve.  The vent line lineup was completed to vent from the 
drywell, except for the rupture disk, which remained closed.  Containment pressure remained stable at approximately 109 
psia (750 kPa abs).  A few minutes later, operators checked and noted that the small air-operated valve had closed. 
15-Mar  0128  Reactor pressure decreased to 91 psig (0.63 MPa gauge). 
15-Mar  0300  Containment pressure exceeded maximum design pressure, and operators again attempted to vent the containment to 
reduce pressure but were unsuccessful.  This was reported to the government and associated authorities at 0417. 
15-Mar  0600 
At around 0600, a loud noise was heard in the area around the torus.  While suppression chamber pressure dropped to 0 
psia (0 Mpa abs), indicating a potential instrument failure, drywell pressure remained high, indicating 105.9 psia (0.73 
MPa abs).  At that time, reactor water level was 110 inches (2,800 mm) below TAF.   
15-Mar  0650 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 58.4 mrem/hr (583.7 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0700. 
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15-Mar  0700 
The government was notified that all nonessential personnel (650 people) were evacuated to Fukushima Daini, leaving 70 
people at the station.  The shift operators periodically went to the control room to log containment pressure and other 
critical parameters. 
15-Mar  0811 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 80.7 mrem/hr (807 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal emission of radioactive materials 
from a fire or explosion.  This was reported to the authorities at 0836. 
15-Mar  0825  Workers observed steam rising from the area around the fifth floor of the reactor building.  This was reported to the 
authorities at 0918. 
15-Mar  1100  The Prime Minister directed that residents living between 12.4 and 18.6 miles (20 and 30 km) of the station take shelter. 
15-Mar  1125 
Containment pressure decreased from 106 psia (730 kPa abs) at 0720shortly after a loud noise was heard around the 
torusto 22.5 psia (155 kPa abs) at 1125.  No information is available regarding containment pressure between the two 
times. 
15-Mar  1600 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 53.2 mrem/hr (531.6 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 1622. 
15-Mar  2305 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 454.8 mrem/hr (4548 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 2320. 
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11-Mar  1446  An earthquake caused seismic motion in excess of the reactor protection system scram setpoints.  A level 3 state of 
emergency was automatically declared for the earthquake. 
11-Mar  1447  Automatic reactor scram signal on seismic trip 
11-Mar  1447  Operators manually tripped the main turbine.  
11-Mar 
apx. 
1448  Emergency diesel generators started and loaded. 
11-Mar  1451  Operators commenced breaking main condenser vacuum. 
11-Mar  1454  Operators confirmed the reactor was subcritical. 
11-Mar  1505  The operators manually initiated reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC). 
11-Mar  1506  The Headquarters for Major Disaster Countermeasures was established in the TEPCO office in Tokyo to assess damages 
from the earthquake and recover from the electric outage in TEPCO's service area.  
11-Mar  1515  Operators completed breaking main condenser vacuum. 
11-Mar  1525  RCIC tripped on high reactor water level. 
11-Mar  1527  The first wave of a series of tsunamis, generated by the earthquake, arrived at the station.  
11-Mar  1535  The second tsunami hit the station. 
11-Mar  --  Unnecessary DC loads were shed to extend battery life. 
11-Mar  1538  All AC power was lost. 
11-Mar  1542  TEPCO entered its emergency plan because of the loss of all AC power, in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 1 of the 
Nuclear Disaster Law.  Government offices were notified.  The corporate Emergency Response Center was established. 
11-Mar  1603  Operators manually restarted RCIC and prepared HPCI for startup. 
11-Mar  1636  The second emergency level was announced. 
11-Mar  2050  Fukushima Prefecture ordered evacuation of the population within a 1.2 mile (2 km) radius of the station. 
11-Mar  2123  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the population within a 1.9 mile (3 km) radius of the station and sheltering 
for the population within a 1.9 to 6.2 mile (3 km to 10 km) radius of the station. 
11-Mar  2158  A small portable electric generator was installed, which restored some temporary lighting in the units 3-4 control room. 
12-Mar  0030  The government confirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) was completed.  
12-Mar  0145  The government reconfirmed the evacuation of the population within 1.9 miles (3 km) was completed.   
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12-Mar  0423 
Increasing radiation levels were observed in the area around the main gate.  Dose rates increased from 0.0069 mrem/hr 
(0.069 µSv/hr) at 0400 to 0.059 mrem/hr (0.59 µSv/hr) at 0423.  The government and associated authorities were 
notified at 0455. 
12-Mar  0544  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the population out to a 6.2 mile (10 km) radius. 
12-Mar  0711  The Prime Minister arrived. 
12-Mar  0804  The Prime Minister departed. 
12-Mar  1136  RCIC tripped.  
12-Mar  --  Station fire engines were being used to inject water into Unit 1.  Additional fire engines were requested but were not 
available. 
12-Mar  1210  Primary containment pressure had slowly increased, peaking at 57 psia (0.39 MPa abs). 
12-Mar  1235  HPCI automatically started on low reactor water level.   
12-Mar  1730  The site superintendent ordered preparations for venting the containment to proceed. 
12-Mar  -- 
HPCI injection continued.  Knowing that venting would be required eventually, operators commenced preparations for 
lining up to vent the Unit 2 and Unit 3 containments.  Operators planned to manually open the vent valves (other than 
the rupture disk) because the dose in the field was currently low. 
12-Mar  1825  The Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the population within a 12.4 mile (20 km) radius of the station. 
12-Mar  -- 
After 2100, operators started a review of the vent procedures to identify the sequence and location of vent valves, 
which were written on a whiteboard.  Emergency response workers reviewed the vent procedure for Unit 1.  Based on 
that review and the accident management procedure for Unit 3, they developed a procedure to manually vent Unit 3 
and provided it to the control room operators. 
13-Mar  0242  The HPCI system automatically tripped, which resulted in a loss of all water injection sources.  
13-Mar  -- 
Operators attempted to restart water injection by installed equipment but were unsuccessful.  HPCI could not be started 
because the batteries were exhausted.  Operators attempted to start RCIC locally, but it would not start.  They next 
attempted water injection by diesel-driven fire pump but could not because reactor pressure had increased as high as 
approximately 580 psi (4 MPa).  Attempts to restore power to the standby liquid control system were unsuccessful 
because the poor working conditions (darkness, debris, flooding) prevented temporary power installation from being 
completed. 
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13-Mar  -- 
To inject water by fire engines, it was necessary to decrease the reactor pressure by operating SRVs, but no SRVs were 
available because the batteries were depleted.  All of the available batteries had already been used, so workers 
scavenged batteries from  cars and connected them to instrumentation in the control room and used them to power an 
SRV. 
13-Mar 
apx. 
0450 
To open the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve, workers used the small generator that was installed to 
provide temporary lighting in the control room to provide power to the valve solenoid.  An operator checked the valve 
indication locally at the torus room, but the valve indicated closed.  The torus room was very hot and the room was 
completely dark, which made for a difficult working environment. 
13-Mar  0500  Reactor pressure increased to greater than 1,070 psi (7.38 MPa).   
13-Mar  0500  Reactor water level was 79 inches (2000 mm) below TAF and lowering.   
13-Mar  0510  Because the RCIC could not be restarted, TEPCO determined that a loss of reactor cooling had occurred in accordance 
with Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law.  Government offices were notified at 0558. 
13-Mar  0515  The site superintendent instructed operators to complete the lineup for venting the containment. 
13-Mar  0523 
The solenoid for the large suppression chamber air-operated vent valve was energized, but the vent valve remained 
closed.  Operators determined that there was insufficient air pressure to operate the valve.  The operators replaced a 
temporary air bottle that had been installed to provide air pressure, and the valve opened. 
13-Mar  0550  A press release was made to announce venting. 
13-Mar  0619  TEPCO determined reactor water level reached the top of active fuel (TAF) at 0415, and a notification was made to the 
government offices. 
13-Mar  0735  The government offices were notified of the dose expected to be received during venting. 
13-Mar  0739  Containment spray was initiated in the containment using a fire engine.  The government was notified at 0756. 
13-Mar  0745  Reactor water level decreased to 118 inches (3,000 mm) below TAF, reactor pressure was 1,060 psig (7.310 Mpa gauge), 
and primary containment pressure increased to 67 psia (0.46 MPa abs).   
13-Mar  0835  Operators opened the motor-operated containment vent valve 15 percent, as directed by the procedure. 
13-Mar  0841  The operators opened the large air-operated torus vent valve, completing the vent lineup except the rupture disk.  The 
government was notified at 0846. 
13-Mar  0856 
The dose rate measured 88.2 mrem/hr (882 µSv/h) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0901. 
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13-Mar  0908  Workers had scavenged enough batteries to power the SRVs, and the operators opened an SRV to depressurize the 
reactor.  At 0920, the government was notified that water injection would be started through a fire protection line. 
13-Mar  0924  Containment pressure lowered from 92 psia (0.637 MPa abs) at 0910 to 78 psia (0.540 MPa abs).  The Emergency 
Response Center determined that venting had successfully started at about 0920. 
13-Mar  0925  Reactor pressure lowered to 50.8 psig (0.35 MPa gauge), and injection of borated fresh water into the reactor using the 
fire system began. 
13-Mar 
apx. 
0928 
The air cylinder providing air to the large air-operated vent valve was losing pressure.  Workers investigated and found a 
leak on one fitting, which they repaired. 
13-Mar  0936  Operators verified that containment pressure was decreasing and that the injection of water into the reactor had 
started.  The government was notified. 
13-Mar  1030  The site superintendent ordered workers to be ready to commence injection using seawater. 
13-Mar  1117  The air-operated torus vent valve was found closed.  The pressure in the air cylinder being used to provide air was 
decreasing. 
13-Mar  --  Attempts to lock open the valve were not successful because of the extreme adverse conditions in the torus room.  The 
room was dark and hot, and the torus was shaking because of the open SRV. 
13-Mar  1220 
Injection of fresh water was stopped as the water ran out.  Workers had prepared to make a swift change to seawater 
injection, but an aftershock and subsequent evacuation order occurred while the work was being carried out, so the 
swap was delayed.  Work was also ongoing to replenish the fresh water supply. 
13-Mar  1230  Workers replaced the air bottle, and the large air-operated torus vent valve was opened.   
13-Mar  1300  Reactor pressure decreased to 28 psi (0.19 MPa), and reactor water level was approximately 79 inches (2,000 mm) 
below TAF by the lowest indication. 
13-Mar  1312  Workers commenced injecting seawater into the reactor using fire trucks and the fire protection system. 
13-Mar  -- 
Requests for off-site fire engines were made, but it was difficult for those fire engines to reach the plant, because the 
roads were impassable and dose rates on the site were increasing.  When they finally were able to come, it took longer 
for the fire engines to come on station because the drivers needed to be changed to site workers off site. 
13-Mar  -- 
Other sources for seawater were considered, including accumulated water in the basement of the Unit 4 turbine 
building, which was accessed by breaking the entrance shutters of truck bay doors and moving fire engines into place.  
However, this was unsuccessful.  Workers also considered taking water from the discharge channel of Unit 4 or the 
training center pool, but this also did not work. 
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13-Mar  1415 
The dose rate measured 90.5 mrem/hr (905 µSv/h) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 1423. 
13-Mar  1431  Radiation dose rates over 30 rem/hr (300 mSv/hr) were measured at the north side reactor building air lock, with visible 
steam and 10 rem/hr (100 mSv/hr) at the south side air lock. 
13-Mar  1500  Containment pressure began to increase from 11.6 psia (0.08 MPa abs) to 13 psia (0.09 MPa abs). 
13-Mar  1528  The dose rate in the Unit 3 side of the control room reached 1.2 rem/hr (12 mSv/hr), and operators moved to the Unit 4 
side. 
13-Mar  1752  A temporary compressor became available for use.  Workers then began to attach the compressor to the instrument air 
system to keep the suppression chamber air-operated vent valve open. 
13-Mar  2010  A reduction in containment pressure indicated that the suppression chamber air-operated vent valve was open.  Over 
the next five days, losses of air pressure or DC power to the solenoid caused the valve to periodically close. 
14-Mar  0110  Injection into the reactor was stopped because of a low level in the main condenser backwash valve pit being used as a 
water source. 
14-Mar  0200  Containment pressure was trending upward at 38.4 psia (0.265 MPa abs).  Personnel decided to open the small 
suppression chamber air-operated vent valve. 
14-Mar  0220 
The dose rate measured 75.1 mrem/hr (751 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) 
limit specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at 
the site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0424. 
14-Mar  0240 
The dose rate measured 65 mrem/hr (650 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0537. 
14-Mar  0300  Containment pressure increased from 38.4 psia (0.265 MPa abs) at 0200, to 45.7 psia (0.315 MPa abs) at 0300. 
14-Mar  0310  Reactor water level decreased to 91 inches (2,300 mm) below TAF by the lowest indication.     
14-Mar  0320  Workers moved the fire engine around, allowing the hose to drop deeper into the valve pit; and seawater injection into 
the reactor was restored using a fire engine.   
14-Mar  0340  The solenoid valve for the small suppression chamber air-operated valve was energized in an attempt to lower PCV 
pressure.  Containment pressure was approximately 47.9 psia (0.33 MPa abs) and continued to trend up. 
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14-Mar  0400 
The dose rate measured 82 mrem/hr (820 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0800. 
14-Mar  0520  Work began to open the small air-operated valve for the suppression chamber.  By 0530, containment pressure was 56.6 
psia (0.39 MPa abs) and increasing.   
14-Mar  0610  The small air-operated suppression chamber vent valve was confirmed open. 
14-Mar  0610  After confirming that the small suppression chamber air-operated valve was open, the operators could not maintain the 
valve open because of a loss of air pressure and a loss of DC power to the solenoid.   
14-Mar  0912 
The dose rate measured 51.9 mrem/hr (518.7 µSv/hr) at the monitoring post, exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) 
limit specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at 
the site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0934. 
14-Mar  0920  Additional fire engines arrived around sunrise, and workers began using two fire engines that had arrived from off site to 
pump seawater from the shallow draft quay (harbor) into the main condenser backwash valve pit. 
14-Mar  1053  Seven 5-ton Self-Defense Force water supply vehicles arrived at the site and started to supply fresh water to the main 
condenser backwash valve pit. 
14-Mar  1101  The Unit 3 reactor building exploded.  The explosion damaged fire trucks and hoses.  Seawater injection into the reactor 
was lost. 
14-Mar  1101 
All workers except shift personnel in the control room stopped work and evacuated to the Emergency Response Center.  
Four TEPCO employees, 3 contractors, and 4 self-defense personnel were injured (11 total).  The explosion scattered 
highly radioactive debris around the site.  Because of the debris and radiation levels, the backwash valve pit was no 
longer usable as a water source. 
14-Mar  1200  Containment pressure began to increase from 52.2 psia (0.36 MPa abs) to 53.7 psia (0.37 MPa abs). 
14-Mar  1630 
The undamaged fire engine was moved to the shallow draft quay, and a new injection lineup was completed.  Fire 
engines and hoses were rearranged to inject seawater directly from the shallow draft quay into the reactor.  Connecting 
two fire engines in series allowed seawater to supply both units 2 and 3. 
14-Mar  1640  Containment pressure began to lower from 69.6 psia (0.48 MPa abs). 
14-Mar  2230  Containment pressure began to increase from 52.2 psia (0.36 MPa abs), and reactor pressure vessel pressure was 26.1 
psi (0.18 MPa) and increasing. 
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14-Mar  2135 
The dose rate measured by a monitoring car is 76 mrem/hr (760 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 2235. 
15-Mar  0650 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 58.4 mrem/hr (583.7 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 0700. 
15-Mar  0700  Nonessential personnel were temporarily evacuated to Fukushima Daini.  Government offices were informed. 
15-Mar  0755  Steam was observed issuing from the upper part of the reactor building.  Government offices were informed. 
15-Mar  0811 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 80.7 mrem/hr (807 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal emission of radioactive materials 
from a fire or explosion.  This was reported to the authorities at 0836. 
15-Mar  1100  The Prime Minister directed that residents living between 12.4 and 18.6 miles (20 and 30 km) of the station take shelter. 
15-Mar  1600 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 53.2 mrem/hr (531.6 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 1622. 
15-Mar  1600  Workers noted that the suppression chamber vent valve had closed. 
15-Mar  1605  The suppression chamber vent valve was opened. 
15-Mar  2305 
The radiation dose at the main gate was 454.8 mrem/hr (4548 µSv/hr), exceeding the 50 mrem/hr (500 µSv/hr) limit 
specified in Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Disaster Law, indicating an abnormal increase in radiation dose at the 
site boundary.  This was reported to the authorities at 2320. 
16-Mar  0155  The bypass valve for the suppression chamber air-operated vent valve was opened.  
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 